Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell

• Decision Date: 07 June 1979
• Citation: 47 N.Y.2d 316,391 N.E.2d 1288,418 N.Y.S.2d 310
• Parties: , 391 N.E.2d 1288 PARK WEST MANAGEMENT CORP., Appellant, v. Arthur MITCHELL et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 310

418 N.Y.S.2d 310

47 N.Y.2d 316, 391 N.E.2d 1288

PARK WEST MANAGEMENT CORP., Appellant, v. Arthur MITCHELL et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 7, 1979.

Eugene J. Morris and Michael J. De Zorett, New York City, for appellant

Kent Karlsson, Brooklyn, for respondents.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. (Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Asst. Atty. Gen., and Shirley Adelson Siegel, Asst. Atty. Gen., of

counsel), in his statutory capacity under section 71 of the Executive Law

Robert Sugerman, New York City, for Ad Hoc Committee to Defend the Warranty of Habitability Law, amicus curiae.

Abraham M. Lindenbaum, Brooklyn, for Rent Stabilization Ass'n of New York City, Inc., amicus curiae.

Louis B. York and Peter M. Wendt, New York City, for Manhattan Legal Services Corporation and another, amici curiae.

Howard Lichtenstein, Marvin Dicker and Abraham Borenstein, New York City, for Realty Advisory Bd. on Labor Relations, Inc., amicus curiae.

Kalman Finkel, John E. Kirklin, New York City, Susan S. Seel, Brooklyn, Morton B. Dicker and Gary R. Connor, New York City, for the Legal Aid Society of New York City, amicus curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURT

COOKE, Chief Judge.

Under the traditional common-law principles governing the landlord-tenant relationship, a lease was regarded as a conveyance of an estate for a specified term and thus as a transfer of real property. Consequently, the duty the law imposed upon the lessor was satisfied when the legal right of possession was delivered to the lessee. The lessor impliedly warranted only the continued quiet enjoyment of the premises by the lessee. This covenant of quiet enjoyment was the only obligation imposed upon the landlord which was interdependent with the lessee's covenant to pay rent. As long as the undisturbed right to possession of the premises remained in the tenant, regardless of the condition of the premises, the duty to pay rent remained unaffected.

Because the common law of leasehold interests developed in rural, agrarian England, the right to possession of the land itself was considered the essential part of the bargain; structures upon the land were deemed incidental. Thus, notwithstanding that the building may have constituted the substantial part of the tenant's consideration for entering into the lease, its destruction did not suspend his duty to pay the entire rent or afford him the right to rescind the lease (see 2 Powell, Real Property, par. 233 Et seq.). Indeed, even if the landlord had expressly covenanted to repair structures on the demised premises, that promise was considered ancillary to the tenant's obligation to pay rent. Hence, the failure of the lessor to perform the obligations imposed by his promise to repair gave the lessee only the right to maintain an action for damages; it did not vest in him a defense to an action grounded upon nonperformance of his covenant to pay rent (1 American Law of Property (Casner ed), § 3.79).

As society slowly moved away from an agrarian economy, the needs and expectations of tenants underwent a marked change. No longer was the right of bare possession the vital part of the parties' bargain. The urban tenant seeks shelter and the services necessarily appurtenant thereto heat, light, water, sanitation and maintenance. Unfortunately, the early attempts of the common law to adapt to the changes encompassed by this societal transition and to mitigate the severity of the rule holding that the tenant's covenant to pay rent was independent of all but the most basic of the landlord's obligations proved less than satisfactory.

The harshness of the common-law rule was mitigated to a degree by decisions holding that performance of a tenant's covenant to pay rent was excused when the premises were destroyed through no fault of his own (e. g., Graves v. Berdan, 26 N.Y. 498, 501). Subsequent judicial holdings' expanded the scope of the landlord's covenant of quiet enjoyment to include a duty to refrain from any act or omission which would render the premises unusable by the tenant (e. g., Tallman v. Murphy, 120 N.Y. 345, 351-352, 24 N.E. 716, 720, 721). Again, however, development of this theory of constructive eviction did not meet the needs of tenants in a society rapidly undergoing urbanization and, as a practical matter, was of no aid in helping them obtain essential services. It simply afforded the tenant the option to abandon the premises and cease paying rent if the failure of services was sufficiently severe. While the constructive eviction principle mollified the rigors of the common law to some extent, it was fraught with uncertainty, for the reasonableness of the tenant's action was subject to the vicissitudes of judicial review in an action by the landlord. If the condition of the dwelling was later determined not to have justified vacation of the premises, the tenant remained liable for unpaid rent. Further, rescission of the lease and abandonment of the premises did not spur landlords into making necessary repairs in locales in which the demand for housing greatly exceeded its supply and compelled tenants living in uninhabitable premises to undergo the expense of locating new premises and moving their belongings. Thus, since the common law imposed no implied service obligations on the landlord, maintenance and other essential services often were never performed, especially in low-income neighborhoods.

