Parker v. State
| Citation | 75 S.E. 437,11 Ga.App. 251 |
| Decision Date | 05 June 1912 |
| Docket Number | 4,131. |
| Parties | PARKER v. STATE. |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Georgia) |
Syllabus by the Court.
On the trial of one accused of the offense of seduction, it is competent for the state to show (as a circumstance evidencing the existence of an engagement to marry) that the female alleged to have been seduced made preparations for her marriage, and sent out invitations to the wedding.
The fact that the female alleged to have been seduced has a living child, as well as the fact that the accused endeavored to induce her to take medicine for the purpose of causing an abortion, while in themselves not sufficient to prove seduction, are both circumstances competent for the purpose of proving that the accused had carnal intercourse with her which is an essential ingredient of the offense of seduction.
As illustrating the interest and credibility of a witness, and for the purpose of impeachment, it is competent to show that the witness made an effort to improperly influence and suborn another witness in the case. It is not error for a trial judge to permit a witness to be interrogated as to any matter pertinent to the issue, although the question sought to be asked, or the answer thereto, either or both, may be prejudicial, when counsel who seeks to ask the question states in his place that he expects to prove the fact which his question seeks to elicit. The issue as to whether a question is asked without a bona fide expectation of receiving the answer apparently expected, and merely for the purpose of prejudicing the opposite party before the jury, or whether the question is asked in good faith, must in every case be left to the discretion of the trial judge, and this discretion will not be controlled, unless it is manifestly abused.
Where the presence of a witness in a criminal case is waived, and it is agreed, with the approval of the court, that the contents of an affidavit, previously given by the witness, be used, instead of his oral testimony, the statements in the affidavit must be considered by the jury just as if they had been delivered by the witness from the stand, and cannot be captiously rejected, either in whole or in part. Where the presence of a witness is waived, and it is agreed that his testimony shall be taken by affidavit, the jury should consider the testimony just as if the witness had orally testified in their presence, and believe him, unless he was impeached or discredited by other testimony. Consequently it was error for the court to charge, as to the contents of such an affidavit: "You may believe as much of it as you please, or as little of it as you please."
In a trial for seduction, the maintenance and education of a child which may have been the result of the illicit connection is not involved, nor is its legitimacy affected by the verdict in the case. The prosecution for seduction is for the punishment of a public wrong, and not for redress of a private injury. It was error, therefore, for the court to allow the Solicitor General, over the objections of the accused, to urge that the defendant should be convicted of seduction, in order that the child might have a legitimate father, and because the female alleged to have been seduced and who would have to raise and maintain the child, should be protected.
Error from Superior Court, Dekalb County; L. S. Roan, Judge.
C. B Parker was convicted of seduction, and brings error. Reversed.
John W Moore and J. E. & L. F. McClelland, all of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
C. S. Reid, Sol. Gen., of Palmetto, Wm. Schley Howard, of Atlanta, and L. J. Steele, of Decatur, for the State.
The defendant was convicted of the offense of seduction, and excepts to the judgment overruling his motion for new trial. As the case turns upon some of the special assignments of error, we shall express no opinion upon the testimony. It suffices to say that the evidence warranted the conviction of the accused and the sentence imposed upon him. But, though the defendant be accused of a most horrible crime (and than one guilty of seduction we can imagine no fouler criminal), he is entitled to a fair and impartial trial, according to the rules of the law, and the just resentment and passion which is necessarily aroused by the very character of the charge should not be permitted to be inflamed so as to prejudice the rights of the accused, or place upon him a burden which the law does not impose.
We are clear that as to most of the exceptions there was no error. There was none in the admission of the testimony of which complaint was made, nor in the ruling upon the question which the Solicitor General was permitted to ask. But we think that in charging the jury the learned trial judge, inadvertently perhaps, depreciated the most vitally important testimony which was at the defendant's command, and that he perhaps underestimated the effect of the language used in the concluding argument of the state's counsel, which submitted to the jury issues foreign to the charge at bar, but the suggestion of which was manifestly calculated to weigh heavily against the accused.
1, 2. The first and second headnotes are self-explanatory.
3. It is alleged in the fourth ground of the motion for a new trial that the Solicitor General asked G. E. Lanier ...
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Bowman v. State
...207, 185 S.E. 530; Conley v. State, 73 Ga.App. 53(5), 35 S.E.2d 569; McTyier v. State, 91 Ga. 254(1), 18 S.E. 140; Parker v. State, 11 Ga.App. 251(2), 75 S.E. 437; Wood v. State, 48 Ga. 192, 15 Am.Rep. 664. Special ground 2 complains because the court excluded evidence tending to show bad c......