Parker v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University

• Decision Date: 14 September 1966
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 65--114
• Citation: 74 Ill.App.2d 467,220 N.E.2d 258
• Parties: Harry V. PARKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY, a Public Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 258

220 N.E.2d 258

74 Ill.App.2d 467

Harry V. PARKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY, a Public Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

Gen. No. 65--114.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

Sept. 14, 1966.

Emerson Baetz, Alton, for appellant.

Donald R. James, Edwardsville, Green & Hoagland, Alton, James K. Almeter, Alton, of counsel, for appellee.

GEORGE J. MORAN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing the plaintiff's complaint in an action brought by Harry Parker to set aside a previous judgment in an eminent domain proceeding, to declare a stipulation made in that proceeding not binding on the plaintiff, and to enjoin the defendant from attempting to enforce the judgment and from entering upon land owned by the plaintiff.

The complaint alleged that Parker was the owner of one parcel of land and the joint owner of another; that an eminent domain suit was filed by the defendant to take a certain amount of land, including both parcels owned by Parker; that a purported stipulation was entered into between the attorney for Parker and the attorneys for the defendant, providing that certain amounts should be paid for certain parcels of land; that, on the same day the paper was executed, the court considered the stipulation and ordered that, upon the payment of the amounts specified in the stipulation, the defendant be vested with title to the property. The complaint then alleged that the stipulation was not lawful because it did not purport to be executed by Parker; it was not authorized by Parker; it did not purport to stipulate as to a fact, but rather to accomplish a sale of real estate; there was no written authority for the execution of the stipulation, as required by the Statute of Frauds; and the court had no jurisdiction to act as a conduit for the sale of real estate.

The complaint also alleged that the judgment of the court was not lawful because it did not contain the provisions required for a judgment following the law of eminent domain, and because it was based on a void stipulation. Parker did not appeal from the prior judgment. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it constituted a collateral attack upon a valid judgment. The court granted the motion and, since Parker declined to plead further, a final judgment was entered.

It is the established law in Illinois that a judgment rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter is not open to impeachment in any collateral action, except for fraud in its procurement; and, even if the judgment is voidable and so illegal or defective that it would be set aside on a proper direct application, it is not subject to collateral attack so long as it stands in force. Walton v. Albers, 380 Ill. 423, 44 N.E.2d 145; Baker v. Brown, 372 Ill. 336, 23 N.E.2d 710; Liberty Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Booth, 403 Ill. 62, 85 N.E.2d 21; Jurek v. Smuczynski, 61 Ill.App.2d 426, 209 N.E.2d 850.

Examining further the requirement of jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court in Ward v. Sampson, 395 Ill. 353, at 361, 70 N.E.2d 324, at 328, held that, '(w)here the court entering a judgment exceeds its jurisdiction and the judgment or decree transcends the statute conferring jurisdiction on the court, the judgment or decree is void, and may be collaterally impeached or set aside on motion after the time for review by appeal has expired.' Oak Park Nat. Bank v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 46 Ill.App.2d 385, 197 N.E.2d 73.

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