Parker v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 13 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 8:10-CV-1576-T-27TGW |
| Parties | RAMON LAWRENCE PARKER, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Ramon Lawrence Parker ("Petitioner"), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, initiated this action for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("petition") (Dkt. 1). Upon consideration of the petition, the Court ordered Respondent to show cause why the relief sought in the petition should not be granted (Dkt. 6). Respondent filed a response to the petition in compliance with this Court's instructions and with the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (Dkt. 10). Petitioner filed a reply to the response (Dkt. 15).
Petitioner raises two claims for relief in his petition. Petitioner alleges: (1) the trial court violated his rights under "the Confrontation and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution" by refusing to allow the defense to impeach the victims during cross-examination with prior false accusations of sexual abuse; and (2) counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately oppose the State's motion in limine to exclude evidence that two of the three victims had previously made false allegations of sexual molestation against Parker and/or other individuals (Dkt. 1 at docket pp. 5-14).
Petitioner was charged by Supersedes Information with four counts of lewd and lascivious act on a child and three counts of sexual battery on a child less than twelve years old (Resp. Ex. 41, Vol. I at record pp. 20-26).1 Petitioner proceeded to a jury trial. On August 8, 2000, Petitioner was found guilty of one count of sexual battery and three counts of lewd and lascivious act on a child (Id. at record pp. 58-59).2 Petitioner was sentenced to fifteen-year prison terms on the three lewd and lascivious act counts which were to run concurrent with each other and to the life imprisonment term imposed on the sexual battery count (Id. at record pp. 64-73). The appellate court affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentences (Resp. Ex. 5); see Parker v. State, 808 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) [table].
Petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion for post conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 ("3.850 motion"), raising four grounds (Resp. Ex. 7). Following an evidentiary hearing (Resp. Ex. 8), the state post conviction court denied the 3.850 motion (Resp. Ex. 9). The appellate court determined that trial counsel's performance was deficient in that she was wholly unprepared for the hearing on the State's motion in limine requesting the exclusion of any testimony or evidence regarding any previous allegations of abuse made by any of the alleged victims (Resp. Ex. 15). The appellate court therefore remanded the case to the post conviction court for an additional evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Petitioner was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance (Id.).
Following the second evidentiary hearing (Resp. Ex. 17),3 the state post conviction court found that Petitioner failed to establish prejudice by counsel's deficient performance, and denied the remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claim (Resp. Ex. 20). The appellate court, however, determined that the post conviction court erred during the second evidentiary hearing in preventing Petitioner from presenting witness testimony regarding the child victims' prior accusations and recantations, reversed the post conviction court's order denying the 3.850 motion, and remanded the case for another evidentiary hearing (Resp. Ex. 27).
After the third evidentiary hearing (Resp. Ex. 29), the state post conviction court denied Petitioner's 3.850 motion (Resp. Ex. 32). In denying the motion, the state post conviction court concluded that Petitioner "could not have properly impeached the victims with any prior false accusations. . .and even if [Petitioner] could have introduced the prior accusations, the outcome would not have been different." (Id. at order p. 19). The appellate court per curiam affirmed the order denying the 3.850 motion (Resp. Ex. 39)
Thereafter, Petitioner filed the instant petition seeking federal habeas corpus relief (Dkt. 1).
Pursuant to the AEDPA, federal habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court's summary rejection of a claim, even without explanation, qualifies as an adjudication on the merits which warrants deference. Ferguson v. Culliver, 527 F.3d 1144, 1146 (11th Cir. 2008).
"Clearly established federal law" consists of the governing legal principles, rather than the dicta, set forth in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court at the time the state court issues its decision. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). A decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court either: (1) applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law; or (2) reached a different result from the Supreme Court when faced with materially indistinguishable facts. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003).
A state court decision involves an "unreasonable application" of the Supreme Court's precedents if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle, but applies it to the facts of the petitioner's case in an objectively unreasonable manner, Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 134 (2005); Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 531 (11th Cir. 2000) or, "if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Bottoson, 234 F.3d at 531 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 406). The unreasonable application inquiry "requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous." Rather, it must be "objectively unreasonable." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-77 (2003) (citation omitted); Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 17-18; Ward, 592 F.3d at 1155.
Finally, the Supreme Court has clarified that: "a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (dictum). When reviewing a claim under § 2254(d), a federal court must bear in mind that any "determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct," and the petitioner bears "the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see e.g. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340 ().
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court established a two-part test for determining whether a convicted person is entitled to relief on the ground that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance: (1) whether counsel's performance was deficient and fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) whether the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Therefore, a habeas court's review of a claim under the Strickland standard is "doubly deferential." Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 113 (2009) (citing Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5-6 (2003))). Because both parts of the Strickland test must be satisfied in order to demonstrate a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a district court need not address the performance prong if the petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong, or vice versa. Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000).
The focus of inquiry under the performance prong is "reasonableness under prevailingprofessional norms" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89. A court must adhere to a strong presumption that "counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The petitioner bears the burden to "prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that counsel's performance was unreasonable." Jones v. Campbell, 436 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006). A court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct," applying a highly deferential level of judicial scrutiny. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987)).
As to the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard, Petitioner's burden of demonstrating prejudice is high. Wellington v. Moore, 314 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2002). Prej...
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