Parker v. Zeisler
| Decision Date | 25 May 1897 |
| Parties | PARKER v. ZEISLER, Collector, et al. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Action by Mary C. Parker against Jacob Zeisler, collector of the city of St. Charles, and another. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Case transferred to the St. Louis court of appeals.
T. F. McDearmon, for appellants. C. W. Wilson, for respondent.
This is a suit to enjoin the collection of certain taxes imposed on property of plaintiff by the city of St. Charles. The plaintiff's contention is that said property is not subject to the taxes. The suit raises the question of the validity of an extension of the limits of that city. Plaintiff's residence is within the new limits, but without the old. The defendants are Mr. Zeisler, collector of St. Charles, and the city itself. The trial court entered a decree for plaintiff. Defendants appealed to this court. The only reason assigned for taking the appeal to the supreme court, instead of the court of appeals, is that the city of St. Charles is a party to the suit. The claim is that that city is a "political subdivision of the state." No construction of any revenue law is involved. The chief point in the case is whether or not the alleged election to extend the city limits was legal and effective to produce the desired result. Some minor points are raised, but no claim is made that any of them would bring the case to the supreme court. The amount of taxes sought to be enjoined is about $700. Counsel for both parties have temporarily left the field of their controversy to unite in a very interesting and able argument to maintain the jurisdiction of this court over the cause.
1. Consent, however, cannot properly be held to confer jurisdiction of the subject-matter of an appeal, any more than of a cause in its earlier stages. So, we are in duty bound to inquire into, and to keep within, the proper limits of our jurisdiction, irrespective of the wishes of the parties interested, or of their learned counsel.
2. The city of St. Charles is a city of the third class, governed by the general charter applicable to cities of that class. It is within the county of St. Charles. Such a city has been expressly declared by the second division of this court not to be a political subdivision of the state, within the meaning of the organic law defining the jurisdiction of the supreme court (Kansas City v. Neal [1894] 122 Mo. 232, 26 S. W. 695); and that ruling has been cited by the First division on at least two occasions: Northcutt v. Eager (1896) 132 Mo. 265, 33 S. W. 1125; City of St. Charles v. Hackman (1896) 133 Mo. 634, 34 S. W. 878. But counsel now ask the court in banc to review the Neal Case, and to overrule it as erroneous. They point out the following sections of the constitution as tending to sustain their contention that cities are political subdivisions of the state, within the intent of that instrument, viz.: Article 4, §§ 47, 51; article 9, §§ 6, 18, 19; article 10, §§ 9, 10, 12. Another section besides those above cited might be mentioned, viz. the second section of the Schedule, which refers "to this state, or to any subdivision thereof, or any municipality therein."
It is insisted by counsel that cities wield vast political power, and that they are also subdivisions of the state. A strong argument is submitted on that question, but it does not seem to us convincing; and at this time it would have to be unanswerable to warrant us in opening up the question anew for decision.
We are most positively of the opinion that it is our duty to adhere to the rulings announced heretofore, holding that a city within a county is not a political subdivision of the state (as that term is used in the section of the constitution under review). The question is really an old one. It arose on the establishment of the St. Louis court of appeals in 1876, when the constitution ordained that all cases pending in the supreme court at St. Louis which came within the final appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals should be transferred to that court. Constitution 1875, art. 6, § 19. Several causes were at that time so transferred by the supreme court in which cities were parties, thus indicating that this court, as then constituted, did not regard a city as a political subdivision, in the sense intended by the definition of the court's jurisdiction. Some of the cases then transferred are these: City of St. Louis v. Kaime (1876) 2 Mo. App. 66; City of St. Louis v. Edgar, Id. 595; Walser v. City of St. Louis, Id. 600. Fulweiler v. City of St. Louis (1876) 61 Mo. 479, at first glance appears an exception to the ruling, but is not an exception when it is understood that the claim of plaintiff therein was for $10,000 damages. The supreme court had jurisdiction of defendant's appeal, because of the amount involved, in the circumstances described in the report. Until the city of St. Louis became separated from the county (in the latter part of 1876), it was no more a political subdivision than any other city in a county. In 1884 the constitutional amendment establishing the Kansas City court of appeals was adopted. By its terms, a similar transfer of cases falling within the final jurisdiction of that court occurred. Rev. St. 1889, p. 88, § 7. The transfers then ordered show beyond question that the supreme court entertained the same view held in 1876 touching the topic of our present discussion. We cite but a few of many cases of such transfer. Bragg v. City of Moberly (1885) 17 Mo. App. 221; Dolan v. City of Moberly (1885) 17 Mo. App. 436; Hedges v. Kansas City (1885) 18 Mo. App. 62; Wright v. Kansas City (1885) 18 Mo. App. 436; Norton v....
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