Parkhurst v. Boykin

• Decision Date: 23 July 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-193, No. 03-194
• Citation: 94 P.3d 450,2004 WY 90
• Parties: NINA H. PARKHURST, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. CARL D. BOYKIN and DEBBIE BOYKIN, Appellees (Defendants). CARL D. BOYKIN and DEBBIE BOYKIN, Appellants (Defendants), v. NINA H. PARKHURST, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

2004 WY 90

94 P.3d 450

NINA H. PARKHURST, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. CARL D. BOYKIN and DEBBIE BOYKIN, Appellees (Defendants).

CARL D. BOYKIN and DEBBIE BOYKIN, Appellants (Defendants), v. NINA H. PARKHURST, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Nos. 03-193, 03-194

Supreme Court of Wyoming. APRIL TERM, A.D. 2004.

July 23, 2004

Representing Appellant Nina Parkhurst: William L. Hiser of Brown & Hiser, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

Representing Appellees Carl D. and Debbie Boykin: Stephen H. Kline of Kline Law Office, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, and VOIGT, JJ, and JAMES, DJ.

HILL, Chief Justice.

[¶1] Nina H. Parkhurst (Parkhurst) seeks review of an order of the district court that found that her son and daughter-in-law, Carl D. "Doug" Boykin and Debbie Boykin (the Boykins), were entitled to retain 100 bales of hay from Parkhurst's ranch. Parkhurst also challenges the district court's determination that the Boykins, as joint owners of a bank account with Parkhurst (who was the primary source of the deposits in the account), could withdraw all of the funds from that account without accounting to her or without a requirement that she be reimbursed for at least half of the monies withdrawn. This portion of the appeal is identified as Case No. 03-193.

[¶2] In their cross appeal, the Boykins seek review of an order of the district court that granted summary judgment in favor of Parkhurst on their claim that they were entitled to a 49% interest in a ranch owned by Parkhurst (the Huston Ranch), as well as some personal property associated with the ranch. The Boykins' claims were premised on theories of an oral contract, promissory estoppel, and equitable estoppel. This portion of the appeal is identified as Case No. 03-194.

ISSUES

[¶3] In Case No. 03-193, Parkhurst raises these issues:

A. Does the evidence support the District Court's ruling that Defendants, Carl D. Boykin and Debbie Boykin, may retain 700 [sic] bales¹ of hay taken from the Huston Ranch?

B. May one joint owner of a joint bank account withdraw all of the funds from that account without accounting to, or being required to reimburse the monies withdrawn to, the other joint [owner] who was the primary source of the deposits to the account?

The Boykins restate the issues thus:

A. Did Parkhurst prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to damages for conversion of 100 bales of hay taken by the Boykins from the Huston Ranch?

B. Did Parkhurst prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she has a right to make a claim against [the Boykins] for any portion of funds taken by him from an account jointly owned by them?

[¶4] In Case No. 03-194, the Boykins raise these issues:

1. Did the District Court commit error in granting [Parkhurst's] motion for summary judgment on [the Boykins'] claim that they are entitled to 49% of the Huston Ranch and other personal property pursuant to an oral contract between the parties?

2. Did the District Court commit error in granting [Parkhurst's] motion for summary judgment on [the Boykins'] claim that they are entitled to 49% of the Huston Ranch and other personal property under the theories of promissory estoppel and/or equitable estoppel?

Parkhurst's response to those claims is:

A. Is the Statute of Frauds applicable to this case?

B. Is there sufficient evidence to allow this matter to proceed to trial under the "substantial part performance" exception to the Statute of Frauds?

C. Is there sufficient evidence to allow this matter to proceed to trial under the "promissory and/or equitable estoppel" exception to the Statute of Frauds?

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

[¶5] Parkhurst initiated this litigation by complaint filed on August 13, 2001. In her first amended complaint, she averred that she was the owner in fee simple absolute and was entitled to a property known as the Huston Ranch, as well as livestock, machinery, vehicles, and other personal property used in the ranch operation. She stated that the Boykins came into possession of a portion of the ranch property and personal property pursuant to a license granted by her. Parkhurst professed that she had terminated that license and demanded that possession of the real and personal property be restored to her, and that the Boykins refused to relinquish the property. Her claims included one to quiet title to the property in her, and to establish that the Boykins had no estate, right, title or interest whatsoever in it.² In addition, she sought to eject the Boykins from the ranch. She maintained that the Boykins had trespassed on her property and had converted crops and personal property to their own use, for which she sought damages. She claimed she had loaned the Boykins $39,589.00 and they had repaid only $7,500.00, leaving a balance due her of $32,089.00. She demanded repayment of that amount. She also asserted that she had maintained a joint checking account with the Boykins, and that the Boykins had withdrawn $7,400.00 from that account and converted it to their own use. She sought to be paid all sums from that account found to be owned by her or attributable to her.

