Park Row Properties, Ltd./Metropark v. Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training
| Decision Date | 15 November 2013 |
| Docket Number | C.A. PC 2011-5077 |
| Parties | PARK ROW PROPERTIES, LTD./METROPARK v. RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND TRAINING, LABOR STANDARDS DIVISION, through its Director, CHARLES J. FOGARTY; GEORGE KLANIAN; and CARLO ACQUISTO |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
Providence County Superior Court
For Plaintiff: Michael D. Chittick, Esq.
For Defendant: Tedford B. Radway, Esq.; Sonja L. Deyoe, Esq.
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
Park Row Properties, Ltd./Metropark (Appellant or Park Row) challenges a decision by the Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training (DLT or Department), after remand, finding Park Row liable for back wages to George Klanian (Mr. Klanian or Claimant) and Carlo Acquisto (Mr. Acquisto or Claimant) (collectively Claimants). Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L 1956 §§ 25-3-5 and 42-35-15.
The Court originally issued a Decision on November 8, 2012 (hereinafter Superior Court Decision of November 8 2012[1]) on Park Row's administrative appeal of a decision of DLT (hereinafter Original Decision), in which DLT found Park Row liable for back wages to Mr. Klanian and Mr. Acquisto. In that Original Decision, DLT determined that Park Row was responsible for payment of time and one-half pay to Mr. Klanian and Mr. Acquisto for work performed on Sundays by each claimant during the course of their employment, pursuant to §§ 25-3-1 to -11 (hereinafter Statute). DLT also imposed on Park Row an administrative fine for violating the Statute.
Park Row argues that two letters issued by DLT demonstrate that DLT interprets §§ 25-3-2 and 25-3-3 of the Statute as well as certain regulations promulgated by DLT pursuant to the Statute, [2] as exempting employers like Park Row from paying time and one-half for Sunday work (hereinafter Premium Pay Requirement). The letters, authored by a DLT employee (hereinafter Official), were written in response to separate inquiries by parties not before the Court. The letters were attached as exhibits to Park Row's original memorandum in support of its position on appeal. The letters, dated September 9, 2005 and April 30, 2007, are discussed in this Court's Decision of November 8, 2012.[3] In that Decision, this Court remanded the matter to DLT with instructions to provide a clear explanation as to whether or not DLT was repudiating its own previous interpretation of the Statute in the present litigation. Specifically, this Court asked DLT to describe what effect certain legislative amendments enacted in 1998 (hereinafter 1998 Amendments) had on the validity of regulations promulgated under the pre-1998 version of the Statute (hereinafter Old Regulations)[4] and whether this interpretation changed between the dates of the Official's letters and the time of the Superior Court Decision of November 8, 2012. The Court stated that if DLT was, in fact, repudiating its previous interpretation of the Statute and the Old Regulations, DLT was to provide a reasoned analysis for this change in position.
In light of the Court's instructions, DLT issued a written "Decision on Remand" dated November 26, 2012. In the Decision on Remand, DLT repudiated "the legal interpretation" contained in the 2005 and 2007 letters from the Official[5] and repudiated "the policy annunciated by" the Official in that correspondence.[6] DLT ruled that the Official's interpretation of the law had been based on "a mistaken legal interpretation of R.I.G.L. § 25-3-1 et seq. [sic]." [7] DLT found that the statements contained in the Official's letters were made "mistakenly and without legal authority"[8] because the Official mistakenly used an inapplicable regulatory definition to reach a legal conclusion about exemptions to the Premium Pay Requirement.[9] DLT ruled that as a department, DLT is unable to "lawfully perpetuate an erroneous legal interpretation, "[10] and so it determined that the Old Regulations were "valid" but "no longer [had] applicability."[11] DLT compared the Old Regulations to what DLT referred to as the "orphaned" section of the same regulations from another case in this jurisdiction.[12] Moreover, citing United States Supreme Court case law, [13] DLT asserted that it was permitted to change its views when its past position had been "grounded on mistaken legal interpretation."[14]
