Park Utah Consolidated Mines Co. v. Industrial Commission

• Decision Date: 19 October 1934
• Docket Number: 5248
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: PARK UTAH CONSOLIDATED MINES CO. et al. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al

36 P.2d 979

84 Utah 481

PARK UTAH CONSOLIDATED MINES CO. et al. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al

No. 5248

Supreme Court of Utah

October 19, 1934

Original proceeding by the Park Utah Consolidated Mines Company and the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company against the Industrial Commission and others, to review an award in favor of Mrs. Geneva B. Cliff, for the death of her son, Orson Cliff, in a proceeding brought on behalf of herself and Wilson, Gladys, Nellie, and Geneva Cliff, minor brother and sisters of deceased, and Anna Burgener grandmother of deceased.

AWARD AFFIRMED.

Irvine Skeen & Thurman and M. C. Faux, all of Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs.

Geo. P Parker, Attorney General, and E. D. Sorenson, of Salt Lake City, for defendants.

McCONKIE, District Judge. STRAUP, C. J., and ELIAS HANSEN, FOLLAND, and EPHRAIM HANSON, JJ., concur. MOFFAT, J., did not participate.

OPINION

McCONKIE, District Judge.

On June 30, 1929, while regularly employed by the Park Utah Consolidated Mines Company at a wage of $ 38.50 per week of 7 days, Orson Cliff of Heber City, Utah, age 19 years, was accidentally injured by a rock which rolled upon his right leg and which necessitated the amputation of that member, and which, on April 16, 1931, due to resulting complications, caused his death. The accident arose out of or in the course of his employment. The United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company was the insurance carrier of the mining company, and immediately after the accident assumed liability and paid compensation until decedent's death, aggregating $ 1,476.57. Decedent left surviving a widowed mother, Geneva B. Cliff, age 43 years, who petitioned for compensation on behalf of herself, her four minor children, Wilson, Gladys, Nellie and Geneva, aged 16, 14, 11, and 10 years, respectively, and Anna Burgener, petitioner's mother, who was 75 years of age, and who lived with, and depended upon, applicant for support. The sole issue raised both before the commission and here is whether the decedent, at the time of his injury, had any person or persons wholly or partially dependent upon him for support, and, if so, the degree of such dependency. The insurance carrier denies that dependency existed at the time of the accident. This opinion recites facts necessary to an understanding of the case, and considers the objections noted in their order. Before doing so, and to avoid repetition, we repeat and reaffirm a few apothems, the more serious cogitation of which would relieve us of so frequent announcement of principles collated again and again.

Our Compensation Act (Rev. St. 1933, 42-1-1 et seq.) is a beneficent law, passed to protect employees and those dependent upon them; to damnify certain persons because workmen cease to earn wages, House of Lords, New Mockton Collieries, Ltd., v. Keeling, 4 B.W.C.C. 332, and to provide workmen's dependents with something in substitution for what they lost by the workmen's death, Utah-Apex Mining Co. et al. v. Industrial Commission, 64 Utah 221, 228 P. 1078; Woldberg v. Industrial Commission, 74 Utah 309, 279 P. 609. The clear intention of the Legislature was "to substitute a more humanitarian and economical system of compensation for injured workmen or their dependents in case of their death," which the more humane and moral conception of our time requires, Gonzales v. Chino Copper Co., 29 N.M. 228, 222 P. 903, 904. The act affords, through administrative bodies, injured industrial workmen or their dependents simple, adequate, and speedy means of securing compensation, Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 57 Utah 246, 194 P. 122, to the end that the "cost of human wreckage may be taxed against the industry which employs it," Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 58 Utah 314, 199 P. 152, 154, 18 A. L. R. 259; Globe Grain & Milling Co. v. Industrial Commission, 57 Utah 192, 193 P. 642, which tax or burden is added to the price of the produce and is ultimately paid by the consumer, Utah Copper Co. v. Industrial Commission, 57 Utah 118, 193 P. 24, 13 A. L. R. 1367; American Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 55 Utah 483, 187 P. 633, 8 A. L. R. 1342. Thus the Legislature sought to promote the public welfare by relieving society of the support of unfortunate victims of industrial accidents, Reteuna v. Industrial Commission, 55 Utah 258, 185 P. 535; Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. Industrial Commission, 75 Utah 556, 286 P. 959; Industrial Commission v. Agee, 56 Utah 63, 189 P. 414, and to avoid the necessity of the employee's dependents becoming objects of public charity. If there is any doubt "respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should be resolved in favor of the employee or of his dependents as the case may be." Chandler v. Industrial Commission, 55 Utah 213, 184 P. 1020, 1022, 8 A. L. R. 930. The law is predicated on the police power inherent in every sovereignty--the power to legislate and to govern for the best interests of the state. Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 57 Utah 246, 194 P. 122; Honnold, Workmen's Compensation, § 12, P. 58; Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 74 Utah 103, 277 P. 206.

