Parker v. Johnson, CA 04-677.
| Decision Date | 02 March 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. CA 04-677.,CA 04-677. |
| Citation | 204 S.W.3d 586 |
| Parties | Sherry PARKER and Sherry Crow, Appellants v. Raymond JOHNSON and Loree Johnson, Appellees. |
| Court | Arkansas Court of Appeals |
Streetman, Meeks & McMillan, by: Denise D. McMillan, Crossett, for appellants.
Vickery & Carroll, P.A., by: Ian W. Vickery, El Dorado, for appellees.
This appeal arose out of a declaratory-judgment action brought to determine whether certain real property was subject to judgment liens arising from judgments obtained by appellants against Tiffany Johnson. The trial court, reasoning that voluntary payment of the mortgage by a subsequent purchaser at a judicial sale had the effect of extinguishing the liens because this action was "no different than a foreclosure proceeding," granted summary judgment in favor of appellees. On appeal, appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment, and in ordering that appellants' judgment liens be set aside as to the real property. We agree, and we reverse and remand.
The relationship of the parties is fairly complex. Judgments were obtained separately by each of the appellants against Tiffany Johnson, and these judgments were recorded on July 1 and 24, 2002. Shortly thereafter, on July 30, 2002, Tiffany Johnson was divorced from Robert Johnson. Upon entry of the final decree of divorce, certain residential real property owned jointly by Tiffany and Robert Johnson during their marriage was converted by operation of law from an estate by the entireties to a tenancy in common pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 9-12-317 (Repl. 2002), and the judgment liens attached to Tiffany Johnson's undivided one-half interest. The property subsequently was sold in a court-ordered partition sale conducted pursuant to a property-settlement agreement that had been approved by the court and incorporated into the divorce decree. The purchaser at the partition sale was the Johnson family corporation, in which appellees Raymond and Loree Johnson are principals. The corporation then voluntarily paid the mortgage debt and sold the property to unrelated parties, the Smiths, who had knowledge of the judgment liens. Appellees brought the present declaratory-judgment action to clear title to the property pursuant to an indemnity agreement with the Smiths.
On appeal, appellants argue that the trial judge erred in ruling that the retirement of the mortgage indebtedness by the Johnson family corporation following the public sale extinguished appellants' judgment liens. We agree. In his order setting aside the judgment liens, the trial judge correctly noted that the mortgage indebtedness predated the judgment liens and had priority over them. He erred, however, in ruling that the voluntary payment of the mortgage indebtedness by the family corporation terminated the judgment liens because this "was no different from a foreclosure proceeding."
It is true that "[a] judgment lien attaches only to the judgment debtor's interest in the land, and, if that interest be subject to any infirmity or condition by reason of which it is...
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Parker v. Johnson
...judgment liens, and reversed and remanded the trial court's grant of summary judgment on that basis. See Parker v. Johnson, 90 Ark.App. 161, 204 S.W.3d 586 (2005). On remand, the trial court conducted a hearing and found that the evidence was insufficient to show a waiver or abandonment of ......
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Parker v. Johnson
...that the judgment liens attached, but that the voluntary payment of the mortgages did not extinguish the liens. Parker v. Johnson, 90 Ark.App. 161, 204 S.W.3d 586 (2005). A trial was held on July 22, 2005, at which the Appellants argued that the homestead issue was barred by res judicata. O......