Parker v. State

• Decision Date: 12 April 2006
• Docket Number: No. PD-0250-05.,PD-0250-05.
• Parties: Christopher Chad PARKER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

206 S.W.3d 593

Christopher Chad PARKER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.

No. PD-0250-05.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 12, 2006.

Chuck Lanehart, Ralph H. Brock, Lubbock, for Appellant.

Carrissa A. Cleavinger, County Attorney, Muleshoe, Matthew Paul, State's Attorney, Austin, for State.

OPINION

COCHRAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KELLER, P.J., and MEYERS, PRICE, JOHNSON, KEASLER and HERVEY, JJ., joined.

A jury convicted appellant of misdemeanor possession of marihuana. On appeal he relied on this Court's decision in State v. Steelman¹ to argue that the police lacked probable cause to enter his home, and, thus, the trial court erred in failing to suppress the marihuana found in plain view after that entry. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling.² We granted review to determine whether the police entered appellant's home without probable cause to believe that any crime had been or was being committed.³ We affirm.

I.

The relevant facts are not disputed. Appellant offered no evidence at the pretrial suppression hearing; he argued only that the undisputed facts did not establish that the police had probable cause to enter his home. Therefore, we set out the pertinent facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling.

On the night of April 2, 2001, Ms. Vangie Leal approached Deputy Ralph Sanchez and Officer Rodney Stevens at a local convenience store and told them that alcohol was being served to minors at a two-story house in the 1400 block of Avenue C in Muleshoe. Deputy Sanchez knew Ms. Leal, so the two officers immediately went to investigate her "tip" at the only two-story house in that block. As they arrived, they noticed several cars parked in front of the house, but no unusual activity occurring outside. As Officer Stevens knocked on the door, Deputy Sanchez noticed someone parting the blinds. He heard a voice from inside say, "It's the police," and saw a young man who looked like "one of the Reynolds kids"⁴ run up the stairs. When appellant opened the door, Officer Stevens could smell a strong odor of burnt marihuana emanating from the home.

Officer Stevens immediately recognized appellant from previous encounters.⁵ He asked Deputy Sanchez to contact his supervisor, and then told appellant that he was there to investigate a report that "there was a juvenile party going on, kids drinking alcohol." He said that he and Deputy Sanchez would have to come inside because he could smell burnt marihuana. Appellant attempted to close the door, but Officer Stevens put his foot in the door and again stated that he needed to secure the residence because of the smell of marihuana. Appellant then let the officers come inside.

The two policemen gathered everyone into the living room. Then Officer Stevens went to find the person that Deputy Sanchez had seen running up the stairs. He also woke up appellant's mother and asked her to join them in the living room. Approximately eight minutes later, two police supervisors arrived.

As a supervisor was asking appellant's mother for consent to search the home, Officer Stevens noticed, for the first time, a marihuana cigarette butt and loose marihuana sitting in plain view on top of a pizza box in the living room. Although appellant's mother consented to a search of her home, the marihuana was found before she gave her consent.

Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the marihuana. After hearing the evidence, the trial judge noted that, because the marihuana was in plain view once the officers were inside, marihuana was not found during a search of appellant's home. Thus, the only issue was whether the police had entered appellant's home legally. The trial judge decided that they had. A jury convicted appellant, sentenced him to 180 days in jail and a $1,000 fine, but recommended suspension of both the jail term and the fine.

On appeal, appellant argued that "[w]hile the odor of marijuana, coupled with other evidence, may give rise to probable cause, the odor of marijuana alone does not justify a warrantless search of a residence." He now states that "[t]he case law in Texas regarding the existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances sufficient to allow officers to make a warrantless entry into a residence, based on the smell of contraband is, at first glance, confusing." We granted review in the hope of dispelling any lingering confusion concerning the existence of probable cause to cross the threshold of a home when officers smell the odor of contraband emanating from that residence.⁶

II.

