Parker v. Brinson Const. Co.

• Decision Date: 25 March 1955
• Citation: 78 So.2d 873
• Parties: Theresa Pharr PARKER, Petitioner, v. BRINSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and Florida Industrial Commission, Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 873

78 So.2d 873

Theresa Pharr PARKER, Petitioner, v. BRINSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and Florida Industrial Commission, Respondents.

Supreme Court of Florida, Special Division A.

March 25, 1955.

Morrice S. Uman, Tampa, for petitioner.

Mabry, Reaves, Carlton, Fields & Ward, Joe L. Sharit, Jr., Tampa, and Rodney Durrance, Tallahassee, for respondents.

DREW, Justice.

This case presents for our determination the question of when interest commences to run, if at all, on payments of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, Chapter 440, F.S.1951, F.S.A.

There is no controlling statute on the subject and this question is one of first impression in this Court. Where the matter has been decided in other jurisdictions having workmen's compensation acts, the answers have been varied. Some of the courts have held that no interest is assessable on deferred payments, Richardson v. National Refining Company, 137 Kan. 473, 21 P.2d 307; other jurisdictions reached the conclusion that interest accrued from the date of the award, Holt v. Spencer Lumber Co., 68 Idaho 478, 199 P.2d 268; and still others that interest commences to accumulate on the principal of the award from the date on which the claim for benefits is filed, Travelers Insurance Co. v. Price, 5 Cir., 111 F.2d 776. In a number of jurisdictions it is held that such interest begins to accumulate from the date when the payments of compensation should have been made by the employer or carrier. Pointe Coupee Electric Membership Corporation v. Pettey, La.App., 6 So.2d 764; J. & B. Mfg. Co. v. Cochran, 216 Miss. 336, 62 So.2d 378; McGee v. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co., 121 Pa.Super. 85, 182 A. 773.

In mentioning the above specific citations, we have merely selected at random cases from various jurisdictions to illustrate the lack of any unanimity or uniformity in the decisions on this subject. There is no clear weight of authority as to any of the rules which we have related but it is clear to us from a careful analysis of the many and varied cases on the subject that the more recent trend of the decisions, and the one which we think is more consonant with the philosophy of workmen's compensation and will eventually be accepted as the correct one, is that the beneficiary of the award is entitled to be paid interest on the award from the date he should have begun receiving it. In Horovitz on Workmen's Compensation (1944), on pages 354, 355, the views of the writer of that well accepted publication on this subject are as follows:

'The more recent trend and the better reasoned opinions add interest from the day the very first installment was due. If an insurer or employer is found to owe a certain amount of back payments, it seems logical that if a court is to enforce the award as to principal, it should do so as to interest; and that interest is due on each weekly installment from the very beginning. Interest owes its very existence to the fact that the principal is unpaid; and if the principal is ordered paid week by week from the very start, there is no adequate reason for denying interest from the same beginning, in the absence of express statutory prohibition of early interest.' (Italics added.)

Interest in the more common acceptation of the term is the cost of hiring money or from the lenders point of view, the return for loaning it. It is compensation paid by a borrower to a lender for the use of the money and ordinarily we speak of interest as arising out of a contractual relation. It is generally considered to be a part of the principal debt itself. In its broadest sense, however, interest is often allowed by way of damages, such interest being defined as moratory interest. This form of interest is that amount of money which is customarily allowed in actions ex contractu and in certain tort actions. 30 Am.Jur., Interest, 6. This Court has long recognized that in actions ex contractu it is proper to allow interest at the legal rate from the date the debt was due. Sullivan v. McMillan, 37 Fla. 134, 19 So. 340, 53 Am.St.Rep. 239; McMillan v. Warren, 59 Fla. 578, 52 So. 825. The fact that there is an honest and bona-fide dispute as to whether the debt is actually due has no bearing on the question. The rule is that if it is finally determined that the debt was due, the person to whom it was due is entitled not only to the payment of the principal of the debt but to interest at the lawful rate from the due date thereof. Sullivan v. McMillan, supra; Everglade Cypress Co. v. Tunnicliffe, 107 Fla. 675, 148 So. 192. In this State interest is not allowed in actions for personal injuries. Farrelly v. Heuacker, 118 Fla. 340, 159 So. 24. In such actions interest accumulates only from the date of the judgment and then by virtue of the applicable statute, Section 55.03, F.S.1951, F.S.A. Skinner v. Ochiltree, 148 Fla. 705, 5 So.2d 605, 140 A.L.R. 410. As to the allowance generally of moratory interest, see 15 Am.Jur., Damages, 583, Section 166 et seq. Our views on this particular phase of the question were summed up recently in Jackson Grain Co. v. Hoskins, Fla. 1954, 75 So.2d 306, 310, as follows:

'In actions growing out of contract and in some actions in tort we have approved the recovery of interest from the time of...