Parker v. Williams and Madjanik, Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 May 1980
• Docket Number: No. 21236,21236
• Citation: 275 S.C. 65,267 S.E.2d 524
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Carol Ann PARKER and Diane L. Logan, Co-Administrators of the Estate of Donnie Edward Parker, Appellants-Respondents, v. WILLIAMS AND MADJANIK, INC., Appellant, and J. M. Ford, James P. Reinbolt, James L. Williams, Donald Madjanik, William A. Dolan and George E. Darmstatter d/b/a, Island Properties, Respondents, and Ansley and Sutton Construction Company.

Page 524

267 S.E.2d 524

275 S.C. 65

Carol Ann PARKER and Diane L. Logan, Co-Administrators of the Estate of Donnie Edward Parker, Appellants-Respondents, v. WILLIAMS AND MADJANIK, INC., Appellant and J. M. Ford, James P. Reinbolt, James L. Williams, Donald Madjanik, William A. Dolan and George E Darmstatter d/b/a, Island Properties Respondents, and Ansley and Sutton Construction Company.

No. 21236.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

May 20, 1980.

Thomas Dewey Wise, of Wise & Cole, Charleston, for appellant.

Joseph R. Young, of Young, Clement & Rivers, Charleston, for respondent Reinbolt.

Wade H. Logan, III, of Holmes, Thompson, Logan & Cantrell, Charleston, for respondents Williams, et al.

Joel D. Bailey, of Moss, Carter, Branton & Bailey, Beaufort.

John E. Parker, of Murdaugh, Peters, Parker & Eltzroth, Hampton, for appellants-respondents.

Samuel F. Painter, of Nexsen, Pruet, Jacobs & Pollard, Columbia, for S. C. Self-Insurers Association, amicus curiae.

Douglas McKay, Jr., of McKay, Sherrill, Walker & Townsend, Columbia, for S. C. Chamber of Commerce, amicus curiae.

Stephen G. Morrison, of Nelson, Mullins, Grier & Scarborough, Columbia, for S. C. Defense Attys. Ass'n, amicus curiae.

LITTLEJOHN, Justice:

Donnie Edward Parker was fatally injured while working on a construction job on January 1, 1974. The realty on which he was working was owned by a partnership doing business as Island Properties, which consisted of James L. Williams, Donald Madjanik, William A. Dolan, and George E. Darmstatter. Island Properties intended to construct a mini-warehouse facility on the property and hired Williams & Madjanik, Inc., an Ohio company, as general contractor for the project. As the name implies, Williams & Madjanik, Inc. was owned by two of the partners of Island Properties. The general contractor hired a company called Yetter Homes, Inc. to erect a roof on the warehouse where the death occurred. Yetter Homes, Inc. then subcontracted the actual installation of the wood trusses and roof to an individual named J. M. Ford. The decedent, Parker, was hired by Ford to work on this project. Parker was killed when a crane lowered a stack of plywood onto the wood trusses which collapsed, pulling in a concrete wall.

Parker's wife and children filed a claim for Workmen's Compensation death benefits against both Yetter Homes, Inc. and Williams & Madjanik, Inc., as employers. The South Carolina Industrial Commission found that Parker was employed by Yetter Homes, Inc. and awarded compensation of approximately $25,000.00 to his wife and children. Yetter Homes, Inc., as employer, was found to be liable for these payments.

The action currently on appeal is a wrongful death tort action brought by the co-administratrices of Parker's estate against (1) Island Properties, (2) Williams & Madjanik, Inc., (3) J. M. Ford, (4) two architects, and (5) Ansley and Sutton Construction Company, the company which supplied the crane and crane operator. This case has been before this court on two previous occasions. See Parker v. Madjanik, Inc., 270 S.C. 570, 243 S.E.2d 451 (1978), and Parker v. Madjanik, Inc., 269 S.C. 662, 239 S.E.2d 487 (1977).

After a lengthy trial, the jury returned a verdict of $90,000.00 in actual damages, against only Williams & Madjanik, Inc., exonerating all other defendants. Both the plaintiffs and Williams & Madjanik, Inc. have appealed. The plaintiffs assert that the trial judge erred in certain evidentiary rulings and in his charge to the jury. ¹ Williams & Madjanik, Inc. contends that the suit was barred as a matter of law. Prior to oral arguments before us, settlements were reached between certain of the parties, leaving Island Properties as the sole defendant-respondent. We reverse the judgment as to Williams & Madjanik, Inc. and affirm as to Island Properties, holding that as to both these parties our Workmen's Compensation Law provided the exclusive remedy for the decedent's death, which remedy has been supplied.

