Parker v. Shecut, No. 25444.

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
Writing for the CourtPLEICONES, Justice
Citation562 S.E.2d 620,349 S.C. 226
PartiesAnne S. PARKER, Petitioner, v. Winfield W. SHECUT and Marion A. Shecut, III, Defendants, of whom Marion A. Shecut, III, is Respondent.
Decision Date15 April 2002
Docket NumberNo. 25444.

349 S.C. 226
562 S.E.2d 620

Anne S. PARKER, Petitioner,
v.
Winfield W. SHECUT and Marion A. Shecut, III, Defendants, of whom Marion A. Shecut, III, is Respondent

No. 25444.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard January 10, 2002.

Decided April 15, 2002.


349 S.C. 227
William O. Pressley, Jr., of Perrin, Perrin, Mann & Patterson, LLP, of Spartanburg, for petitioner

A.F. Carter, III, of Carter Law Firm P.A., of Orangeburg, for respondent.

PLEICONES, Justice:

We granted certiorari to consider the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the Master in Equity's determination that Respondent Marion A. Shecut, III, ("Bo") did not oust his cotenant, Petitioner Anne S. Parker ("Anne"), from their jointly-owned beach house. Parker v. Shecut, 340 S.C. 460, 531 S.E.2d 546 (Ct.App.2000). We reverse and remand.

FACTS

In October 1992 Mary Shecut died, leaving her estate of approximately $1.3 million dollars to her three children, Anne, Bo, and Defendant Winfield W. Shecut ("Win"). Mary's will named Bo and Win executors of the estate. On April 6, 1993, Anne, Bo, and Win executed a written agreement ("private agreement") delineating how the substantial real property inherited from their mother would be divided. Under the private agreement, Win received the bulk of the family's farm

349 S.C. 228
property adjacent to his own residence, while Anne and Bo received, as tenants in common, some farmland, a beach house at Edisto Island (which is at the heart of the issue on appeal), and a number of commercial properties in Orangeburg County. Anne and Bo agreed to manage their properties together, and each deposited $3,000.00 in a banking account under the name Shecut Investments. The two apparently did not execute a partnership agreement or otherwise reduce their management agreement to writing

Correspondence in the record suggests problems with the property arrangement between Anne and Bo began by early 1994. On February 15, 1994, Anne wrote Bo a letter offering to sever the co-tenancy in some of their joint property, with each receiving sole ownership of a portion. She complained that some of the property was not "being utilized equally between us."

Despite Anne's complaints, she and Bo maintained the beach house as a rental property through 1995. Anne presented evidence that the beach house generated the following gross rents between 1993 and 1995:

YEAR GROSS RECEIPTS 1993 $ 8,497.00 1994 $18,181.00 1995 $19,841.00

According to Bo, however, after taxes, insurances and other expenses, the beach house generated only $229.00 in income in 1995. Bo included this amount on his income taxes for 1995. He testified that he claimed no income for the years 1993 and 1994. A real estate appraiser, called by Anne, testified that the Edisto Island beach house was a break-even rental property. The appraiser added that the best use for the house, that is the most profitable use, was to sell it.

During the years the beach house was rented, Anne took one-half of its depreciation on her income tax returns. In 1995, Anne amended the agreement with Edisto Realty, the real estate company managing the beach house property, and had all rental checks mailed directly to her home in Atlanta.1 Upon receipt of the rental checks, Anne endorsed them over

349 S.C. 229
to the attorney for the mother's estate. According to Bo, during the year Anne received rental checks, taxes and other expenses on the property were not paid, and Edisto Realty had to pay some of the expenses on the beach house. Bo also testified that he retrieved a check for about $4,000.00 from Edisto Realty in June 1995 and kept the check

In January 1996 Bo, without consulting Anne, made the beach house his primary residence, and ceased renting the house. Anne testified that Bo told her in March 1996 that she was not welcome to use the beach house. He also told her he changed...

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13 practice notes
  • Garrison v. Target Corp., Appellate Case No. 2017-000267
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • January 15, 2020
    ...absolute or a new trial nisi. See Parker v. Shecut , 340 S.C. 460, 480, 531 S.E.2d 546, 557 (Ct. App. 2000), rev'd on other grounds , 349 S.C. 226, 562 S.E.2d 620 (2002) ("When an order is internally inconsistent, that inconsistency must be raised to the trial court by way of a post-trial m......
  • Moore v. Weinberg, No. 4209.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • February 20, 2007
    ...but does not extinguish it, is not a novation. Parker v. Shecut, 340 S.C. 460, 531 S.E.2d 546 (Ct.App.2000), rev'd on other grounds 349 S.C. 226, 562 S.E.2d 620 (2002). In order to effectuate a novation by the substitution of a new obligation, both contracting parties must consent that the ......
  • Arnal v. Arnal, No. 3943.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • February 7, 2005
    ...distinguished from judicial, in nature. Parker v. Shecut, 340 S.C. 460, 497, 531 S.E.2d 546, 566 (Ct.App.2000), rev'd on other grounds by 349 S.C. 226, 562 S.E.2d 620 Husband has failed to present any evidence of bias by the family court judge. It is not sufficient for Husband to assert bia......
  • Shirey v. Bishop, Appellate Case No. 2017-001678
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • April 22, 2020
    ...App. 2000) ("Affirmative defenses, such as the statute of frauds, must be set forth in a responsive pleading."), rev'd on other grounds , 349 S.C. 226, 562 S.E.2d 620 (2002). Here, neither appellant pleaded the statute of frauds in their answers to Shirey's amended complaint, nor did Bishop......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
13 cases
  • Garrison v. Target Corp., Appellate Case No. 2017-000267
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • January 15, 2020
    ...absolute or a new trial nisi. See Parker v. Shecut , 340 S.C. 460, 480, 531 S.E.2d 546, 557 (Ct. App. 2000), rev'd on other grounds , 349 S.C. 226, 562 S.E.2d 620 (2002) ("When an order is internally inconsistent, that inconsistency must be raised to the trial court by way of a post-trial m......
  • Moore v. Weinberg, No. 4209.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • February 20, 2007
    ...but does not extinguish it, is not a novation. Parker v. Shecut, 340 S.C. 460, 531 S.E.2d 546 (Ct.App.2000), rev'd on other grounds 349 S.C. 226, 562 S.E.2d 620 (2002). In order to effectuate a novation by the substitution of a new obligation, both contracting parties must consent that the ......
  • Arnal v. Arnal, No. 3943.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • February 7, 2005
    ...distinguished from judicial, in nature. Parker v. Shecut, 340 S.C. 460, 497, 531 S.E.2d 546, 566 (Ct.App.2000), rev'd on other grounds by 349 S.C. 226, 562 S.E.2d 620 Husband has failed to present any evidence of bias by the family court judge. It is not sufficient for Husband to assert bia......
  • Shirey v. Bishop, Appellate Case No. 2017-001678
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • April 22, 2020
    ...App. 2000) ("Affirmative defenses, such as the statute of frauds, must be set forth in a responsive pleading."), rev'd on other grounds , 349 S.C. 226, 562 S.E.2d 620 (2002). Here, neither appellant pleaded the statute of frauds in their answers to Shirey's amended complaint, nor did Bishop......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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