Parking Facilities, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach

• Citation: 88 So.2d 141
• Parties: PARKING FACILITIES, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. The CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, a municipal corporation under the laws of the State of Florida, Appellee.
• Decision Date: 08 June 1956
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 141

88 So.2d 141

PARKING FACILITIES, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. The CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, a municipal corporation under the laws of the State of Florida, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida, En Banc.

June 8, 1956.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 13, 1956.

Ward & Ward, Miami, for appellant.

Ben Shepard, Miami, and Joseph A. Wanick, Miami Beach, for appellee.

DREW, Chief Justice.

Appellant land owner in the City of Miami Beach sought to compel the defendant city to issue a building permit allowing it to construct a multiple level parking garage with stores on the ground floor and facilities within for the sale of gasoline, oil and grease and similar garage service. The building was to be constructed on land located within a district zoned by the defendant city as 'REE multiple-family district.' The lower court directed the issuance of the building permit to construct the parking garage and held that portion of the ordinance, infra, limiting and restricting such building to the parking of automobiles to be unconstitutional and void, holding with respect thereto 'there is no reasonable factual basis for the conclusion reached by the City Council that the general welfare of the City of Miami Beach required that 'multiple level automobile parking garages' be limited and restricted to the parking of automobiles.' With respect, however, to the provision in the ordinance under attack which excluded stores from such building, the court held that such provision was valid and constitutional and 'not violative of any right of the plaintiff.' The appellant land owner has appealed from that portion of the decree adverse to it. No cross-assignment of error were taken by the defendant city, hence the sole question before us is whether the ordinance which allows the construction of a parking garage in a multiple-family district but excludes therefrom stores is a valid and constitutional exercise of the police powers of the municipality.

The portion of the zoning ordinance under consideration, so far as the questions involved in this appeal are concerned, reads as follows:

'Section 5 1/2

'Use Regulations

'REE Multiple-family district

'In the 'REE' Multiple-family District no building or land shall be used and no building shall be hereafter erected, constructed, reconstructed, or structually altered, which is designed, arranged or intended to be used for any purpose unless otherwise provided for in this ordinance except for one or more of the following uses:

'1. Any use permitted in the 'RE' Multiple-family District.

'2. Multiple-level Automobile Parking Garages only upon approval and permit by the City Council of the City of Miami Beach, Florida, after a public hearing at which due consideration shall be given to the effect upon traffic of the proposed use and then only if the construction and use of said parking garage shall be subject to the following conditions and restrictions;

'a. That the building shall be fully enclosed and shall conform in outward appearance to that of other buildings in the area;

'b. That no exterior sign other than an identification sign shall be permitted, the location, design and size of which shall be approved by the City Council;

'c. That the services rendered shall be restricted to the parking of automobiles.'

Appellant relies heavily upon a decree of the same circuit judge of June 1, 1954 relating to the same section of the zoning ordinance as affirmed by this Court without opinion in City of Miami Beach v. Midcentury Corp., Fla.1954, 75 So.2d 606. While the same section of the ordinance was involved in the Midcentury case as in this case, the factual situation was entirely different. In the Midcentury case, the main point at issue was not whether the city may lawfully prohibit stores in such a parking garage but whether the restriction limiting the use of the land involved in that case to parking garages was valid. In the Midcentury case the court upheld the land owner's contention that the zoning of his property for uses other than business was unconstitutional and void. In this case the same judge, in commenting on the Midcentury case, said:

'That the decree in the case of Midcentury Corp. v. City of Miami Beach, relied upon by plaintiff's counsel as being determinative of the issues in this case is readily distinguishable on the facts. The Court there found and determined, that the land there involved not only abutted directly upon business property but that other surrounding environmental facts and circumstances rendered the existing zoning in its application to that land unreasonable, and that any zoning other than business uses deprived the owners of the beneficial use of their property.'

The record in this case shows that plaintiff's property is located in the heart of a multiple-family district where stores are prohibited. The reasonableness of such classification is not an issue here. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the ordinance under question deprives the plaintiff of the beneficial use of its property. Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 1 So.2d 642. Not only does the record show that the parking of automobiles is one of gravest problems faced by the City of Miami Beach but this Court judicially knows that such problem is one of the most pressing and serious confronting governmental bodies. The solution of this problem or anything which tends to solve it necessarily contributes to the general welfare. The construction of a parking garage as required in the ordinance in a multiple-family district is not detrimental to the district or inconsistent with the uses allowed therein but, on the contrary, is essential to the maintenance of the integrity of such district. On the other hand, the use of a portion of the building for stores or other business enterprises would violate the integrity of the district and plant therein a growth which could well spread and destroy the character of the neighborhood. It would constitute spot zoning of the worst order, a practice which we and all other courts have universally condemned. Moreover, these zoning ordinances come to us with the presumption of validity. City of Miami Beach v. Hogan, Fla., 63 So.2d 493, and cases there cited. We are not authorized to substitute our judgment in matters of this kind for that of the constituted authorities of the City of Miami Beach so long as their actions are, as here, within constitutional limitations.

We think the eminent chancellor below correctly determined the issues in this case and that the decree appealed from is without error.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, THORNAL and O'CONNELL, JJ., and STANLY, Associate Justice, concur.

TERRELL and ROBERTS, JJ., dissent.

ROBERTS, Justice (dissenting).

We here review a decree of the Circuit Court of Dade County holding valid and constitutional as to plaintiff, appellant here, a provision of the zoning ordinance of the City of Miami Beach.

The ordinance in question, being Ordinance No. 973, was adopted in 1951 as an amendment to the general zoning ordinance (No. 289). It established a new Use District, labelled 'REE', to permit the construction and operation of multiplelevel parking garages in the Districts so designated, in addition to all the uses authorized for 'RE' Use Districts. 'RE' is the designation for hotel and apartment-house Use Districts, although such uses as miniature golf courses, public schools, lodge halls, churches and synagogues are permitted therein as well as a few other commercial uses when approved by the city.

As shown by the city's 'Use District Map', four 'REE' Use Districts had been established in the City of Miami Beach as of April 1953. One of these, comprising four blocks, is located on Collins Avenue near its intersection with Lincoln Road, and we have heretofore considered the validity vel non of Ordinance No. 973 in controversies arising out of the proposed construction of a multiple-level parking garage in the particular 'REE' District. In Drexel v. City of Miami Beach, Fla., 64 So.2d 317, 318, we held unconstitutional and void a provision of the ordinance prohibiting the construction of multiple-level parking garages except upon "approval and permit by the City Council * * * after a public hearing at which due consideration shall be given to the effect upon traffic of the proposed use * * *." for the reason that such provision vested in the municipal authorities an arbitrary discretion without prescribing definite rules and...