Parker v. Republican Co.
Decision Date | 22 May 1902 |
Citation | 181 Mass. 392,63 N.E. 931 |
Parties | PARKER v. REPUBLICAN CO. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Wm. B. Sprout and Wm.
R Bigelow, for plaintiff.
J. E Cotter, J. B. Carroll, and W. H. McClintock, for defendant.
The plaintiff was a physician residing in West Springfield at the time of the alleged publications, and practiced in the city of Holyoke. At the trial the defendant's evidence tended to prove the truth of the matter set forth in said publications, including the truth of the charge that the plaintiff had assaulted the wife of Amenzo Griffith while he was operating upon her, and while she was under the influence of a drug. The plaintiff's evidence tended to contradict all the foregoing evidence offered by the defendant. It appeared from a certified copy of the record of the police court of Holyoke that on January 6, 1896, after the alleged assault, Wallace A. Parker made a complaint against Amenzo Griffith, of Springfield, in the county of Hampden, that said Griffith 'with force and arms did threaten the said Wallace A. Parker to commit an assault on him, the said W. A. Parker, and that said W. A. Parker had reason to be afraid and is afraid that the said Amenzo Griffith will do him, the said Wallace A., great bodily harm and mischief; wherefore he prays sureties of the peace and good behavior against the said Amenzo Griffith,' etc. It further appeared by said record that said Griffith gave bail for $300 to appear on January 7, 1896, at 9 a. m., and did appear on January 7, 1896, and pleaded not guilty, and that the case was thereupon continued to January 8, 1896, at 9 o'clock. It further appeared that on January 8, 1896, It further appeared that said Griffith thereupon furnished sureties and was released. It also appeared that the plaintiff had brought an action in tort against Griffith for charging him with having assaulted his wife.
BARKER, J. (after stating the facts).
1. The publications of January 7th and 9th were admitted at the trial to have been made by the defendant, and it is not contended that the language was not defamatory. The defenses of the truth of the charges and that the plaintiff authorized and consented to the publication of January 7th raised questions of fact upon which the evidence was conflicting and which were for the jury. The remaining defense of privilege, that the publications were fair reports of judicial proceedings, was also for the jury. If we should assume that the complaint and warrant of January 6th were a judicial proceeding within the meaning of the law of privileged communications, whether the publication of January 7th, relating to that complaint, and the publication of January 9th, relating to the trial upon it, were fair reports of...
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