At the proper stages of the pretrial and trial process, Williams and Madjanik, Inc. and Island Properties made motions for summary judgment, nonsuit, and directed verdict, based upon the theory that under § 42-1-540, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), the Workmen's Compensation Law provides the exclusive remedy available to the employee. After verdict, the general contractor renewed its motion by asking for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial judge erred when he refused the motions.

Prior to the enactment of our Workmen's Compensation Law, an employee who sustained a work related injury had no choice but to look to the courts for compensation. The common law was usually unsatisfactory since the employer could assert the defenses of assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow-servant rule, among others. Injured employees generally received little or no compensation because at least one defense was usually applicable. Gradually society recognized the need for a comprehensive approach to provide adequate compensation for injured employees. This court has previously recognized the foundation of our concept of workmen's compensation.

"The American concept of workmen's compensation is founded upon recognition of the advisability, from the standpoint of society as well as of employer and employee, of discarding the common law idea of tort liability in the employer-employee relationship and of substituting therefor the principle of liability on the part of the employer, regardless of fault, to compensate the employee, in predetermined amounts based upon his wages, for loss of earnings resulting from accidental injury arising out of and in the course of the employment. . . . " Case v. Hermitage Cotton Mills, 236 S.C. 515, 115 S.E.2d 57 (1960).

The South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Law, § 42-1-10, et seq., created a comprehensive approach to provide compensation for employees injured by accidents arising out of and in the course of their employment. The employee receives the right to swift and sure compensation; the employer receives immunity from tort actions by the employee. This quid pro quo approach to workmen's compensation has worked to the advantage of society as well as the employee and employer.

An examination of our Workmen's Compensation Law, our case law, and the record before us, leads us to the conclusion that the trial judge should have held as a matter of law that both Island Properties and Williams & Madjanik, Inc. were statutory employers of the decedent and, as such, immune from this tort action. They were the statutory employers of the subcontractor's (Yetter Homes, Inc.) employees, including the decedent, because our compensation law makes them liable to provide workmen's compensation coverage.

The rights of the parties involved in this action are spelled out by the following sections of our Workmen's Compensation Law:

" § 42-1-400. Liability of owner to workmen of subcontractor.

When any person, in this section and §§ 42-1-420 and 42-1-430 referred to as owner, undertakes to perform or execute any work which is a part of his trade, business or occupation and contracts with any other person (in this section and §§ 42-1-420 to 42-1-450 referred to as 'subcontractor') for the execution or performance by or under such subcontractor of the whole or any part of the work undertaken by such owner, the owner shall be liable to pay to any workman employed in the work any compensation under this Title which he would have been liable to pay if the workman had been immediately employed by him."

" § 42-1-410. Liability of contractor to workmen of subcontractor.

When any person, in this section and §§ 42-1-420 to 42-1-450 referred to as 'contractor,' contracts to perform or execute any work for another person which is not a part of the trade, business or occupation of such other person and contracts with any other person (in this section and §§ 42-1-420 to 42-1-450 referred to as 'subcontractor') for the execution or performance by or under the subcontractor of the whole or any of the work undertaken by such contractor, the contractor shall be liable to pay to any workman employed in the work any compensation under this Title which he would have been liable to pay if that workman had been immediately employed by him."

" § 42-1-420. Liability of subcontractor to workmen of sub-subcontractor.

When a subcontractor in turn contracts with still another person, in this section and §§ 42-1-430 to 42-1-450 also referred to as a 'subcontractor,' for the performance or execution by or under such last subcontractor of the whole or any part of the work undertaken by the first subcontractor, the liability of the owner or contractor shall be the same as the liability imposed by §§ 42-1-400 and 42-1-410."

" § 42-1-430. Construction of Title when proceedings are against owner or contractor.

When compensation is claimed from or proceedings are taken against an owner or contractor then, in the application of this Title, reference to the owner or contractor shall be substituted for reference to the subcontractor, except that the amount of compensation shall be calculated with reference to the earnings of the workman under the subcontractor by whom he is immediately employed."

" § 42-1-440. Indemnity of principal contractor.

When the principal contractor is liable to pay compensation under any of §§ 42-1-400 to 42-1-450, he shall be entitled to indemnity from any person who would have been liable to pay compensation to the workmen independently of such sections or from an intermediate contractor, and have a cause of...