Parker v. Energy Development Co.

• Decision Date: 05 December 1984
• Docket Number: No. 84-55,84-55
• Citation: 691 P.2d 981
• Parties: Bruce PARKER, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CO., an Iowa corporation, Appellee (Defendant).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 981

691 P.2d 981

Bruce PARKER, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CO., an Iowa corporation, Appellee (Defendant).

No. 84-55.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Dec. 5, 1984.

John R. Hursh and Holly Brown of Central Wyoming Law Associates, P.C., Riverton, for appellant.

John A. MacPherson and Catherine MacPherson of Johnson, MacPherson & Noecker, Rawlins, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROSE, Justice.

This appeal comes here for--among other reasons--the resolution of the question which asks whether an employer is immune from "intentional or culpably negligent conduct" ¹ resulting in an employee's injury or death under Wyoming's worker's compensation law.

The facts necessary to a decision on this issue are contained in the appellant's brief. There it is said:

"The Plaintiff, Bruce Parker, was employed by the Defendant, Energy Development Co., as a pumper in the Vanguard No. 2 underground coal mine in Hanna, Wyoming. On or about February 23, 1982, at approximately 2:45 a.m., the Plaintiff was in a crew which was rock dusting a roadway inside the underground mine by spreading ground limestone on the wet roadway to dry the moisture for traction. The roof of the mine caved in while the crew was second-mining a bleeder pillar between numbers one and two left entries. Four hundred tons of rock fell on Virgle Cordell Renfrow, Jr., Steven Olivas, and Bruce Parker. Only Bruce survived."

The complaint alleged culpable negligence and the commission of an intentional tort against the person of Bruce Parker by Energy Development Co., an Iowa corporation which was Bruce Parker's employer and which was contributing to Parker's account in the worker's compensation fund. A motion to dismiss the appellant's amended complaint was filed and granted on the ground that any and all claims by employee Parker against employer Energy Development Co. are foreclosed by Art. 10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution ² and § 27-12-103(a), W.S. 1977. ³

Decision

We will affirm.

This appeal was argued in this court September 11, 1984, just two weeks after the publication of our opinion in Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., Wyo., 687 P.2d 885 (1984). ⁴ At argument, counsel asked that we overrule Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., supra, in which we held that the worker's compensation employer is immune from its employee's action for intentional tort by reason of the language of Art. 10, § 4 and § 27-12-103(a). This we decline to do.

In Wendy's, we reviewed the history of the worker's compensation law and we revisited the compromise between the employer and the employee which resulted in our state's Worker's Compensation Act, § 27-12-101, et seq., W.S. 1977. Through this legislation, the workers gave up their rights of action in common-law tort for injury or death in return for certain designated employer-funded benefits which were payable without regard to any but the worker's culpable negligence.

We pointed out in Baker v. Wendy's of Montana Inc. supra, that, in return for contributing to the compensation fund in behalf of the injured or the heirs of a deceased employee, the parties to the statutory contract agreed that the contributing employer would receive absolute immunity from all common-law rights of action for an employee's injury or death. We called particular attention to the language of the Art. 10, § 4 constitutional provision which said that the right of each employee to compensation from the fund

" * * * shall be in lieu of and shall take the place of any and all rights of action against any employer contributing * * * to such fund in favor of any person or persons by reason of any such injuries or death." (Emphasis added.)

We drew attention to § 27-12-103(a), which called for the same exclusive-remedy trade-off as does Art. 10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution. We said in Baker that these provisions of Constitution and statute mean exactly what they say: i.e., a covered employee may not bring any cause of action whatever against his contributing employer for injury or death under any circumstances. In Baker we said, 687 P.2d at 888-889:

"For all the same reasons that an employer may not avoid paying a compensation claim where the worker is injured through his or her own ordinary negligence, the worker does not have a tort action against the employer when he (or it) is negligent and the worker is covered. This is so because the act creates liability without fault on the part of the contributing employer and likewise provides the employer with absolute immunity from tort actions including the employer's violation of his duty of care whether the negligence is ordinary or culpable. Mauch v. Stanley Structures, Inc, [Wyo.,] 641 P.2d [1247,] 1250 [1982]; Barnette v. Doyle, [Wyo.,] 622 P.2d [1349,] 1352 [1981]. This is to say that immunity is absolute. Mauch v. Stanley Structures, Inc., supra, 641 P.2d at 1252 (Rose, C.J., specially concurring).

