Parker v. Side by Side, Inc.
| Decision Date | 27 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 12 CV 7204,12 CV 7204 |
| Citation | 50 F.Supp.3d 988 |
| Parties | Joseph Parker, Plaintiff, v. Side by Side, Inc., an Illinois corporation d/b/a “Sidetrack,” Arthur Johnston, William Stadt, James Kays, and David Oakes, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Stephen Falk Boulton, Boulton & Associates, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.
Alex Breland, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Scott M. Gilbert, Polsinelli, PC, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
Plaintiff Joseph Parker brings this action against his former employer, Defendant Sideby–Side, Inc. d/b/a Sidetrack (“Sidetrack”), and four former coworkers (the “Individual Defendants”). Plaintiff asserts claims against Sidetrack for sexual harassment, religious harassment, and retaliation under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Plaintiff also asserts a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) against Sidetrack and the Individual Defendants. Before the Court are Defendants' motions for summary judgment. (See R. 46, 52, 54, 57, 60.)
For the following reasons, the Court grants Sidetrack's motion for summary judgment (R. 46) with respect to Plaintiff's sexual harassment, retaliation, and IIED claims, but denies it with respect to Plaintiff's religious harassment claim. In addition, the Court grants the Individual Defendants' motions for summary judgment on Plaintiff's IIED claims. (R. 52, 54, 57, 60.)
Local Rule 56.1 “is designed, in part, to aid the district court, ‘which does not have the advantage of the parties' familiarity with the record and often cannot afford to spend the time combing the record to locate the relevant information,’ in determining whether a trial is necessary.” Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir.2011) (citation omitted). Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires the moving party to provide “a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue.” Cracco v. Vitran Exp., Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir.2009). The nonmoving party then must file “a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon.” Id. (citing N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(B) ). The nonmoving party also must present a separate statement of additional facts, if any, that it contends require the denial of summary judgment. See Ciomber v. Cooperative Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 643–44 (7th Cir.2008) (citing N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(C) ).
In general, the aim of Local Rule 56.1 statements and responses is to identify the relevant admissible evidence supporting the material facts, not to make factual or legal arguments. See Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir.2006) (). The rule makes the summary judgment process less burdensome on district courts by requiring the parties to nail down the relevant facts and the way they propose to support or refute them. Sojka v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 686 F.3d 394, 398 (7th Cir.2012). “When a responding party's statement fails to dispute the facts set forth in the moving party's statement in the manner dictated by the rule, those facts are deemed admitted for purposes of the motion.” Cracco, 559 F.3d at 632. In sum, “[f]or litigants appearing in the Northern District of Illinois, the Rule 56.1 statement is a critical, and required, component of a litigant's response to a motion for summary judgment.” Sojka, 686 F.3d at 398.
Here, Plaintiff responded to Sidetrack's and Arthur Johnston's joint Local Rule 56.1(a) statement of material facts, but he did not respond to Defendants William Stadt's, James Kays', or David Oakes' separate Local Rule 56.1(a) statements. Stadt, Kays, and Oakes argue that, as a result, the Court should deem admitted the facts set forth in their Local Rule 56.1(a) statements. (See R. 78, Indiv. Defs. Reply Br. at 1.) Many of the facts presented in their Local Rule 56.1(a) statements, however, mirror the facts provided in Sidetrack's and Johnston's joint Local Rule 56.1(a) statement. For any overlapping facts, the Court has deemed Plaintiff's responses to Sidetrack's and Johnston's joint Local Rule 56.1(a) statement as responses to Stadt's, Kays', and Oakes' corresponding statements of fact. For the remaining facts, however, the Court has deemed Plaintiff's failure to respond as admissions. See Cracco, 559 F.3d at 632.
Additionally, Plaintiff directed his Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) statement of additional facts to Sidetrack and Johnston, but not to Stadt, Kays, and Oakes. Consequently, Sidetrack and Johnston filed a joint response to those additional facts, but Stadt, Kays, and Oakes did not. The same counsel represents all Defendants, however, and a review of Sidetrack's and Johnston's joint response shows that it fully protects Stadt's, Kays', and Oakes' interests. The Court, therefore, has considered Plaintiff's additional facts, where appropriate, in deciding Stadt's, Kays', and Oakes' motions for summary judgment.
