Park and Recreation Bd. of City of Minneapolis v. Carl Bolander & Sons Property

• Decision Date: 28 February 1989
• Docket Number: No. C9-89-25,C9-89-25
• Citation: 436 N.W.2d 481
• Parties: PARK AND RECREATION BOARD OF the CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, in the name of and in behalf of the City of Minneapolis, Petitioner, Respondent, v. CARL BOLANDER & SONS PROPERTY, et al., Appellants, State of Minnesota, et al., Lower Court Respondents.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

Page 481

436 N.W.2d 481

PARK AND RECREATION BOARD OF the CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, in the name of and in behalf of the City of Minneapolis Petitioner, Respondent, v. CARL BOLANDER & SONS PROPERTY, et al., Appellants State of Minnesota, et al., Lower Court Respondents.

No. C9-89-25.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Feb. 28, 1989.

Syllabus by the Court

Appeals in condemnation proceedings may be taken from an order determining the issue of public necessity or from the final judgment. An order denying a motion for new trial is not independently appealable.

Christopher J. Dietzen, Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren, Ltd., Bloomington, for respondent.

Mark E. Miller, Hessian, McKasy & Soderberg, Minneapolis, for appellants.

Considered at Special Term and decided by WOZNIAK, C.J., and HUSPENI and CRIPPEN, JJ., without oral argument.

SPECIAL TERM OPINION

WOZNIAK, Chief Judge.

FACTS

Appellants, Carl Bolander & Sons, et al. (Bolander) owned real estate known as Boom Island, a 24-acre tract next to Nicollet Island near downtown Minneapolis. The city commenced eminent domain proceedings in 1981. By order issued May 4, 1981 the trial court found the city had the power and authority to condemn the property and that Bolander was not entitled to compensation for the going concern value of its business. (Bolander operated a demolition, excavating, and rock crushing operation on Boom Island and argued that maintaining close proximity to downtown gave it a market advantage.) Bolander attempted to appeal the May 4 order, but on July 28, 1981, the supreme court dismissed Bolander's appeal.

Subsequently, a hearing was held before condemnation commissioners, who awarded Bolander compensation for the taking. Bolander appealed the award to district court. After a special verdict, Bolander moved for a new trial. The motion was denied by order dated November 25, 1988.

Bolander filed this appeal seeking review of the November 25, 1988 and May 4, 1981 orders. This court questioned jurisdiction and directed the parties to file informal memoranda regarding the appealability of the orders.

DECISION

Eminent domain proceedings are "special proceedings." Antl v. State, 220 Minn. 129, 133, 19 N.W.2d 77, 79 (1945). The proper appeal in such proceedings is generally from the final decision, order or judgment. See Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 103.03(g); Schiltz v. City of Duluth, 435 N.W.2d 625 (Minn.Ct.App.1989). In special proceedings, a motion for a new trial is not needed to preserve issues for appellate review, and an order denying such a motion is not appealable. Id.; see Knutson v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 406 N.W.2d 560 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (order denying motion for new trial in implied consent proceeding is not appealable). Similarly, an order denying a motion for new trial in a condemnation proceeding is not appealable.

Historically, the proper appeal in eminent domain proceedings has been from the final judgment ¹ of condemnation, not the order approving the petition. See County of Blue Earth v. Stauffenberg, 264 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Minn.1978) (proper appeal from final certificate filed with county recorder after entry of final judgment); State v. Wren, Inc., 275 Minn. 259, 262, 146 N.W.2d 547, 550 (1966) (appeal from final judgment, not order granting condemnation petition); Town of Lebanon v. Land Holding Co., 274 Minn. 558, 559, 143 N.W.2d 60, 61 (1966) (appeal from final judgment, not order).

In 1978, in deciding Stauffenberg, the supreme court recognized the traditional route of appeal, and further provided that:

Henceforth, in a condemnation proceeding where the issue of public necessity has been determined by the district court, an aggrieved party may appeal directly to this court from the district court order.

Stauffenberg, 264 N.W.2d at 650 (emphasis added). After Stauffenberg, appeals in condemnation proceedings are authorized from either the order on public necessity or from the final judgment. On appeal from the final judgment, the parties may obtain review of other interlocutory or intermediate orders pursuant to Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 103.04. See Wren, Inc., 275 Minn. at 262, 146 N.W.2d at550.

In State v. Savage, 255 N.W.2d 32 (Minn.1977), the supreme court noted that the state had untimely appealed several orders denying new trials. The time to appeal from the judgments had not expired, and the court allowed the state to file "appeals from the judgments and [proceeded] to...