Parker v. Edwards
Decision Date | 30 September 1942 |
Docket Number | 20,24. |
Citation | 21 S.E.2d 876,222 N.C. 75 |
Parties | PARKER v. EDWARDS et al. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
This is an action for libel tried before Williams, J., at May Term, 1942, of Beaufort, based upon a telegram delivered by the defendant Lucy F. Edwards to the defendant Western Union Telegraph Company, and sent by said company from Wilson North Carolina, by way of Richmond, Virginia, to Judge Frizzelle at Washington, North Carolina, where he was holding the Superior Court of Beaufort County, and engaged in the trial of the case of Parker v. Parker, wherein the plaintiff was one and the same person as the plaintiff in this case and the defendant was Cheshire J. Parker, her husband, which telegram read:
The action against the defendant Elizabeth Josephine Parker was dismissed and no appeal taken. The defendant Western Union Telegraph Company appeals from an adverse judgment predicated upon the verdict. The plaintiff Phrocine Latham Parker appeals from that portion of the judgment predicated on the fifth issue addressed to the measure of damage.
H S. Ward, of Washington, for plaintiff Phrocine Latham Parker.
Francis R. Stark, of New York City, and Rodman & Rodman, of Washington, for defendant Western Union Tel. Co.
Appeal of defendant Western Union Telegraph Company.
The defendant telegraph company makes the subject of exceptive assignments of error the refusal of the court to sustain its demurrer to the evidence, and to enter a judgment as in case of nonsuit, under C.S. § 567. These assignments are untenable. The telegram in suit contained written words that amounted to a charge of incontinency against the plaintiff, a woman. C.S. § 2432. The telegram was received and delivered by the company to the addressee, Judge Frizzelle. The defendant company defends upon the ground, inter alia, that in so far as it was concerned the telegram was a privileged communication, and that it was free from malice in transmitting the same to the addressee. The allegations to this effect raised the fourth issue submitted to the jury, to which no objection was made, said issue being:
The court charged the jury in effect that even though the telegram was libelous on its face, the defendant, being a public service corporation, was required by law to transmit it, provided in so doing it acted in a manner free from malice--in other words, that the telegraph company acted under a qualified privilege, the qualification being that the receiving, sending and delivering of the telegram was bona fide in the regular course of its business, and free from ill will or malice, and that the burden of proof of want of good faith or of malice was upon the plaintiff. This was in accord with the authorities.
"A telegraph company is not liable for routine transmission of an...
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