Park v. Rizzo Ford, Inc.
Decision Date | 24 January 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 2004-264-Appeal.,No. 2004-339-Appeal.,2004-264-Appeal.,2004-339-Appeal. |
Citation | 893 A.2d 216 |
Parties | John M. PARK v. RIZZO FORD, INC. Sandra Mendoza et al. v. Midland Hyundai, Inc. d/b/a Midland Mazda-Hyundai. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Christopher M. Lefebvre, Pawtucket, for Plaintiff.
Giovanni La Terra Bellina, Providence, for Defendant Rizzo.
Barbara Harris, Providence, for Defendant Midland.
Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.
In these two consolidated civil suits, John M. Park as well as Sandra Mendoza and Charles E. Williams (collectively plaintiffs) appeal two Superior Court judgments in favor of Rizzo Ford, Inc. and Midland Hyundai, Inc. d/b/a Midland Mazda-Hyundai (collectively defendants), respectively. The plaintiffs based their causes of action upon a Department of Transportation regulation (DOT regulation) that placed a $20 limit on all "title preparation fee[s]" charged by licensed motor vehicle dealers. On the defendants' motions, the motion justice, after concluding that the DOT regulation no longer was in force at the time the defendants charged the plaintiffs the relevant fees, dismissed the plaintiffs' suits. Although we are troubled by the ineptitude exhibited by the state agencies in this case, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court for the reasons set forth in this opinion.
In 1992, the Rhode Island Department of Transportation (RIDOT) adopted a DOT regulation, which included the following language:
On January 23, 1992, RIDOT filed the DOT regulation with the Secretary of State. Attached was a cover letter, dated January 15, 1992, generally outlining the reasons for the DOT regulation:
There is no evidence that the public was notified of, or given opportunity to comment on, the regulation.
Each of the plaintiffs purchased motor vehicles from his or her respective defendants. The plaintiffs alleged that defendants charged them various fees in contravention of the DOT regulation. They sought actual damages, attorneys' fees, and litigation expenses, as well as declaratory1 and injunctive relief. Finally, plaintiffs moved to certify a class of individuals who were charged any prohibited fees in conjunction with the purchase of a vehicle from defendants within four years of the filing of the action.
The motion justice, after finding that the DOT regulation was an emergency regulation that had expired 120 days after being enacted, granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs now appeal that judgment.
Although defendants originally filed a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, contending that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, the motion justice, citing defendants' reliance on evidence outside the pleadings, properly treated defendants' motion as one for summary judgment. See Rule 12(b) ( ).
"This Court reviews the granting of summary judgment de novo and applies the same standards as the motion justice." DeCamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. 875 A.2d 13, 20 (R.I.2005).
"The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Super. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Relying on express language in the cover letter to the DOT regulations, the motion justice concluded that the regulation in question was enacted as an emergency regulation. The plaintiffs argue on appeal that, because the language evidencing that it was an emergency regulation was not contained in the regulation itself, the trial justice committed reversible error.
General Laws 1956 § 42-35-3, P.L. 1995, ch. 300, § 1, provides, in pertinent part:
Thus, to be given the force of law, all applicable regulations must be enacted pursuant to either the formal adoption procedure outlined in subsection (a) or the emergency adoption procedure outlined in subsection (b).
As authority for the argument that the regulation in question is not an emergency regulation, plaintiffs cite Providence Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 116 R.I. 225, 227, 354 A.2d 413, 414 (1976), in which we noted that a pertinent regulation clearly was labeled an "emergency" regulation, and that it was accompanied by factual findings supporting the need for an emergency regulation.3 The holding in Providence Gas Co., however, does not support plaintiffs' argument. That case does not hold that a regulation must be expressly identified as an emergency regulation; it does not hold that the factual findings must be included in the regulation itself; nor does it hold that statements contained in a cover letter are insufficient to support a conclusion that the attached regulation is an emergency regulation. Thus, we reject plaintiffs' argument that language in a cover letter cannot prove that a regulation was enacted as an emergency regulation.
Our de novo review of the cover letter and the regulation clearly reveals that the DOT regulation was enacted as an emergency regulation. First, the cover letter and the regulation both state that the DOT regulation was enacted pursuant to, among other Rhode Island statutes, § 42-35-3(b) and § 42-35-4(b)(2), which are the very statutes that create the emergency regulation procedure. Second, the cover letter, which reads "[t]he Department of Transportation finds that [there] is imminent peril to the public health, safety and welfare * * *," actually tracks the language of § 42-35-3(b), which reads "[i]f an agency finds that an imminent peril to the public health, safety, or welfare requires adoption of a rule upon less than thirty (30) days' notice * * *." (Emphases added.) Third, the cover letter made the requisite finding of imminent peril: ...
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