Parham v. Griffin

• Decision Date: 22 January 2015
• Docket Number: No. 11–CV–477 WFK.,11–CV–477 WFK.
• Parties: Charles PARHAM, Petitioner, v. Patrick GRIFFIN, Superintendent, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

86 F.Supp.3d 161

Charles PARHAM, Petitioner

v.Patrick GRIFFIN, Superintendent, Respondent.

No. 11–CV–477 WFK.

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed Jan. 22, 2015.

Charles Parham, Pine City, NY, pro se.

Sholom Joseph Twersky, Kings County District Attorneys Office—Generic, New York State Attorney Generals Office—Generic, New York State Attorney Generals Office, Lori Glachman, Brooklyn, NY, for Respondent.

DECISION AND ORDER

WILLIAM F. KUNTZ, II, District Judge:

Before the Court is a petition for the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Charles Parham (“Petitioner”). Following a jury trial in New York state court, Petitioner was convicted of murder in the second degree. Petitioner's direct appeal of the conviction was denied by the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department (“Second Department”). The New York Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's request for leave to appeal from the Second Department's decision. Now, Petitioner seeks federal habeas relief in this Court on four grounds: (1) that the lower court wrongly denied his Payton, Wade, Dunaway, Mapp , and Huntley applications, (2) that the trial court's denial of Petitioner's request to call a witness on his own behalf violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, (3) that the Petitioner should have been granted a mistrial due to the improper comments made before the jury by a prosecution witness, and (4) that the jury's guilty verdict should have been set aside because the evidence was legally insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. For the reasons below, the Court finds that Petitioner's claims are either without merit or not cognizable under federal habeas review. Accordingly, the petition for the writ of habeas corpus is denied in its entirety.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The District Attorney of Kings County affirms that on September 5, 2001, Petitioner Parham, Keyron Jackson (“Jackson”) and Floyd Taborn (“Taborn”), also known as James Taylor, entered the Brooklyn, New York, residence of Gerald Green. Petitioner, Jackson, and Taborn were each armed with a gun and had planned to steal money and drugs from Green. Petitioner went upstairs in Green's home, where he found two of Green's children and Anita Jones. One of the children fled downstairs to his mother, Beverly Gilliard, crying that Petitioner had a gun. Petitioner then moved the other child and Jones to a bedroom, went into Green's bedroom (where Green's six-year- old daughter had been sleeping, but ran from the room crying after Petitioner's entry), pistol-whipped him in the head, and demanded money and drugs. When Green said that he had none, either Petitioner or Jackson shot Green fatally in the head. Dkt. 7, Response to Order to Show Cause, Affirmation of Sholom J. Twersky (“Twersky Aff.”), ¶ 4. Petitioner was arrested at the home of his sister, Ayisha Parham, on September 9, 2001, after she consented to police entry into her apartment. Dkt. 7, Response to Order to Show Cause, Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Opp.”), 11. Ms. Parham then told the police that, prior to Petitioner's arrest, she had heard from her brother Larry that Petitioner had been involved in Green's murder. Opp., 13.

Petitioner denied involvement in the invasion of Green's home or in the murder of Green, claiming that he was with a woman named Penny at the time. Dkt. 7–2, Brief of Defendant–Appellant submitted to the Second Department (“Brief of Def.-Appel.”), at 13.

Petitioner was charged in Kings County with four counts of murder in the second degree, two counts of burglary in the first degree, one count of burglary in the second degree, two counts of attempted robbery in the first degree, one count of attempted robbery in the second degree, one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. On February 19, 2003, Taborn agreed to cooperate with the Kings County District Attorney's Office and testify against Petitioner, pursuant to an agreement which was later amended on October 15, 2004. Under the cooperation agreement, Taborn would plead guilty to murder in the second degree, attempted robbery in the first degree, and burglary in the first degree. If Taborn fully cooperated and testified in Petitioner's case—and cooperated with North Carolina and Virginia authorities in an unrelated case—Taborn's plea to second-degree murder would be vacated, and he would be sentenced to twelve years in prison for attempted robbery and burglary. If Taborn failed to cooperate fully, his plea to second-degree murder would stand and the prosecutors would recommend a sentence of twenty-five years to life imprisonment. Twersky Aff. at ¶ 8; Brief of Def.-Appel. at 5.