Appellant's confusion may stem from the fact that the standards for a warrantless entry into a home differ from those for a warrantless arrest.⁷ Each action requires the police to jump over two distinct hurdles. In both situations the first hurdle involves the existence of probable cause to believe that some offense has been or is being committed, but differs depending on whether probable cause points to a person (arrest) or a location (search).⁸ The second hurdle differs depending on whether the officer is crossing the threshold of a home without a warrant to investigate an offense, or he is making a warrantless arrest.

Under Texas law, a police officer must have both probable cause with respect to the person being arrested, plus statutory authority to make that arrest.⁹ To establish probable cause to arrest, the evidence must show that "`at that moment [of the arrest] the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the arrested person had committed or was committing an offense'"¹⁰ There is, of course, a significant difference between the notion that there is probable cause to believe that someone has committed an offense and probable cause to believe that this particular person has committed an offense.¹¹ Probable cause to arrest must point like a beacon toward the specific person being arrested. Second, the police officer who lacks a warrant to arrest must have statutory authority to make such a warrantless arrest.¹²

On the other hand, when the question is probable cause to cross the threshold of a private residence, probable cause may point to the location, but not necessarily a specific person. Again, the State must leap two hurdles. In Estrada v. State,¹³ this Court recently reiterated the well-established probable cause standard that applies to a warrantless entry or search of a specific location: "`Probable cause to search exists when reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer on the scene would lead a man of reasonable prudence to believe that the instrumentality of a crime or evidence of a crime will be found.'"¹⁴ Probable cause that points like a beacon toward the location (but not necessarily any particular person) is the first hurdle.¹⁵ The second hurdle is that exigent circumstances, those which justify an immediate need to enter a residence without first obtaining a search warrant, must also exist.¹⁶ If either probable cause or exigent circumstances are not established, a warrantless entry will not pass muster under the Fourth Amendment.

Appellant relies on this Court's decision in State v. Steelman as support for his argument that, as a matter of law, the odor of marihuana by itself is insufficient to establish probable cause for an officer to enter a home without a warrant.¹⁷ Appellant reads too much into that case. In Steelman, police officers entered the defendant's home and arrested everyone in the room after smelling the odor of marihuana when the defendant opened the door. We concluded that the odor of marihuana emanating from a home cannot, by itself, justify a reasonable belief that any particular individual present had committed or was committing any particular offense.¹⁸ In Steelman we noted that "`odors alone do not authorize a search without a warrant.'"¹⁹ But we did not, as appellant argues, find that the odor of marihuana alone was insufficient to establish probable cause to believe that someone had committed or was then committing the offense of possession of marihuana.²⁰ With respect to a warrantless entry and arrest, Steelman simply reiterated what previously had been well established: the odor of marihuana emanating from a residence, by itself, is insufficient to establish both the probable cause and statutory authority required for a warrantless arrest of a particular person inside.²¹

Even beyond the critical distinction between probable cause that points to a person versus probable cause that points to a location, appellant's focus on the odor of marihuana as the sole criminal conduct that the officers observed is too narrow. The odor of contraband is certainly an important fact which may (or may not) be dispositive, given a specific context, in assessing whether probable cause exists. But probable cause does not depend upon the accumulation of only those facts which show overtly criminal conduct. Instead, probable cause is the accumulation of facts which, when viewed in their totality, would lead a reasonable police officer to conclude, with a fair probability, that a crime has been committed or is being committed by someone.

The court of appeals compared the facts of the present case to those found in Effler v. State²² and McNairy v. State.²³ In both of those cases, officers entered trailers after smelling the byproducts of the methamphetamine production process and seeing or hearing people running through or out of the trailer. In each case, the defendants were in the process of producing methamphetamine when the police entered. The Effler court relied on our ruling in McNairy to find that both probable cause and exigent circumstances existed, and thus, a warrantless entry was permissible.²⁴ In the present case, the court of appeals applied the definition of probable cause and exigent...