These early attempts presaged a distinct trend among courts and legislatures toward characterizing a lease of residential property as a contract containing an implied warranty of habitability interdependent with the covenant to pay rent (e. g., Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis.2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409; Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (DC)). A number of factors mandated departure from the antiquated common-law rules governing the modern landlord-tenant relationship. The modern-day tenant, unlike his medieval counterpart, is primarily interested in shelter and shelter-related services. He is usually not competent to perform maintenance chores, even assuming ability to gain access to the necessary equipment and to areas within the exclusive control of the landlord (see Javins v. First Nat. Realty Corp., 138 U.S.App.D.C. 369, 375-376, 428 F.2d 1071, 1077-1078, cert. den. 400 U.S. 925, 91 S.Ct. 186, 27 L.Ed.2d 185). Since a lease is more akin to a purchase of shelter and services rather than a conveyance of an estate, the law of sales, with its implied warranty of fitness (Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-314) provides a ready analogy that is better suited than the outdated law of property to determine the respective obligations of landlord and tenant (Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal.3d 616, 626-627, 111 Cal.Rptr. 704, 517 P.2d 1168).

The transformation of the nature of the housing market occasioned by rapid urbanization and population growth was further impetus for the change. Well-documented shortages of low- and middle-income housing in many of our urban centers has placed landlords in a vastly superior bargaining position, leaving tenants virtually powerless to compel the performance of essential services. Because there is but a minimal threat of vacancies, the landlord has little incentive to voluntarily make repairs or ensure the performance of essential services (see Boston Housing Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 197-198, 293 N.E.2d 831; Javins v. First Nat. Realty Corp., 138 U.S.App.D.C. 369, 377-379, 428 F.2d 1071, 1079-1081, Supra ). While it is true that many municipalities have enacted housing codes setting minimum safety and sanitation standards, historically those codes could be enforced only by municipal authorities (Davar Holdings v. Cohen, 280 N.Y. 828, 21 N.E.2d 882; but see L.1977, ch. 849, § 13).

In short, until development of the warranty of habitability in residential leases, the contemporary tenant possessed few private remedies and little real power, under either the common law or modern housing codes, to compel his landlord to make necessary repairs or provide essential services. Initially by judicial decision (e. g., Tonetti v. Penati, 48 A.D.2d 25, 367 N.Y.S.2d 804; Jackson v. Rivera, 65 Misc.2d 468, 318 N.Y.S.2d 7; Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc.2d 996, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406; Steinberg v. Carreras, 74 Misc.2d 32, 344 N.Y.S.2d 136) and ultimately by legislative enactment in August, 1975, the obsolete doctrine of the lease as a conveyance of land was discarded. Codifying existing case law, the enactment of section 235-b of the Real Property Law (L.1975, ch. 597, as amd), placed "the tenant in parity legally with the landlord" (1975 Sen.J. 7766-7776 (remarks of Senator Barclay)). A residential lease is now effectively deemed a sale of shelter and services by the landlord who impliedly warrants: first, that the premises are fit for human habitation; second, that the condition of the premises is in accord with the uses reasonably intended by the parties; and, third, that the tenants are not subjected to any conditions endangering or detrimental to their life, health or safety. ¹

Petitioner is the owner of Park West Village, an apartment complex comprised of seven highrise buildings on the Upper West Side of Manhattan. For a 17-day period in May, 1976, petitioner's entire maintenance and janitorial staff did not report to work due to a strike by members of Employees' Union Local 32-B. As a result of the strike, the tenants of Park West Village suffered extensive service interruptions which prompted some of them to withhold rent for the period encompassed by the strike.

Petitioner...