Parker v. State
| Decision Date | 15 February 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 21895,21895 |
| Citation | 218 Ga. 654,129 S.E.2d 850 |
| Parties | Jesse Lafayette PARKER v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The verdict was supported by the evidence and, therefore, the general grounds of the motion for new trial were properly denied.
2. The charge on admissions and incriminatory statements was authorized by the evidence and was not an expression of opinion.
3. A charge on involuntary manslaughter was not required.
4. A charge on the principle of mutual combat was not required.
5. The evidence required a charge on the definitions of manslaughter and voluntary manslaughter and the punishment for voluntary manslaughter, and the trial court erred in not so charging.
John G. Davis, Clayton, Stow & Andrews, Gainesville, for plaintiff in error.
Ben F. Carr, Sol. Gen., Eugene Cook, Atty. Gen., Rubye G. Jackson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for defendant in error.
The denial of a motion for new trial following a conviction for murder with recommendation of mercy and sentence to life imprisonment is for review here.
Jesse Lafayette Parker was tried in the Superior Court of Rabun County upon an indictment charging him with the murder of Ronald Hicks Rogers. His amended motion for new trial contained the general and five special grounds of alleged error. The latter five complained of the trial court's failure to charge on the subjects of manslaughter, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter and mutual combat, and also its charging upon admissions and incriminating statements.
The undisputed evidence was that the defendant shot and killed the deceased with a pistol on the night of July 14, 1962, at 'Hop's Place' in Rabun County. In events leading up to the shooting the deceased, accompanied by three other persons, including a brother, had arrived there first in a truck. Shortly afterward the defendant, with four others, had driven up in an automobile. Argument immediately ensued between the occupants of these two vehicles. As to what transpired between their arrival at 'Hop's Place' and the homicide, the evidence was in sharp conflict.
Some of the testimony was that the defendant and the deceased began to argue; that one of the others in the car with the defendant had a pistol which was unloaded; that the defendant took it from him, saying he would get some shells; that the defendant left the group and was gone from five to seven minutes; that while returning the defendant fired one pistol shot in another direction; that after his return he and the deceased resumed argument; that the deceased did not have a knife and did not threaten the defendant in any manner; that they decided to fight without weapons; that the defendant laid a pistol upon one of the nearby motor vehicles and then got another from under his belt and shot the deceased while they were eight or ten feet apart and while the deceased was standing still.
There was contrary testimony, including that the defendant warned the deceased against attacking him during their fatal encounter; that the deceased advanced toward and swung at the defendant twice with a knife which was described as a deadly weapon, attempting to cut him with it; that after the defendant urged the deceased's brother to stop the deceased, but to no avail, the deceased continued to advance and strike at him with the knife; and that the defendant then fired the fatal shot.
Furthermore, there was testimony showing that certain members of the deceased's group, including the deceased, went to this place 'to fight'; that during the argument between them the deceased told the defendant that while the defendant used to whip him when they were in grammar school he didn't think he could now and wasn't afraid of him; that when that was said the deceased had a knife in his hand, 'just a small knife, the kind you carry in your pocket'; that the defendant and the deceased 'said they were going to fight'; that the deceased told the defendant 'if he would put the gun up he would fight him fair' and the defendant laid the pistol he had in his hand on the back of a car; that they 'started to swing'; and that the defendant stepped backwards, got another gun from under his belt and shot the deceased.
1. Considering first the evidence in the light of the general grounds of the motion for new trial we find that it supprots the verdict. The court instructed the jury to determine whether the defendant was guilty of the crime of murder or was justified in the killing and therefore not guilty of any crime. With conflicts in the evidence, as indicated by the recital above, the jury chose to accept the version that the defendant shot and killed the deceased with malice aforethought. Being supported by evidence and approved by the trial judge, the verdict will not be set aside as urged by the general grounds of the motion for new trial.
2. Next, we consider the special ground of the motion which complains that the court erred in instructing the jury on the subject of admissions and incriminatory statements. The objection is that this portion of the charge was not authorized by the evidence and was an expression of opinion in violation of Code § 81-1104. Authorization for the charge was provided by the Sheriff of Rabun County, who swore that the defendant told him that 'the boy was coming at him with a knife, and he shot him.' This statement of the defendant, considered with other facts and circumstances as brought out in the evidence, tended to establish some of the essentials of the crime. The charge on this subject did not, as we view it, constitute an expression of opinion. This porion of the charge was not erroneous. Sheffield v. State, 188 Ga. 1(2), 2 S.E.2d 657. Also see Pressley v. State, 201 Ga. 267, 270, 39 S.E.2d 478.
3. Nor was it erroneous for the trial court not to charge the jury as to involuntary manslaughter, as is contended in one of the special grounds. As we evaluate the evidence, this offense was not involved. None of the evidence authorized the conclusion that the killing was unintentional. Furthermore, the defendant's unsworn statement to the jury did not require such charge. The defendant's claim that he attempted only to shoot the deceased in the...
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