Parker v. State

Decision Date05 October 1976
Docket Number7 Div. 468
PartiesAlvin Vernon PARKER, alias v. STATE.
CourtAlabama Court of Criminal Appeals

William D. Hudson, Gadsden, for appellant.

William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen., and Sarah M. Greenhaw, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

W. AUBREY DOMINICK, Circuit Judge.

Appellant-defendant, Parker, an indigent at the time of trial and on this appeal, was indicted for robbery and convicted therefor. The charge was that of robbing a grocery store. The sentence was ten years in the penitentiary.

On October 28, 1975, appellant and one Glover had entered the grocery store of a Mr. Bishop. There was no one else in the store at the time except Bishop. Parker had allegedly walked up to Bishop, struck a pistol in his face, and told him to go to the back of the store. Bishop went to the back and stepped into a cooler room and shut the door. Parker allegedly then shot once into the floor by the cooler. Bishop remained in the cooler room until he thought it was safe to come out. When Bishop left the cooler, the store was empty and $75.00 was missing from the cash register.

About fifteen minutes after the robbery, Parker returned to the store. Parker said he had come to the store because he had heard the police were looking for him. Bishop told the police that he was the person who had robbed him. He was arrested and taken to jail where he was advised of his constitutional rights. At that time he signed a waiver of rights but made no statement. The next morning he was brought from the jail for more questioning. He was advised of his rights again but he did not sign a waiver. He later allegedly confessed to the robbery.

I.

Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in sustaining the objection concerning oral testimony as to what the accused said to an investigating officer at the scene of the crime. The statement had been reduced to writing and signed by the accused. Prosecuting attorney had claimed that the written statement of the accused was the best evidence, and not what the officer had heard the accused say. Both the written statement and the oral testimony of a witness who heard the statement are classed as primary evidence. Elkins v. State, 250 Ala. 672, 35 So.2d 693. It could well be that written evidence would be more convincing and accordingly of greater weight, but either could have been admitted and it was not error for the Court to sustain objection to the oral statement.

II.

Counsel for defendant complains that the trial judge erred by not allowing the defendant to present evidence outside the presence of the jury as to the voluntariness of defendant's statement to police officers and in admitting said statement without first having heard such evidence.

Ordinarily, when the voluntariness of a confession is brought to a question, duty rests in the first instance on the trial judge to determine whether the confession was voluntary. Wallace v. State, 290 Ala. 201, 275 So.2d 634; Kendrick v. State, 55 Ala.App. 11, 312 So.2d 583. The trial judge did err by remarking to the lawyers at the bench that the voluntariness was to be determined by the jury. The error was harmless because the defendant denied over making any statement or confession to the police officers after receiving the 'Miranda' warnings. Whether or not a statement was ever made is one of fact to be determined by the jury. A jury may disregard a confession if they entertain a reasonable doubt as to its truth. Bennett v. State, 46 Ala.App. 535, 245 So.2d 570. The question of voluntariness is never reached.

Defense counsel also complains that the trial court erred by sustaining the objection to the question addressed to defendant on direct examination as to whether defendant understood the waiver of rights that he had signed. The question is moot. The defendant had been asked by the prosecuting attorney if he understood that which was read to him from a card that had the 'Miranda' warnings on it after being arrested for trespassing three months prior to this incident. Defendant's response was that he thought he did.

III.

Another contention of the defendant is that the trial court committed reversible error in sustaining the state's objections to certain questions. The purpose of the questions was to show that the victim, Bishop, and defendant had past conflicts which had developed an ill will between them. It appears on the record that the evidence was independent and unconnected with that charged, and remote and irrelevant in its objective, and would shed no light on the existence of the bias. Therefore, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by sustaining the State's objections to the questions. James v. State, 52 Ala.App. 389, 293 So.2d 305.

IV.

Remarks were made by the prosecuting attorney during closing arguments about what he remembered from when he was a child, to which defense counsel objected. It would have been proper for the Court to have sustained the objection to the remarks, but there was no reversible error. Taylor v. State, 54 Ala.App. 353, 308 So.2d. 714. As stated by Judge Harwood in Bullard v. State, 40 Ala.App. 641, 645, 120 So.2d 580, 584:

'Of necessity a wide discretion must be allowed the trial judge in regulating the argument of counsel. Trials are adversary in nature. Vigorous prosecution and defense is to be expected. Neither defense counsel nor the prosecutor should be too closely hampered by niceties of speech if he is to be effective, but should be permitted to say his say in his own style. This, of course, does not mean that unfair and prejudicial argument is to be condoned for one instant.'

Also during the closing argument of the prosecuting attorney, a statement was made in which there was no evidence to support it. An objection was raised but overruled by the trial court. This was harmless error and without prejudice. Taylor v. State, 54 Ala.App. 353, 308 So.2d 714. Therefore, there was no injury.

V.

The final point defense counsel raises is that the...

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11 cases
  • Magwood v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 8 Octubre 1985
    ...made by the accused...." See Gwin v. State, 425 So.2d 500 (Ala.Crim.App.1982), writ quashed, 425 So.2d 510 (Ala.1983); Parker v. State, 337 So.2d 1378 (Ala.Crim.App.1976); Sperling v. State, 57 Ala.App. 583, 329 So.2d 641 (1976); C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 200.19 (3d The typed ......
  • Kennedy v. State, 7 Div. 966
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 31 Enero 1984
    ...into evidence instead of, or in addition to, the written transcription of that recording. See, A.R.A.P. 45." See also Parker v. State, 337 So.2d 1378 (Ala.Cr.App.1976) (police officer allowed to relate accused's oral confession over argument that best evidence is the written and signed form......
  • Perry v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 26 Junio 1984
    ...648 (Ala.Crim.App.1982); Williams v. State, 377 So.2d 634 (Ala.Crim.App.) , cert. denied, 377 So.2d 639 (Ala.1979); Parker v. State, 337 So.2d 1378 (Ala.Crim.App.1976). Further, a court may properly refuse to charge on lesser included offenses when it is "clear to the judicial mind that the......
  • Powell v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 29 Mayo 1992
    ...648 (Ala.Crim.App.1982); Williams v. State, 377 So.2d 634 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 377 So.2d 639 (Ala.1979); Parker v. State, 337 So.2d 1378 (Ala.Crim.App.1976). Further, a court may properly refuse to charge on lesser included offenses when it is 'clear to the judicial mind that ther......
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