Utah Copper Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah

• Decision Date: 22 October 1920
• Docket Number: 3474
• Citation: 57 Utah 118,193 P. 24
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: UTAH COPPER CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH et al

193 P. 24

57 Utah 118

UTAH COPPER CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH et al

No. 3474

Supreme Court of Utah

October 22, 1920

Appeal from District Court, Third District, Salt Lake County; P. C Evans, Judge.

Proceedings by Julia C. Rushton for compensation for the death of Louis J. Rushton, the employe, opposed by the Utah Copper Company the employer. Compensation was awarded by the Industrial Commission, the award affirmed by the district court, and the employer appeals.

JUDGMENT UPHOLDING AWARD AFFIRMED.

Dickson Ellis, Lucas & Adamson, of Salt Lake City, for appellant.

Dan B. Shields, Atty. Gen., and James H. Wolfe, Oliver C. Dalby, Herbert Van Dam, Jr., and Delbert M. Draper, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondents.

GIDEON, J. CORFMAN, C. J., and FRICK, WEBER, and THURMAN, JJ., concur.

OPINION

GIDEON, J.

Louis J. Rushton, a resident of Salt Lake county, died on January 2, 1919, as the result of an accidental injury received while in the employ of appellant. He left as his dependents his widow and nine minor children, the oldest being thirteen years of age. He also left one unborn child. The nature of the work and the facts concerning the employment of the deceased will be discussed during the course of this opinion. By so discussing, the application of the facts to the conclusions reached will be more readily understood.

The widow, Julia C. Rushton, in her own right and as guardian of the minor children, petitioned the Industrial Commission for compensation for the death of her husband. The company answered her petition. Subsequently, on May 6, 1919, the commission made an award. An appeal was taken by the company to the district court of Salt Lake county. That court affirmed the award, and the company, by appeal, now brings the entire record to this court for review.

Numerous errors are assigned and relied on by appellant as grounds for a reversal of the award made by the commission. We shall attempt, in the course of the opinion, to review the objections thus made.

It is conceded by appellant that in the light of the authorities the underlying principles of the Workmen's Compensation act (Comp. Laws 1917, sections 3061-3165) do not conflict with any constitutional rights. N.Y. Cent. R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 37 S.Ct. 247, 61 L.Ed. 667, L. R. A. 1917D, 1, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 629; Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 37 S.Ct. 255, 61 L.Ed. 678, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 637; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 37 S.Ct. 260, 61 L.Ed. 685, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 642; Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U.S. 400, 39 S.Ct. 553, 63 L.Ed. 1058, 6 A. L. R. 1537; Reteuna v. Ind. Com., 55 Utah 258, 185 P. 535. It cannot be fairly claimed that the provisions of the act are in conflict with natural justice. The objections against upholding the award in question therefore relate principally to the jurisdiction of the commission over the parties and the subject-matter and the procedure by which it is claimed such jurisdiction was acquired.

It is claimed that in the application or administration of certain provisions of the act in controversy the Constitution of the state has been violated, and that the effect of the award in this proceeding amounts to taking property without due process of law. The question, or questions, therefore, presented for determination must be decided upon whether or not jurisdiction is given the commission under the facts in this particular case, to make any award, and if that be granted whether the commission has followed the procedure prescribed by the act, and whether that procedure in any way conflicts with the state Constitution.

In addition to the claim made that the employment of deceased was such that the commission had no jurisdiction over the case, it is further urged by appellant (and such may be designated the dominant objection) in support of its numerous assignments of error that the award, based as it must be, upon the proceedings leading up to the same, does not relieve appellant from any future liability to the minor heirs of the deceased should it be determined in proceedings instituted by such heirs, or by one representing them, that the death was caused by the negligence of the appellant company.

Counsel for appellant has prefaced his very able and extensive argument by reminding the court that the Industrial Commission is a mere creature of statute, and exercises only ministerial and administrative duties, and has no judicial power; also that the commission does not have exclusive or final authority to determine what matters come within its jurisdiction, and that such is a judicial question, which the courts must finally determine; that for that purpose courts should and will review the evidence and findings to determine the jurisdiction of the commission in any particular case. This court has held that the Industrial Commission is an administrative body, and also that the court will review the record, at least to the extent of determining whether there is any evidence to support the commission's findings. Industrial Com. v. Evans, 52 Utah 394, 174 P. 825; Garfield Smelting Co. v. Industrial Commission, 53 Utah 133, 178 P. 57.

Error is assigned on the alleged ground that the petition filed with the Industrial Commission by the widow and guardian is insufficient to support an award. In other words, it is urged that the petition does not state facts sufficient to entitle petitioner to any relief against appellant. On the other hand, it is contended by the Attorney General that any application that will set the machinery of the commission in motion is sufficient.

Assuming, without so holding, that the commission was without jurisdiction to grant petitioner any relief or to make an award unless the petition contains sufficient facts to support an award, it remains nevertheless, to be determined whether the petition in this case is sufficient to support the award made.

It appears from the application filed with the commission that the deceased, Louis J. Rushton, was killed by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by the appellant, here, defendant in the proceedings before the commission; that the petitioner is the widow of the deceased and the guardian by judicial appointment of his minor children. The daily wage received by the deceased at the time of the injury resulting in death is also stated. The petition contains the names of the minor children and their ages. The widow and minor children are, by the provisions of Comp. Laws Utah 1917, section 3140, presumed to be dependents of the deceased. We have here, then, an application or petition stating the death by accident, the employment by appellant, the daily wage, and the names, ages, and relationship of the dependents. The necessary elements to entitle the appellant to an award, hence the necessary facts to give the commission jurisdiction to make the award, are found in the petition.

We remark that doubtless the blank forms used by the commission could easily be changed so as to include such additional information as would relieve the petition from the criticism made by appellant.

The appellant is what is known as a self-insurer. It is therefore insisted that the commission has no jurisdiction to make an award against it as such self-insurer. It is argued in support of this contention that the commission, being purely an administrative body, has only such power and authority as have been conferred upon it by express grant or as arise by implication as necessary and incidental to the full exercise of the powers expressly granted, and that courts will not, by construction, authorize the exercise of additional powers. It is doubtless true that courts cannot, by construction, legislate and give to the commission powers not granted by the act, but it is equally well settled that the grant of a specific power in furtherance of the purpose of the Legislature, such purpose being apparent from the entire act, will authorize the use and exercise of such incidental powers as are necessary to accomplish the object sought by the legislation.

The recent history of the enactment of the law in question justifies the court in saying that the recognized and known intent of the Legislature was to secure compensation to injured employes, or to their dependents in case of death, whether such injury or death resulted from the negligence of the employer or was purely accidental. Also, it was the intent to secure such compensation without delay and without the expense and annoyance of a suit at law. An administrative body, to wit, the commission, was created primarily to enable injured employes or dependents of such employes when death ensues to obtain such relief without delay, and without having to resort to the uncertainties and expense of litigation.

Comp. Laws Utah 1917, section 3114, provides the method of securing such compensation. Three methods are enumerated: (1) By insuring in the state insurance fund; (2) by insuring in a stock or mutual association authorized to transact the business of workmen's compensation insurance in this state; and (3) by self-insurance upon "furnishing to the commission satisfactory proof of financial ability to pay direct the compensation in the amount and manner and when due as provided for in this title."

By section 3115 the employer insuring in a stock or mutual association is required to file with the commission, in the form prescribed by it, notice of his insurance, together with the contract or policy of insurance. Section 3116 provides that the policy of insurance shall cover the liability of the employer for compensation, whether issued by the commission or by a stock company, and also contain a provision setting forth the right of the employe to...