[¶6] In answer to Parkhurst's complaint, the Boykins claimed that they were entitled to be on the ranch under the terms of an oral contract with Parkhurst, and that the oral contract also entitled them to a 49% interest in the Huston Ranch and associated personal property. With respect to personal property issues, the Boykins claimed that some of the personal property on the ranch belonged to them or was jointly owned by them with Parkhurst. The Boykins also claimed they were justified in withdrawing money from the parties' joint checking account. The Boykins filed counterclaims which included: A claim for specific performance of their alleged oral contract with Parkhurst; breach of that contract by Parkhurst; promissory estoppel; equitable estoppel; unjust enrichment; quantum meruit; and declaratory and injunctive relief.

[¶7] In answer to interrogatories propounded by Parkhurst, the Boykins related the following sequence of events:

In November of 1997, Nina Parkhurst came to our house in Encampment, Wyoming and told us that she and her sister were splitting the ranch. She told us that she needed someone to manage her half of the ranch and that if we would come out to live on the ranch and manage it for a year, she would then deed 49% of the ranch to us at the end of that year. She told us that she would also transfer the "NX" brand to us. Nina also promised us if we would come manage the ranch that she would give us all the off-colored heifer calves produced by her herds.

Part of the agreement was that we were to be able to continue to run our outfitting business from the ranch. We discussed the fact that sometimes the outfitting business did well financially and when it did well, we wouldn't need to take a monthly draw or money from the ranch. It was agreed that we could take a draw whenever we needed one and when we did, Nina would write a check.

Based on the agreement we had with Nina, we agreed to move out to the ranch and manage it. [Parkhurst] also promised us at that time that as time went on, she would gradually deed to us the rest of the ranch as she had previously done with Doug's brother Randy and the Z[Z Lazy V] Ranch. Nina indicated that she would investigate the best manner in which to transfer the rest of the ranch in order to limit inheritance tax. Nina indicated that she had several meetings with Bill Hiser concerning ways for us to avoid paying inheritance tax on the ranch.

We started moving to the ranch in late December of 1997. Nina needed our flatbed and our horses to operate the ranch, and we brought those to the ranch. We also bought a small plow, a sweep and a small square baler for use on the ranch. Additionally, we bought a couple of bulls to use on the cowherd. We used our own vehicles for ranch purposes year round. We supplied the wood-burning stove for the shop. We bought veterinary supplies, salt and tubs and little things along the way. We bought ear tags for the whole herd ($1.50-2.00 per tag for 200+ cows and calves).

After we had been on the ranch for a year, we asked Nina about transferring title to the 49%. Nina told us that she didn't have money for attorney fees at that time to accomplish the transfer of the 49% but that she would get it transferred when she did have the money for a lawyer. In the summer of 1999, Nina told us that she was forming a corporation for the joint ownership of the ranch and gave us the unsigned paperwork reflecting that she was going to form the corporation. Later that summer she indicated to us she had been to an estate-planning seminar, and she gave us some of the paperwork from that seminar. She indicated that she was concerned about the tax consequences of a transfer. At some point she gave us Nina Huston's estate tax return to show us the manner in which the land was transferred to Nina Parkhurst and the consequences of the transfer.

During much of this time, Nina's husband was ill, and Nina stayed with her husband and seldom came to the ranch during that year. We did not press the issue of the transfer of the 49% of the ranch that year. However, in 2000 we had many more discussions with Nina about the transfer of 49% of the property. At some point she told [us] that she was considering using a limited liability company or an insurance

trust to transfer the property instead of a corporation. She typed her thoughts out for us in this regard. She also brought an accountant named Dennis Tschacher to the ranch who discussed the consequences of the transfer of half of the ranch to us and the sale of the gift and/or sale of the remainder (with the purchase price to be forgiven at death) over time. Nina never denied that she had promised us that she would transfer the interest in the ranch, but rather she kept indicating to us that she had to consult with her accountant and her lawyer about how best to

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