Parker v. Bates

• Decision Date: 18 November 1949
• Docket Number: 16284.
• Parties: PARKER v. BATES, Treasurer, et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

56 S.E.2d 723

216 S.C. 52

PARKER v. BATES, Treasurer, et al.

No. 16284.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

November 18, 1949

Stephen Nettles, Greenville, Benjamin A. Bolt Greenville, for appellant.

Atty Gen. John M. Daniel, Asst. Atty. Gen. T. C. Callison, Asst Atty. Gen. R. Hoke Robinson, R. McC. Figg, Jr., Charleston, O. T. Wallace, Charleston, Edgar A. Brown, Barnwell, for respondents.

STUKES, Justice.

This action was brought in the original jurisdiction, in accord with prior permission, and heard at a special term in September 1949. It embodies attack by a Greenville citizen and taxpayer upon the validity of Act No. 344 of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1949, 46 Stat. 768.

It was entitled, 'An Act to allocate funds to the counties of the State for the construction of health centers, hospitals or for other public purposes; and further relating to the fiscal affairs of the State.' Section 1 appropriated from the general funds of the State, admittedly surplus $2,584,000 to the respective counties at the rate of $40,000 per county plus $6000 for each member of the House of Representatives. It was provided that the appropriations were, quoting, 'for use in: (a) the erection of hospitals and/or health centers and/or for matching grants by the Federal Government for the erection of hospital and/or health centers, (b) for the purpose of paying off existing bonds sold for the erection and/or equipping of hospital and/or health centers. (c) for operation of county hospitals and/or health centers, (d) for purchase of equipment and supplies for hospitals and/or health centers, (e) for hospitalization of indigent citizens, (f) for any other eleemosynary hospitals in said counties whether or not such hospital is a county or municipal owned institution, (g) or in the event any health center or hospital has been erected and/or equipped with county funds, the sums herein provided may be used as reimbursement to such county of costs of such erecting and equipping thereof, and (h) and/or for other public uses.'

Upon passage the Governor vetoed original provisions which gave control of expenditures in the counties to the respective legislative delegations, and these vetoes were sustained. Item (h) above was also vetoed by the Executive but the veto was overridden and it is a part of the law before us. The mechanics of this procedure were followed as outlined in the State Constitution of 1895, Art. IV, sec. 23. The veto power is a part of the legislative process. Doran v. Robertson, 203 S.C. 434, 27 S.E.2d 714.

In the brief of plaintiff the constitutionality of the act is challenged as follows:

I. The provision of the Act permitting the money to be used for privately owned eleemosynary hospitals is invalid because it is a grant of public funds for a sectarian purpose.

II. The provisions of the Act permitting the money to be used 'for other public uses' is invalid because it fails to specify the uses.

III. The hospital and health center provisions of the Act are invalid because they constitute a use of State funds for a county purpose.

Our consideration might well be limited to the foregoing but other relatively minor points arose in oral argument, to which we shall also make brief reference. General observations which are applicable will be first stated and then plaintiff's specifications of alleged unconstitutionality, reproduced above, will be discussed and decided seriatim.

Of primary importance are the long established rules which were concisely set forth in Moseley v. Welch, 209 S.C. 19, 39 S.E.2d 133, 137, as follows: 'We approach the consideration of the various constitutional grounds upon which this legislation is challenged with the following well settled principles in mind: The supreme legislative power of the State is vested in the General Assembly; the provisions of our State Constitution are not a grant but a limitation of legislative power, so that the General Assembly may enact any law not expressly, or by clear implication, prohibited by the State or Federal Constitution; a statute will, if possible, be construed so as to render it valid; every presumption will be made in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment; and a statute will be declared unconstitutional only when its invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of the Constitution. Santee Mills et al. v. Query et al., 122 S.C. 158, 115 S.E. 202; Clarke v. S. C. Public Service Authority et al., 17 S.C. 427, 181 S.E. 481; Ellerbe v. David, County Treasurer, et al., 193 S.C. 332, 8 S.E.2d 518; Pickelsimer v. Pratt, et al., 198 S.C. 225, 17 S.E.2d 524.' This quotation was also approvingly included in the opinion in the very recent decision of Gaud v. Walker, 214 S.C. 451, 53 S.E.2d 316.

