Parker v. Simpson

• Decision Date: 04 January 1902
• Citation: 62 N.E. 401,180 Mass. 334
• Parties: PARKER et al. v. SIMPSON.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

180 Mass. 334

62 N.E. 401

PARKER et al. v. SIMPSON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

January 4, 1902

COUNSEL

Wm H. Bent and L. H. Kileski, for appellant.

Trull & Wier and Geo. A. Sanderson, for appellees.

OPINION

HAMMOND J.

In this bill as finally amended, at the time of the argument before this court, the plaintiffs are Percy Parker, the administrator with the will annexed of the estate of Elizabeth Simpson, and Odonathus Simpson, one of her sons and legatees, and the defendant is Verrazano Simpson, also a son and legatee. The amount involved is several hundred thousand dollars, and the pleadings are very voluminous; but following pretty closely the statement of the case contained in the report of the master, we think that the nature of the controversy, including the respective contentions of the parties, may be fairly summarized as follows:

Benjamin F. Simpson, possessed of a large estate, died at an advanced age, in April, 1883, and left surviving him his widow, the said Elizabeth, and the two sons, who are parties to this bill. Longinus, a third son, left home when a youth, has not been heard from since 1858, and it is supposed that he never was married, and that he died in that year. The master has found that he is dead. The bulk of Benjamin's property was left to his widow as a residuary legatee, and she received as such about $375,000, of which about $250,000 was in personal property. She was born in 1801, and died in 1897. During the latter part of her life she was in excellent physical condition for a woman of her age, and retained her mental capacity to the last. In May, 1884, Elizabeth surrendered to Verrazano a note, which she held against him for $25,000, and took in return therefor his unsecured note for $3,000, and received no other consideration. In June 1884, she made a will devising her property equally to her two sons. In October, 1884, she made another will, giving to Odonathus her real estate, and to Verrazano her personal estate. In June, 1887, she conveyed to Verrazano all her personal and the greater part of her real estate, and received therefor his unsecured notes to the amount of $150,000. In 1888 she, as executrix of her husband's will, executed a confirmatory assignment of some of this property. In June, 1892, she gave up to Verrazano the notes she had received from him in 1887, as aforesaid, and substantially all the rest of her property, and received as the consideration therefor an agreement on his part to pay her $550 per month during her life, and a bond conditioned to pay the absent son, Longinus, $50,000, should he appear in person to claim the same within five years from her decease. After her decease the will of October, 1884, was presented for probate, and disallowed, and then the will of June, 1884, was presented and allowed.

The contention of the plaintiffs is that the defendant, Verrazano, from the time of the death of his father, was the trusted and confidential adviser of his mother during the rest of her life; that by reason of her age and lack of business experience, and through her great confidence in the business capacity of the defendant, she intrusted the care and management of her property to him; that while he was thus acting as such adviser he procured the gift of May, 1884, the execution by his mother of the will of October, 1884, and the contracts of 1887 and 1892, by means of fraud, misrepresentation, and undue influence practiced and exerted by him upon her; that these acts of the defendant were done in pursuance of a general scheme and plan, conceived and formed by him immediately after the death of his father, to get all the property into his own hands, and to defraud Odonathus of his share; that he deceived his mother in all these matters, especially as to the value of the property conveyed to him in 1887 as aforesaid, which it is allowed was much greater than the consideration paid by him, and as to the contents and legal effect of the will of October, 1884, and the contract of 1892; and that he concealed from her all knowledge of this fraud, misrepresentation, and undue influence, and that up to the time of her death she never knew that he had been guilty of such conduct before her, nor was such misconduct known to the plaintiffs until about May 24, 1897.

The defendant denies that at any time he acted as the trusted and confidential adviser of his mother, or that in any of the transactions of which the plaintiffs complain he practiced upon her any undue influence, fraud, or concealment. He avers that at the time of each of these transactions she was in the full possession of her mental faculties, and was fully competent to transact business; that in each she acted freely, voluntarily, and with full knowledge of the nature and meaning of it and of every paper connected therewith; that each transaction was wise and prudent on her part; that the result of each was fully understood and realized by her; and that to the last she was perfectly satisfied with it, and never otherwise expressed herself.

As to the main issues, the master finds as follows: 'That during all these years the defendant was the one person upon whose judgment Elizabeth Simpson relied in business matters. She was impressed with his business capacity, and proud of this success in the accumulation of property. This capacity to accumulate, joined with an appreciation of his kindly treatment of her, and the position he had obtained in life in marked contrast to that of his brother Odonathus, had made him, in a sense, her favorite son, and the more readily led her to put greater confidence in any suggestion as to business affairs which came from him, and rendered all the more easy the assumption by him and the acquiescence by her to his position of a 'trusted and confidential adviser,' upon whom she relied for advice. I find that he guided and controlled her acts with reference to her property, either personally, when he was present with her, and otherwise, during all these years, through the men McAlvin and Jones, who were in daily contact with her, in charge of his affairs, but all the time subject to his order and direction, and at whose request and dictation she would sign such instruments as they presented to her.' The master also finds that from the death of his father the defendant was the trusted and confidential adviser of his mother until her death. He further finds, in substance, that all the contracts and conveyances of which the plaintiffs complain were obtained by the defendant from his mother by fraud and undue influence while he was her confidential adviser; that in this way the defendant, between the death of his father and that of his mother, obtained from her the bulk of her property, in pursuance of a general scheme and plan formed shortly after the death of his father; and that at no time during her life did the mother know of this fraud and undue influence. The master, further finds that she never knew or understood the provisions of the will dated October 1, 1884, and that such provisions were known to the defendant, and that in all the dealings subsequently to 1884 the defendant, acting as the confidential and trusted adviser, never informed his mother of the provisions of said will, nor called to her attention the effect that her acts would have upon the disposition of her property. In a word, his findings sustain the allegations of the bill in these respects. The master found for the plaintiffs, and, all exceptions to his report having been overruled, there was a decree for the plaintiffs.

During the progress of the case various amendments were made to the pleadings. The defendant filed several demurrers to the bill, a request that issues be framed for a jury, and a motion that the master's report be recommitted, all of which were overruled, and the defendant appealed. He also filed numerous exceptions to the master's report, all of which were overruled, and he appealed, as also from the final decree. The plaintiffs filed exceptions to the report, which were overruled, and they appeal. The case is before us upon the questions raised by these several appeals. Some of them become immaterial by subsequent amendments and otherwise.

It would serve no useful purpose to go over seriatim the grounds of the various demurrers. We shall here notice only those which are insisted on in the defendant's brief, and we shall consider them topically, in the order there suggested. The others call for no remark, except to say that they do not seem to us sound.

1. As to discovery: The defendant insists that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the discovery sought in the first prayer, that the defendant disclose under oath a true statement and account of all the real and personal property transferred and delivered to him as aforesaid, and of the rents, proceeds, and income thereof, and of all property purchased with funds so received, and the income and proceeds thereof. But we do not think that he is in a position to avail himself of this contention, even if there is anything in it. The bill is for relief, and not for discovery. The part of the demurrer which refers to this matter is to the whole bill. The bill is sustainable for relief. Therefore the demurrer, being to the whole, cannot be sustained. Story, Eq. Pl. § 312, and cases cited in the notes. Although the rule to the master ordered that the parties should produce before him upon oath all deeds, books, papers, and writings relating to the matter, the defendant took no appeal and asked for no modification of the rule. He must be held to have acquiesced in it.

2. As to misjoinder: Nor is the bill objectionable on the ground of misjoinder of plaintiffs. The bill proceeds upon the ground of...