Pari-Mutuel Clerks' Union of Kentucky, Local 541, SEIU, AFL-CIO v. Kentucky Jockey Club

• Decision Date: 22 April 1977
• Docket Number: AFL-CIO,PARI-MUTUEL
• Citation: 551 S.W.2d 801
• Parties: 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2364 CLERKS' UNION OF KENTUCKY, LOCAL 541, SEIU,, by Andy Mann, President and Larry Wilson, Appellants, v. KENTUCKY JOCKEY CLUB et al., Appellees.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Page 801

551 S.W.2d 801

95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2364

PARI-MUTUEL CLERKS' UNION OF KENTUCKY, LOCAL 541, SEIU, AFL-CIO, by Andy Mann, President and Larry Wilson, Appellants, v. KENTUCKY JOCKEY CLUB et al., Appellees.

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

April 22, 1977.

Rehearing Denied July 1, 1977.

Herbert L. Segal, Irwin H. Cutler, Jr., Segal, Isenberg, Sales & Stewart, Louisville, for appellants.

James U. Smith, Jr., Andrew J. Russell, Smith & Smith, Irwin G. Waterman, Morris, Garlove, Waterman & Johnson, Louisville, for appellees.

CLAYTON, Justice.

In this case we are required to determine whether an employer over which the National Labor Relations Board has declined jurisdiction may lawfully discharge an employe because he has authorized a labor union to represent him for the purpose of collective bargaining, and, if not, what relief a circuit court is authorized to order in his behalf.

Appellant Larry Wilson was employed as an assistant starter at the Latonia Raceway in Florence, Kentucky. Because the NLRB, which normally has jurisdiction over labor disputes, has for some time declined to assert jurisdiction in any proceeding involving the horseracing industry, this action was brought in the Boone Circuit Court. The appellants alleged that on January 18, 1974, a majority of the employes in an appropriate unit at the raceway, the assistant starters, authorized the Pari-Mutuel Clerks' Union of Kentucky, Local 541, Service Employes International Union, AFL-CIO, to represent them for the purpose of collective bargaining, and that on January 21, 1974, a telegram was dispatched so informing the employer and demanding that the union be recognized as the starters' exclusive bargaining agent. It was further alleged that Wilson, as a member of this majority, signed a card granting the union such authority and that on the same day, January 18, 1974, the employer terminated Wilson's employment due solely to his union association, taking from him at this time his racetrack identification card. Appellants claimed these acts to be in violation of KRS 336.130 ¹ and sought injunctive relief and an award of back pay for the time he would have been employed but for his discharge. The court below issued its restraining order on January 23, 1974, enjoining the appellees from unlawfully terminating Wilson's employment, from refusing to reemploy him, and from refusing to return his identification card. Additionally, appellees were restrained from resorting to intimidation, threats and coercion in any form with regard to those employes wishing to associate for the purpose of collective bargaining, and from refusing to recognize and to bargain in good faith with the union. The appellees subsequently moved to dissolve the restraining order and to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This appeal results from a ruling in favor of those motions.

Accepting as true the factual allegations made by the complaint, we have no difficulty in concluding the discharge of appellant Wilson to be within the sphere of activity condemned by KRS 336.130. We can think of few tactics available to an employer seeking to discourage association by its employes for the purpose of collective bargaining which are more coercive or intimidating than the discharge or threatened discharge of those employes pursuing that objective. It thus becomes...