Parker v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.
| Decision Date | 12 June 1944 |
| Docket Number | 15656. |
| Parties | PARKER v. GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Heyward Brockinton and Nelson, Mullins & Grier, all of Columbia for appellant.
C T. Graydon, T. P. Taylor, and F. Ehrlich Thomson, all of Columbia, for respondent.
Respondent Jack Parker, brought this action against appellant, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, to recover actual and punitive damages on account of an alleged conversion by appellant of a Chevrolet automobile. At appropriate stages of the trial appellant duly made motions for a nonsuit and a directed verdict. Both motions were refused by the trial Judge and the case was submitted to the jury, resulting in a verdict favorable to respondent for both actual and punitive damages. The sole question raised is whether the trial Judge erred in refusing these motions.
On October 7, 1940, respondent purchased from the J & OK Chevrolet Company of Columbia, South Carolina, by whom he was employed as a mechanic, a 1936 used Chevrolet sedan automobile for $464.40. (The cash price was $367, the difference between this and the time price representing insurance and "carrying charges"). Respondent paid the sum of $78 at the time of the sale and to secure the deferred balance of $386.40, executed, along with his wife, a conditional sale contract. On the same day the seller sold and assigned this contract to appellant. The contract is somewhat ambiguous as to whether the deferred balance was to be paid in weekly or monthly installments. Both appellant and respondent construed the contract in the pleadings as payable in certain monthly installments. Adopting their construction, the contract provided for monthly installments at the rate of $35 per month for the first two months and thereafter at the rate of $22.60 per month, payable on the 21st day of each month, commencing November, 1940. The contract contained a stipulation that the purchaser "shall not transfer any interest in this contract or said property." It also empowered the holder to take immediate possession of the automobile upon default by the purchaser in complying with any of the terms of the contract. Appellant repossessed the automobile on June 23, 1941, contending that respondent had defaulted in the payment of one installment and had disposed of the automobile contrary to the above provision. Respondent denied that he was in default in paying the installments, contending there was an agreement whereby all monthly payments were advanced one month, and denied that he had disposed of the car. Under the well settled rule, the evidence bearing on these contentions must be considered in the light most favorable to respondent.
Prior to June, 1941, all collections on the contract were handled by the employees of the Chevrolet Company, who treated the contract as calling for weekly installments and collected from respondent on that basis. The collections so made were remitted by the Chevrolet Company to appellant. The weekly payments were made in irregular amounts, but it appears that any deficiency in a weekly installment was made up in subsequent payments. It further appears that it became necessary to make some repairs on the car and respondent testified that in April or May, 1941, while his installments were not in arrears, he discussed this with a Mr. Arant, who was credit manager of the Chevrolet Company, stating that he was unable to make the necessary repairs and keep the installments on the contract current, and as a result, it was agreed between them that the monthly payments were to be advanced one month. Arant, who was a witness for appellant, admitted that he told respondent that he could "skip" a weekly payment, but denied giving permission to "skip" a monthly payment, stating that he was without authority to grant such permission without payment of an extension charge. It was Arant's recollection that this incident occurred in December, 1940.
The first contact or communication which respondent had with any admitted agent or representative of appellant was on Saturday morning, June 21, 1941. According to respondent's testimony, a Mr. Clark, representing appellant, called on him at that time claiming that he was in arrears on the payment due May 21, 1941. He said that he advised Clark of the extension agreement he had with Arant, under which the May 21st installment was due that day and the June 21st installment would not become due until July 21, 1941, and Clark stated that this arrangement made with Arant was satisfactory. Respondent further testified that he told Clark that he had not been "paid off yet" and to come back that afternoon; that Clark did not come back, but called at his home on the next day, Sunday, when he was away. Respondent's next conversation with Clark was on the following Monday morning and it is undisputed that on this occasion he paid to Clark the sum of $22.60. It further appears that about this time, or shortly prior thereto, respondent had some negotiations with a Mr. Cook whereby respondent was to sell the Chevrolet car to Cook in consideration of the payment of $50, the assumption by Cook of the unpaid installments due to appellant, and delivery by Cook of a 1934 Plymouth automobile. According to the testimony of respondent and Cook, these negotiations had not assumed final form because of the necessity of ascertaining whether appellant would be agreeable to this transfer. Because of these negotiations, respondent testified that after he paid Clark the sum of $22.60, both he and Clark went to see Cook. Cook was busy at the time and requested the parties to take the matter up further late that afternoon.
A further conference was had between respondent, Cook and Clark about six o'clock that Monday afternoon. Cook testified that at this conference he advised Clark that he would like to go through with the trade; that Clark stated that he would have to pay a transfer fee of $10 before the transfer could be made; and that he told Clark he did not have the money with him and would bring it the next morning, but Clark said that he could not wait. On this occasion the car was taken by Clark. According to respondent's testimony, when the negotiations for the sale of the car to Cook resulted unsuccessfully, Clark wanted to take the car. He says he protested, reminding Clark that under the extension agreement he was not in default, but Clark ignored his protests and took the car.
Clark's testimony as to what transpired at these conferences contradicts in many particulars that of Cook and respondent. He denied ratifying any extension agreement which respondent had with Arant, but said that respondent asked him for an extension, to which he replied that if respondent paid the installment due May 21st, appellant would consider extending it, but he could not grant the extension without the approval of appellant's office. According to his contention, the May 21st installment was past due and the next installment was due that day. Clark admitted that respondent told him on Saturday morning that he could not make a payment until that evening, and said that at the request of respondent, he called at respondent's home on Sunday morning; that respondent was not at home; and that he talked to respondent's wife, who advised him that respondent had traded the car to Cook. He further testified that in the conversation on Monday morning, he advised respondent of his information that the car had been disposed of to Cook and respondent replied that he had traded with Cook, but had not had time to make the transfer. At the suggestion of respondent, both went to see Cook who was busy and all agreed to meet late that afternoon. Clark further testified that at the conference of the three late Monday afternoon, he informed Cook that in order to transfer the car, it would be necessary for Cook to pay the June 21st installment and a transfer fee of $10; that Cook said he was unable to do this; that he then offered to store the car for a reasonable length of time to afford Cook an opportunity of raising the necessary funds; that Cook was unwilling to do this and advised him that the car was Parker's; and that he thereupon made demand on respondent for the outstanding balance, which respondent said he was unable to pay. According to Clark's version, respondent then consented for him to take the car upon his giving respondent permission to remove the spotlight. Upon being asked whether he seized the car on account of the...
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