Justice Cheryl Chambers of the Supreme Court of Kings County conducted a combined Dunaway¹ /Payton² / Rodriguez³ /Wade⁴ /Mapp⁵ /Huntley⁶ hearing on May 27, 2003, and on June 21, July 6, and October 18, 2004. Dkt. 11–2, Decision and Order of Justice Cheryl E. Chambers (“Hearing Order”). At this hearing, Ms. Parham testified that she never consented to police entry into her apartment and that she never had, nor told the police that she had, any knowledge prior to Petitioner's arrest that Petitioner was wanted for Green's murder. Hearing Order at 2–3.

With respect to the Dunaway question, Justice Chambers found that the police had probable cause to arrest Petitioner. Hearing Order at 7. Justice Chambers cited People v. Baptiste, 201 A.D.2d 659, 608 N.Y.S.2d 266 (2nd Dep't 1994) in support of her finding that a photographic identification by an eyewitness constitutes probable cause. Justice Chambers further found that there was no Payton violation because the police detectives' testimony at the hearing—stating that Ms. Parham freely consented to police entry into her apartment—was more credible than Ms. Parham's. In support of this determination, Justice Chambers cited Ms. Parham's self-contradiction on the subject of whether or not she recognized the men at her door as police officers, the “implausible” nature of her account of her interview with Detective Timothy Duffy at the precinct, the “evasiveness” of her demeanor on cross-examination, and the “wealth of convincing detail” in Detective Duffy's account of what she told him. Hearing Order at 8.

On the Wade and Rodriguez questions, Justice Chambers found that the police's identification procedures were not unduly suggestive and that Taborn, being Petitioner's cousin and having frequent contact with him, knew him sufficiently well to be “impervious to any police suggestion.” Hearing Order at 8–9. On the Huntley question, Justice Chambers found that Petitioner's statement to the police was voluntary, and on the Mapp question, she found that there was no illegal seizure of physical evidence from Petitioner. Hearing Order at 9.

Petitioner's first trial ended in a mistrial on December 22, 2004 because of a deadlocked jury. Twersky Aff. at ¶ 7. Petitioner's second trial began on April 11, 2005 and ended on April 26, 2005. He was found guilty of second-degree murder under New York Penal Law § 125.25(3) on May 2, 2005 and sentenced, as a persistent violent felony offender, to a term of imprisonment of twenty-five years to life imprisonment on June 9, 2005. Twersky Aff. at ¶¶ 9–11. Petitioner then appealed from his conviction to the Second Department, raising the following claims: (1) that the trial court erred in denying his Payton, Wade, Dunaway, Mapp , and Huntley applications, (2) that Petitioner's right to present a witness on his own behalf was violated, (3) that the trial court erred in denying Petitioner's request for a mistrial in his second trial, (4) that the trial court erred in denying Petitioner's motion to set aside the verdict, and (5) that the sentence of the trial court was excessive. Brief of Def.-Appel. at i, 3.

The Second Department affirmed Petitioner's conviction, holding that Petitioner's arrest was lawful, that the physical evidence seized from Petitioner was admissible, that Petitioner's statement to police was admissible, and that the trial court did not err in excluding Petitioner's witness because the only purpose of the witness's testimony was to impeach a prosecution witness on collateral matters. People v. Parham, 74 A.D.3d 1237, 904 N.Y.S.2d 144 (2nd Dep't 2010). Furthermore, the Second Department concluded that the Petitioner's claims based on Wade and Rodriguez were meritless. Id. at 145–46. On the mistrial question, the Second Department found that a curative instruction regarding improper comments from a prosecution witness was sufficient to protect Petitioner's rights, and that the trial court was correct to deny Petitioner's application for a mistrial on double jeopardy grounds. Id. at 146. The Second Department further found that the Petitioner's motion to set aside the verdict on the grounds that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was unpreserved for appellate review. Id. Nevertheless, the Second Department reviewed the question and found the evidence legally sufficient to establish Petitioner's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Finally, the Second Department found that the sentence was not excessive. Id. at 147.

Judge Jones of the New York Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's request for leave to appeal on November 9, 2010. People v. Parham, 15 N.Y.3d 923, 913 N.Y.S.2d 650, 939 N.E.2d 816 (2010).

On January 28, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Dkt. 1, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”). Petitioner makes four claims in his habeas petition: (1) that the trial court wrongly denied his Payton, Wade, Dunaway, Mapp , and Huntley applications, (2) that the trial court's denial of Petitioner's request to call a witness on his own behalf violated his Sixth...