Counties are subdivisions of the State, subordinate and subject to legislative control, created and existing with a view to the policy of the State and serving as its agencies. Generally speaking they function as such and as instrumentalities of the State for purposes of political organization and local administration. 14 Am.Jur. 185, 186, 188, Counties, §§ 3, 5. This conception of a county is supported by our decisions and many others which are cited in the footnotes to the text. Chesterfield County v. State Highway Department, 191 S.C. 19, 3 S.E.2d 686, 698, and earlier cases cited in the opinion. There it was said: 'The County is but an agency or arm of the State for governmental purposes, and privileges conferred upon counties and grants to them by the State, such as those here said to exist, are merely for the more convenient performance of the State's governmental functions'. Plaintiff is prone in argument to disregard the true status of a county and to treat it as a sovereignty separate and apart from the State with distinct revenues and purposes, which it is not. 20 C.J.S., Counties, § 1 p. 755. Except for the constitutional provisions relating to counties they are subject to the plenary control of the legislature of the State, even to the extent of abolishment.

'Generally, where a surplus remains after the accomplishment of the purpose for which an appropriation is made, it may be diverted to other causes,' which means 'causes' for which taxes may have originally been levied. 42 Am.Jur. 776, Public Funds, § 80. Annotation, Ann.Cas.1917B, 867. Manifestly there can be no unconstitutional diversion of surplus funds, as there was in the legislation condemned in State ex rel. Edwards v. Osborne, 193 S.C. 158, 7 S.E.2d 526, and in the second suit of the same title, State ex rel. Edwards v. Osborne, 195 S.C. 295, 11 S.E.2d 260. See the tangent case of State ex rel. Brown v. Bates, 198 S.C. 430, 18 S.E.2d 346.

There is no established segregation of tax sources between State and counties. Both may levy ad valorem taxes on property but the State has found it unnecessary to do so in recent years, depending upon excises, income taxes and the like. Likewise the counties may, and do, derive income from licenses of various kinds, road taxes, etc. In impressive amounts the proceeds of numerous levies by the State are in part divided annually among the counties by varying formulae, which proves the inaccuracy of the argument that the counties are confined in the accomplishment of their constitutional purposes to 'county taxes.' The following is from the State appropriation act of 1948, sec. 69, 45 Stat. at page 2178:

'Item 1. Aid to Counties:

Income Tax ........................ $1,875,000.00

Alcoholic Liquors Tax .............. 2,546,000.00

Beer and Wine Tax .................... 378,000.00

Insurance Tax ........................ 475,000.00

Bank Tax ............................. 120,000.00

Motor Vehicle Dealers' Licenses ....... 40,000.00

Gasoline Tax ....................... 3,400,000.00

Game Protection Fund ................. 110,000.00

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Total (Item 1) Aid to Counties ... $8,944,000.00'

Hospitalization and other aid to the sick have constituted approved governmental activities for many generations and this court had recent occasion to expressly declare that expenditures therefor by state and county may be validly made under our constitution. Smith v. Robertson, 210 S.C. 99, 41 S.E.2d 631. Battle v. Willcox,

128 S.C. 500, 122 S.E. 516.

Since hospitalization and other aid to indigent sick is a proper state purpose there is no constitutional or other legal reason why the State could not from its tax funds erect and maintain a hospital in every county, of uniform size and expense. This will hardly be done for the needs vary in the counties on account of their respective populations and available existing hospitals and other health conditions and facilities. However, the consideration demonstrates the validity of the hump sum appropriation of $40,000 per county. The legislature went further, in recognition of the larger needs of the heavier populated counties, and provided $6,000 additional to each county per member of the House of Representatives, and the number of members per county is measured by relative county population. Const., Art. III, sec. 3. This partial uniformity in the distribution among the counties is not embraced in plaintiff's 'questions involved' but it was referred to in oral argument and has been considered without avail to plaintiff. It cannot fairly be said to be arbitrary or capricious.

There is a compelling, practical reason for a uniform starting sum for each county, here $40,000. A health center building, is apt to cost as much to build in a small, poor county as in a comparatively large, rich one; and as much to equip and maintain. Administrative expense is also likely to vary little, compensation of skilled personnel, etc. Health...