"Our various interpretations of § 27-12-103(a), W.S. 1977, reflect the absolute immunity afforded contributing employers under the worker's compensation laws of Wyoming.

" 'It is clear that the language "take the place of any and all rights of action" and "shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies", means just what is said and needs no judicial construction. * * * [A]s a general proposition, the exclusive remedy of the Wyoming workmen's compensation laws is the only remedy available unless the employment was unlawful or illegal.' Jordan v. Delta Drilling Company, Wyo., 541 P.2d 39, 48 (1975).

" 'As to a contributing employer, compensation from the fund was made the sole and exclusive remedy for a covered workman.' Markle v. Williamson, [Wyo.,] 518 P.2d [621,] 625 [1974]."

Compensable Injury--The Test

In Baker, there was an intentional physical work-related assault resulting in emotional injury, and there we held that if such an injury was job-related--i.e., there was a nexus between the injury and some condition of employment--then the injury occurred within the scope and/or course of employment and was compensable. We then said that a compensable injury precludes a cause of action for personal injury or death against the employer. In the case at bar, it is alleged, and for purposes of this opinion only we accept as true the fact, that the plaintiff-appellant received physical work-related injury in consequence of the contributing employer's culpable negligence and/or intentional misconduct. In deciding whether the employer's exclusive-remedy provision was a bar to a common-law intentional-tort cause of action, we said in Baker:

"The single issue for our decision in this appeal is: Was the claimed harm--i.e., assault and battery to the persons of the appellants and intentional infliction of emotional distress--a covered 'injury' within the contemplation of the Worker's Compensation Act? If the appellants' allegations of harm constitute 'injury' as conceived by the Act, and if it was inflicted when the appellants were within the scope of their employment, there cannot be an independent right of action against Wendy's because that company is the contributing employer of the appellants and would therefore be absolutely immune from suit. The test for determining whether the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act operate to prevent actions against covered employers for intentional acts of employees is whether or not the claimed injury would be compensable under the Act.

" 'In determining whether the workmen's compensation statute in general and the exclusivity provision in particular preclude an employee from bringing an action at law against his employer for fraud, defamation, false imprisonment or the like, most courts have inquired whether the injury complained of is one which was compensable under the Compensation Act.' Annot. 46 A.L.R.3d 1279, 1282." (Emphasis added.) 687 P.2d at 889.

It stands without dispute that the appellant in the case at bar was injured while he was in the course or scope of his employment--in fact, he has received worker's compensation benefits. See Cottonwood Steel Corporation v. Hansen, Wyo., 655 P.2d 1227 (1982); Matter of Willey, Wyo., 571 P.2d 248 (1977); In re Jensen, 63 Wyo. 88, 178 P.2d 897 (1947). We pointed out in Wendy's and we point out here that, in order for § 27-12-102(a)(xii), W.S. 1977 ⁵ to be complied with, there need only be a causal connection between the injury and the course of employment. Quoting from a prior opinion, we said:

" ' * * * [T]he injury is compensable if it arises out of and in the course of employment. This requirement emphasizes the need for a causal connection between the injury and the employment. Such a causal connection is supplied when there is a nexus between the injury and some condition, activity, environment or requirement of the employment. Parrott v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 145 Ohio St. 66, 60 N.E.2d 660. See, Standard Oil Co. v. Smith, 56 Wyo. 537, 111 P.2d 132; In re Jensen, supra; Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Workmen's Compensation Department v. Boston, Wyo., 445 P.2d 548. Cf., White Ditching Company v. Giddeon, Wyo., 413 P.2d 45. It is this requirement, and only this requirement, which is envisioned by the language contained in § 27-311(n) [now § 27-12-102(a)(xii), W.S. 1977].' (Emphasis added.) In re Willey, supra, 571 P.2d at 250, quoted in Cottonwood Steel Corporation v. Hansen, supra, 655 P.2d at 1232-1233." 687 P.2d at 892.

There can be no doubt but that the facts of the case at bar meet the nexus test of Willey, supra.

In affirming the trial court on this issue, we hold, then, that where the employee's injury occurs in a work-related situation, as it did here, and is in all other respects compensable, as it is here, the employer of the injured or deceased employee who is contributing to the compensation fund in behalf of the worker's account is absolutely immune from all common-law tort remedies arising...