Pari-Mutuel Emp. Guild, Local 280, Bldg. Service Emp. Intern. Union v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc.
| Decision Date | 13 April 1959 |
| Docket Number | PARI-MUTUEL |
| Citation | 169 Cal.App.2d 571,337 P.2d 575 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | , 37 Lab.Cas. P 65,427 Application ofEMPLOYEES' GUILD, LOCAL 280, BUILDING SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, Petitioner and Appellant, v. LOS ANGELES TURF CLUB, INC., Hollywood Turf Club, Operating Company, Del Mar Turf Club, Western Harness Racing Association, Tanforan Company, Ltd., Pacific Turf Club, Inc., California Jackey Club, Inc., Los Alamitos Race Course and California Horse Racing Association, Respondents. Civ. 23563. |
David Sokol, Los Angeles, for appellant.
O'Melveny & Myers, Freston & Files, Los Angeles, Oakes & Horton, San Diego, for respondents.
Petitioner Pari-Mutuel Employees' Guild, Local 280, Building Service Employees International Union, appeals from a judgment entered pursuant to the court's denial of its petition for an order directing arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement between petitioner and Los Angeles Truf Club, Inc., Hollywood Turf Club and several other Turf Clubs operating in this State. The judgment provides that the petition be denied and petitioner recover nothing.
Appellant is a labor union which, for collective bargaining purposes, represents those employees of the respondents who work in the pari-mutuel department. Their duties are to sell pari-mutuel tickets, cash the same, assist in calculating wagering odds and perform related activities. The parties have had a collective bargaining agreement for many years. The one now before us became effective on September 16, 1957, and extends to September 16, 1960.
Certain employees of respondents, members of the union, work in jobs classified as 'Machine Supervisor A' and 'Machine Supervisor B.' Their duties, as set forth in the job descriptions of the bargaining agreement, are to supervise machines, distribute paper to machines and sell tickets on each race.
The collective bargaining agreement describes these jobs as follows:
The rates of daily pay are specified as follows:
"Aug. 1 Aug. 1 Aug. 1
'57 to '58 to '59 to
July July End of
31, '58 31, '59 Cont
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
"Machine Supervisor 29.60 30.60 31.60
A
"Machine Supervisor 27.60 28.60 29.60
B
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Section 1 of Article VI of the agreement says:
Section 6 of Article II says:
Under Article IV the Labor-Management Committee has the duty of reviewing and rendering a decision, within ten days, of all matters submitted to it and its decision is declared to be binding upon the Union, its members, and the employer. In case of disagreement the matter must be submitted to arbitration as provided in Article V. That article contains familiar provisions for processing grievances submitted to arbitration; also the following: 'The arbitrator shall not modify, vary, change, add to, or remove any terms or conditions of this Agreement.'
In November, 1957, appellant Union notified respondents that it felt an undue burden was being imposed on machine supervisors by their assignment to ticket selling windows. The Labor-Management Committee held a meeting to consider the alleged grievance but no decision was reached. Appellant then made a written request for arbitration.
This having failed to eventuate the Union filed its petition for an order directing arbitration which alleges: 'That a dispute between the parties arose over the assignment of machine supervisors to selling windows, and on February 25, 1958 the parties agreed to submit the same to David Ziskind, selected as the arbitrator; a copy of said agreement to so submit is attached as Exhibit 'B' and made a part hereof.' Said proposed agreement, Exhibit 'B' states: 'Now, therefore, it is mutually agreed by the parties that the issue to be submitted to arbitration is as follows: Does the assignment of machine supervisors to selling windows to sell tickets constitute an undue burden on such supervisors?' In response to this allegation of the petition respondents alleged that the parties 'tentatively agreed orally that said dispute could be submitted to David Ziskind, as Arbitrator, provided the parties were unable to settle such dispute by negotiation, and provided further that petitioner could and did present a grievance that was arbitrable under said Agreement.' Also that the purported agreement, Exhibit 'B', 'was withdrawn by respondents before it was accepted by Petitioner.' To this was added: 'And respondents particularly deny that there could be an arbitrable dispute between the parties over the assignment of Machine Supervisors to selling windows as alleged in Paragraph IV of said Petition in that said Collective Bargaining Agreement specifically provides that a Machine Supervisor 'shall be assigned to a selling window each day and sell tickets each race.''
The trial court found that said dispute did arise; that none of respondents was in default under the arbitration provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement; that that agreement specifically provides 'that a Machine Supervisor shall be assigned to a selling window and sell tickets each race'; that Article V, covering arbitration, provides 'that the arbitrator shall mot modify, vary, change, add to or remove any terms or conditions of said Collective Bargaining Agreement'; that the proposed submission agreement attached to the petition as Exhibit 'B' was withdrawn and revoked by respondents before its acceptance by petitioner and before any notice of acceptance was mailed to respondents; that the Collective Bargaining Agreement is the only written agreement between the parties for arbitration of disputes. Among its conclusions of law the court stated: Appellant's counsel construes this to be a ruling 'that there was no arbitrable issue before the Court and that the submission agreement had been withdrawn.' We think this a correct interpretation of the ruling,--that absence of arbitrability is an implied subsidiary finding.
It should be noted at the outset that no undue burden upon any individual machine supervisor is asserted. The claim, raised just two months after the bargaining agreement was consummated, is that assigning machine supervisors to selling tickets was an undue burden upon them as a class. The contract expressly provides that they shall perform such services and that no arbitration shall result in a modification variance, change in, addition to or removal of any terms or conditions of the contract by the arbitrators. The following observations of Texoma Natural Gas Co. v. Oil Workers I. U., etc., D.C., 58 F.Supp. 132, 148, 1 are pertinent: * * *
* * *
* * *
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Posner v. Grunwald-Marx, Inc.
...Cal.App.2d 163, 4 Cal.Rptr. 328; Griggs v. Transocean Air Lines, 176 Cal.App.2d 843, 1 Cal.Rptr. 803; Pari-Mutuel Emp. Guild etc. v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 169 Cal.App.2d 571, 337 P.2d 575; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. United Rubber Workers, 168 Cal.App.2d 444, 335 P.2d 990; Solari v. One......
-
Johnson v. Hydraulic Research & Mfg. Co.
...his own jurisdiction. (See McCarroll v. L.A. County etc. Carpenters, 49 Cal.2d 45, 65--66, 315 P.2d 322; Pari-Mutuel etc. Guild v. L.A. Turf Club, 169 Cal.App.2d 571, 578, 337 P.2d 575; Thornton v. Victor Meat Co., supra, 260 Cal.App.2d 452, 467, fn. 11, 67 Cal.Rptr. 887.) Assuming the vali......
-
Grunwald-Marx, Inc. v. Los Angeles Joint Bd. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America
... ... Clothing Workers of America, called 'Union,' from a judgment awarding money damages to ... Code Civ.Proc. § 1282; Pari-Mutuel, etc., Guild v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 169 ... Local 659, I. A. T. S. E. v. Color Corp. Amer., 47 ... by the acquiescence of the [192 Cal.App.2d 280] other party in such repudiation. This doctrine ... ...
-
Publicists Local 818 of Intern. Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Emp. and Motion Picture Mach. Operators of U.S. and Canada v. National Screen Service Corp.
...the contract has terminated. In this appellants are clearly wrong. As this court said in Pari-Mutuel etc. Guild v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 169 Cal.App.2d 571, at page 578, 337 P.2d 575, at page 579: 'As a general rule, the question of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate and of the sco......