Parker v. Rich

Decision Date30 March 1937
Citation297 Mass. 111,8 N.E.2d 345
PartiesHERMAN W. PARKER v. MAURICE E. RICH, administrator.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

February 2, 3 1937.

Present: RUGG, C.

J., PIERCE, FIELD DONAHUE, & LUMMUS, JJ.

Practice, Civil Commencement of action. Executor and Administrator Limitation of actions. Words, "Commenced."

An action is not "commenced" within the long established meaning of that word and its meaning in G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 197, Section 9, as amended by

St. 1933, c.

221, Section 4, by the mere filling out of a writ without attempt at service upon the defendant.

Seasonable filing in the registry of probate of the notice specified in G. L.

(Ter. Ed.) c. 197, Section 9, as amended by St. 1933, c. 221, Section 4, is ineffectual to prevent the barring of an action against an administrator not "commenced," within the long established meaning of that word, before the expiration of a year from his giving bond.

CONTRACT. Writ in the Municipal Court of the city of Boston dated December 19, 1935.

The action was heard by Brackett, J., who found for the plaintiff in the sum of $412.37. A report was ordered dismissed by the Appellate Division. The defendant appealed.

C. S. Walkup, Jr., for the defendant. E. R. Greenhood, for the plaintiff.

RUGG, C. J. This is an action of contract to recover charges for services rendered to the defendant's intestate with respect to the funeral of his wife. The case was submitted on these agreed facts: On December 21, 1934, the defendant was appointed administrator of the estate of the deceased and gave bond as required by law; on December 19, 1935, the writ in the present case was made out; on December 20, 1935, a notice was filed in the registry of probate under St. 1933, c. 221 Section 4, setting forth the pendency of this action in the Municipal Court of the City of Boston and stating the name of the estate, the name and address of the plaintiff and the amount of the claim; the writ was not turned over to an officer for service but was entered in court on its return day, which was January 4, 1936. The defendant pleaded the short statute of limitations among the defences. The trial judge ruled that it was immaterial in a technical sense whether this action was actually commenced within one year after the approval of the bond of the administrator, found that the action was not barred by the statute of limitations, and found for the plaintiff. There appears to be no dispute as to the amount of the debt due the plaintiff, provided he is entitled to recover. The parties have filed in this court a stipulation to the effect that, as a result of a motion filed on February 6, 1936, an order of personal notice to the defendant issued out of the Municipal Court of the City of Boston, which was served in hand upon the defendant, and that the latter duly appeared and answered. The facts thus stipulated are confirmed by the docket entries.

The question to be decided is whether the defendant as administrator can avail himself of the short statute of limitations. The pertinent words of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 197, Section 9, as amended by St. 1933, c. 221, Section 4, the governing statute applicable to the facts here disclosed, are these: "an executor or administrator shall not be held to answer to an action by a creditor of the deceased which is not commenced within one year from the time of this giving bond for the performance of his trust, or to such an action which is commenced but not entered within said year unless before the expiration thereof the writ in such action has been served by delivery in hand upon such executor or administrator or service thereof accepted by him or a notice stating the name of the estate, the name and address of the creditor, the amount of the claim and the court in which the action has been brought has been filed in the proper registry of probate."

The Judicial Council in its sixth report, page 21, recommended the enactment of legislation to protect from personal responsibility executors and administrators who had made distribution of assets of estates in their hands "for the payment of claims of which they have had no notice which have been kept alive by actions begun just before the end of the year but which are not returnable until after the assets of the estates have been distributed." Doubtless, as a result of this recommendation, St. 1931. c. 417, Section 1 was enacted, which was amended by St. 1933, c. 221, Section 4, already quoted. The word "commenced," in this latter section, as applied to actions at law in connection with...

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2 cases
  • Parker v. Rich
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • April 1, 1937
  • Ott v. Comeau
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • March 30, 1937

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