Parker v. King
| Decision Date | 19 January 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 40792,40792 |
| Citation | 108 So.2d 224,235 Miss. 80 |
| Parties | Rosa Lee PARKER v. Byron KING. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Russell & Little, Magee, Crisler, Crisler & Bowling, Jackson, for appellant.
J. B. Sykes, J. W. Walker, Mendenhall, for appellee.
On December 22, 1956 Rosa Lee Parker, the appellant, was the owner of a one-fourth undivided interest in the minerals and mineral rights in and upon a designated twenty-acre tract of land located in Simpson County, Mississippi. On the stated date she executed a transfer and conveyance of such minerals and mineral rights to Byron King by an instrument entitled Mineral Right and Royalty Transfer. On December 24, 1956 Byron King executed the same kind of conveyance to James B. Sykes and J. W. Walker for a consideration of $1,500.
Rosa Lee Parker filed a bill in this cause against King, Walker, Sykes and one Gaydon Drew. She alleged that King, through his agent Drew, obtained the said mineral deed from her to King by means of false and fraudulent representations and promises, and that Sykes and Walker, when they purchased from King, were aware of the fraud which had been practiced upon her, or, if Sykes and Walker did not have personal knowledge of such fraud, the circumstances were such as to charge them with notice of it.
King, in his pleading, denied all fraud in the procurement of said deed. He admitted, however, that Drew was his agent in obtaining the conveyance. He admitted he had agreed to pay $500 for the minerals, which had not been done, and he tendered that sum into court.
Sykes and Walker denied they were aware of any wrong which had been practiced on Rosa in the procurement of the deed to King, and denied that the circumstances were such as to charge them with notice of any such wrong. No process was had upon Drew. He made no appearance in the cause either by plea or as a witness.
The chancellor found and decreed that Walker and Sykes had done no wrong and that the circumstances were not such as to charge them with notice or knowledge of any wrong on the part of Drew as the agent of King. Walker and Sykes averred that they were innocent purchasers and they were vested with good title to the minerals under their deed from King.
The chancellor did not specifically adjudicate as to the title of King, but since he found that Walker and Sykes had a good title, he necessarily found he could not set aside the conveyance from Rosa Lee Parker to King. He gave a personal decree against King in favor of Rosa Lee Parker in the sum of $500, with interest thereon at six per centum per annum from December 22, 1956, the date of the deed, to the date of the decree.
King departed this life on November 30, 1957 and his administrator has been duly summoned and is a party to this...
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...their chain of title had actual knowledge of a prior deed. Simmons v. Dantzler, 152 Miss. 428, 118 So. 829 (1928); Parker v. King, 235 Miss. 80, 108 So.2d 224, 226 (1959). But even though Wheless's knowledge of the Daws Deed is not imputed to the appellants, the fact that Wheless is not a b......
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...it is subject to the intervening rights of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the fraud. See Parker v. King, 235 Miss. 80, 108 So.2d 224, 226 (1959) (fraudulently induced execution of a mineral deed is voidable); see also Guice v. Burrage, 156 F.2d 304, 306 (5th Cir. 1946); L......
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...i.e., it is subject to the intervening rights of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the fraud. See Parker v. King, 235 Miss. 80, 108 So.2d 224, 226 (1959) (fraudulently induced execution of a mineral deed is voidable); see also Guice v. Burrage, 156 F.2d 304, 306 (5th Cir.194......