Parker v. Sweet
| Decision Date | 19 March 1910 |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
| Parties | PARKER v. SWEET et al.<SMALL><SUP>†</SUP></SMALL> |
Appeal from District Court, Tarrant County; W. T. Simmons, Judge.
Suit by R. C. Parker against C. L. Sweet and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and judgment rendered.
Theodore Mack, for appellant. Bryan & Spoonts, for appellees.
Appellant instituted this suit to restrain appellee Sweet, as sheriff, and the other appellee, as an execution creditor, from selling an automobile, seised by virtue of a writ of execution, alleging that such vehicle was exempt to him as the head of a family. The district judge granted the temporary writ of injunction, but afterward on motion of appellees dissolved it, and the complainant has appealed. The question thus presented appears to be a new one. Article 2395, Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1897, so far as pertinent to the present inquiry reads: Concretely stated then the question for determination is whether an automobile owned by a married man, the head of a family, is included in the term "carriage," and therefore exempt under the statute quoted. The Standard Dictionary defines the word "carriage," as follows: The definition given by other lexicographers is substantially the same. In a broad sense, then, an automobile is undoubtedly a carriage. It was so held in Trenton v. Toman (N. J. Ch.) 70 Atl. 606, and Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 14 Pa. Dist. R. 592, cited in Berry on Automobiles, § 15. On the other hand, it has also been held that an automobile is not a carriage within the meaning of a statute requiring cities and towns to keep their highways in repair so that they may be reasonably safe and convenient for travelers with their horses, teams, and carriages. Doherty v. Ayer, 197 Mass. 241, 83 N. E. 677, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 816. But even in the last case cited it is said...
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Patterson v. English
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