Finally, the Court has not considered statements of fact set forth by either side that fail to comply with Local Rule 56.1, and it has deemed as admitted those statements of fact to which the opposing party failed to properly respond. SeeCracco, 559 F.3d at 632. With these principles in mind, the Court turns to the relevant facts.
Sidetrack is a bar located in Chicago's Lakeview neighborhood that caters primarily to single gay men. (See R. 47, Defs. L.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 3, 6.)1 Jose “Pepe” Pena and Defendant Arthur Johnston co-own Sidetrack (id. ¶ 4), and the remaining Individuals Defendants are employees: David Oakes is a bartender; Jimmy Kays is a night manager; and Bill Stadt is Sidetrack's facilities manager. (Id. ¶¶ 13–15.) Plaintiff began working for Sidetrack as part of its security team on August 4, 2010. (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff's duties included checking patrons' identifications, picking up glassware around the bar, and generally responding to any security issues. (Id. )
At the beginning of his employment, Plaintiff signed Sidetrack's Anti–Harassment and Nondiscrimination Policy (the “Anti–Harassment Policy”), which prohibits sexual and discriminatory harassment. (Defs. L.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 11.) The Anti–Harassment Policy sets forth several options an individual may pursue to address offensive behavior, including self-help, mediation, submitting a formal complaint, and seeking reassignment. (See R. 47–5, Anti–Harassment Policy at 3–5.) The Policy designates Johnston and Sidetrack's attorney, Stephen Herseth, as mediators to assist individuals in handling any issues related to sexual and discriminatory harassment and as the company's contacts should an individual want to submit a formal complaint. (Id. at 3–4.) Under the Policy, an individual may choose any of the options for addressing harassment outlined in the Policy and may “continue to bring any work-related problem to his or her supervisor” in addition to Johnston, Pena, and Herseth. (Id. at 3.) Although Plaintiff signed the Anti–Harassment Policy verifying that he read and understood it, Plaintiff states that he felt rushed in his review and did not completely understand the Policy. (Pl. L.R.56.1(b) Stmt. of Add'l Facts ¶ 29 (citing 47–6, Pl. Dep. 25:8–28:4).) It is unclear whether Sidetrack gave Plaintiff a copy of the Anti–Harassment Policy for his records. .)
On May 18, 2011, Plaintiff's boyfriend at the time, Kevin DuJan, sent a letter to Sidetrack claiming that Sidetrack employees had harassed him on May 5–6, 2011 because he is a Christian and a Republican. (Defs. L.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 12, 22–26; see also R. 47–4, DuJan Letter at DEF000194.) In his letter, DuJan asserted that Sidetrack employees also had harassed Plaintiff because of DuJan's beliefs and Plaintiff's relationship with him. (Defs. L.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 26.) DuJan claimed that Oakes, in particular, repeatedly harassed Plaintiff about his relationship with DuJan and threatened to have Plaintiff fired if the relationship continued. (See DuJan Letter at DEF000190–93.) DuJan filed a religious discrimination complaint against Sidetrack with the City of Chicago's Commission on Human Relations on June 2, 2011. (See R. 48–3.)
Sidetrack hired an attorney, Brett Rappaport, to investigate DuJan's allegations. (Defs. L.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 21, 27.) Rappaport met with several individuals during his investigation, including Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 27.) In advance of his meeting with Rappaport, Plaintiff submitted a seven-page personal statement describing several incidents of sexual and religious harassment he purportedly had suffered at the hands of Sidetrack employees. (Id. ¶ 28.) After receiving Plaintiff's statement, Sidetrack placed him on paid leave purportedly to allow the investigation into DuJan's and Plaintiff's allegations to proceed and to ensure that Plaintiff felt comfortable during the pendency of the investigation. (Id. ¶ 29.) There is some evidence, however, that Sidetrack placed Plaintiff on leave at least in part because Plaintiff was excessively using his intercom to report his activities and location. (See Pl. L.R. 56.1(b) Resp. ¶ 29.)
On August 26, 2011, Sidetrack terminated Plaintiff for cause. (Id. ¶ 49.) According to Sidetrack, it terminated Plaintiff because he refused to meet with Sidetrack's attorney regarding its investigation, was insubordinate, and made false allegations of harassment. (See id. But see Pl. L.R. 56.1(b) Resp. ¶ 49.) Plaintiff, however, claims that Sidetrack terminated Plaintiff in retaliation for complaining about the harassment he endured. Following his...
To continue reading
Request your trial