In a February 11, 2013 "Supplemental Memorandum of Law, " Park Row submitted a response to DLT's Decision on Remand. Park Row argues that DLT changed its position from its own Original Decision by ruling, in the DLT Decision on Remand, that the Old Regulations were "valid."[15] Park Row contends that this position contradicts DLT's position from the Original Decision—that the Old Regulations had been "impliedly repealed." Park Row claims that DLT repudiated the Old Regulations only, for the first time, through the DLT Decision on Remand, issued on November 26, 2012.[16] Park Row claims that DLT's failure to apply the heretofore "valid" Old Regulations to Park Row's circumstances, and instead apply its application of the "new" policy announced in the Decision on Remand, is a "manifest injustice" that requires this Court to reverse.[17] Park Row contends that DLT is retroactively imposing this "new" policy against Park Row without any authority to do so. Park Row also argues that the administrative penalty imposed against Park Row violates Park Row's right to due process and is therefore unconstitutional.[18] Park Row maintains that it reasonably relied on DLT's prior interpretations—including, specifically, the Official's letters from 2005 and 2007—in choosing to not abide by the Premium Pay Requirement, and therefore, even if DLT had adequately explained the reason for changing its policy in its Decision on Remand, DLT's "retroactive" application of the "new" policy and the attendant administrative penalty would be unlawful.[19]
This Court's review on appeal from a decision of an administrative agency is governed by the Rhode Island Administrative Procedures Act, §§ 42-35-1 to -18. See Rossi v. Employees' Retirement Sys. of R.I., 895 A.2d 106, 109 (R.I. 2006). This Court may reverse or modify an agency's decision if:
This Court's review of an agency decision is, in essence, "an extension of the administrative process." R.I. Pub. Telecomms. Auth. v. R.I. State Labor Relations Bd., 650 A.2d 479, 484 (R.I. 1994).
In reviewing an agency decision, this Court "shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." Sec. 42-35-15(g). This Court will defer to an agency's factual determinations so long as they are supported by legally competent evidence. Town of Burrillville v. R.I. State Labor Relations Bd., 921 A.2d 113, 118 (R.I. 2007). Our Supreme Court has defined legally competent evidence as "some or any evidence supporting the agency's findings." Auto Body Ass'n of R.I. v. State of R.I. Dep't of Bus. Regulation, 996 A.2d 91, 95 (R.I. 2010) (citation omitted). "[I]f 'competent evidence exists in the record, [this] Court is required to uphold the agency's conclusions.'" Auto Body Ass'n, 996 A.2d at 95 .
In contrast to its review of findings of facts, this Court reviews agency determinations of law de novo. Arnold v. R.I. Dep't of Labor & Training Bd. of Review, 822 A.2d 164, 167 (R.I. 2003). In general, this Court will accord deference to an agency's interpretation of '"a statute whose administration and enforcement have been entrusted to the agency."' Town of Richmond v. R.I. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 941 A.2d 151, 157 (R.I. 2008) (quoting Murray v. McWalters, 868 A.2d 659, 662 (R.I. 2008)). However, "an agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency's earlier interpretation is 'entitled to considerably less deference' than a consistently held agency view." I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987) (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981)); accord R.I. Hosp. v. Sebelius, 670 F.Supp.2d 148, 155 (D.R.I. 2009). When an agency departs from its prior interpretations without providing a reasoned explanation, the reviewing court may find the agency's action to be arbitrary and capricious. Harrington v. Chao, 280 F.3d 50, 58-59 (1st Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
Park Row advances three arguments through its supplemental memorandum of law. This Court will first analyze the impact of the 1998 Amendments on the Statute and the Old Regulations, and then it will address Park Row's arguments.
First this Court clarifies the impact that the 1998 Amendments had on the validity of the Old Regulations. As a matter of statutory construction, this Court must give a statute's terms "their plain and ordinary meaning unless a contrary intent is clearly shown on the face of the statute." Little v. Conflict of Interest Comm'n, 121 R.I. 232, 237, 397 A.2d 884, 887 (1979) (citing Andreozzi v. D'Antuono, 113 R.I. 155 158, 319 A.2d 16, 18 (1974)). By amending, in 1998 §§ 25-3-2 and 25-3-3 so as to remove all reference to the Sunday work permit requirement (hereinafter Work Permit Requirement), the Legislature plainly and clearly...
To continue reading
Request your trial