Plaintiff insists:

(1) That the evidence does not support the finding that the decedent, at the time of the injury, was contributing to his mother and to his dependent brother, sisters, and grandmother a monthly sum entitling them to the maximum amount provided by the Industrial Act. Notwithstanding erudite argument, it must yield to the record. The undisputed evidence was that decedent was employed by the mining company for a month at $ 165, or $ 38.50 a week, and that out of the last 2 weeks' pay he contributed at least $ 73 to his dependents, which contribution was for their support. Such contribution justified a maximum award, and was in keeping with the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at the date of the injury, and is consistent with the general provisions of the act.

(2) That the evidence was not sufficient to support a finding of necessity of contribution. It seems daft and unjuristic, certainly malapropos, that this court should be required to repeatedly expostulate with legists about principles so well established, and to so frequently reaffirm that the findings and conclusions of the commission on questions of fact are conclusive and final and are not subject to review, Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 76 Utah 141, 287 P. 931; Heiselt Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 58 Utah 59, 197 P. 589, 15 A. L. R. 799, and that they cannot be disturbed unless it appears as a matter of law that they are contrary to law and contrary to the evidence. We cannot weight conflicting evidence, nor direct which of two or more reasonable inferences ought to be drawn from evidence not in conflict. Tintic Milling Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 261, 207 P. 1114; Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Industrial Commission, 71 Utah 190, 263 P. 746; Parker v. Industrial Commission, 78 Utah 509, 5 P.2d 573; McVicar v. Industrial Commission, 56 Utah 342, 191 P. 1089; Geo. A. Lowe Co. v. Industrial Commission, 56 Utah 519, 190 P. 934; Adams v. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah 157, 246 P. 364; Standard Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah 292, 247 P. 298; Hauser v. Industrial Commission, 77 Utah 419, 296 P. 780; Chief Consolidated Min. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 78 Utah 447, 4 P.2d 1083; Moray v. Industrial Commission, 61 Utah 409, 213 P. 797; Alexander v. Industrial Commission, 61 Utah 430, 213 P. 1078; Combined Metals Reduction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 74 Utah 247, 278 P. 1019; Higley v. Industrial Commission, 75 Utah 361, 285 P. 306; Bain v. Industrial Commission, 58 Utah 370, 199 P. 666. In the determining of facts, the conclusions of the commission are like the verdict of a jury, and will not be interfered with by this court when supported by some substantial evidence. Kavalinakis v. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah 174, 246 P. 698.

A dependent is one who looks to another for support, and the true criterion is whether one has a reasonable expectation of continuing or future support--to receive such contributions as are necessary and needed to maintain him in his accustomed station in life. Hancock v. Industrial Commission, 58 Utah 192, 198 P. 169; McGarry v. Industrial Commission, 63 Utah 81, 222 P. 592; Utah-Apex Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 64 Utah 221, 228 P. 1078. The question of dependency is primarily a question of fact, and the commission's findings upon it must stand if there is any substantial evidence to support them. There is no exact scale or standard to measure the "degree of proof which will suffice to support a particular conclusion of fact." Daly Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah 483, 248 P. 125. The proper course is to look to all the circumstances and to say to what extent, if at all, dependency exists.

By close adherence to correct principles darkened mists are dissipated. Thus with the fundamentals enumerated in mind it becomes apparent that the evidence fully justified the commission's findings upon the question of necessity. At the time of decedent's injury the applicant was convalescing from a prolonged illness of pneumonia, acute laryngitis, and mastoid infection. She was nervous; was unable to control the use of her limbs in walking; and had eye trouble. Her son Wilson wore one artificial eye and suffered impairment of sight in the other. He was unhealthy and illy prepared to render her aid. Various maladies rested heavily upon all the children. Whenever Nellie ate food or drank water or exercised she suffered pain. The grandmother was feeble and indigent. The mother was without financial means sufficient to enable her to consult or employ medical or surgical aid. Although she earned an average...