Parkinson v. Watson
| Decision Date | 08 December 1955 |
| Docket Number | No. 8407,8407 |
| Parties | d 191 B. R. PARKINSON and Robert C. Poe, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Edward H. WATSON and Ray P. Greenwood, Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Peter W. Billings, H. Wright Volker, Salt Lake City, E. R. Callister, Jr., Atty. Gen., David K. Watkiss, H. R. Waldo, Jr., Salt Lake City, for appellants.
A. W. Sandack, J. Lambert Gibson, Salt Lake City, Richard C. Howe, Murray, for respondents.
Marl D. Gibson, Price, Orval Hafen, St. George, amici curiae.
This is a declaratory judgment action brought to determine the validity of an act reapportioning the Utah Legislature, enacted by the 1955 Session 1 Plaintiffs are two members of the Salt Lake County Redistricting Committee, appointed pursuant to the Act, and the defendants are the other members of said Committee and other named public officials concerned with its operation.
The Act reapportions the House of Representatives on the basis of one representative for each 13,000 population or major fraction thereof, provided that each county is given one representative, as required by the Constitution. 2 With respect to the Senate, it provides for a revision of certain of the state senatorial districts, and further, in the districts entitled to more than one senator, for the subdividing of the district 'as near equal in population as practical' so that senators will be elected from a given area rather than from the district at large. No fault is found with the foregoing provisions, but it is the formula for determining the number of senators from each district that is challenged.
The charge of unconstitutionality is leveled specifically at the use of the 'double ratio' for determining representation in the Senate as provided in Section 36-1-1:
'Representation in the senate of the state shall be on a basis of one senator for the first nineteen thousand inhabitants, or major fraction thereof, and one additional senator for each additional fifty-five thousand inhabitants, or major fraction thereof, residing within the senatorial district. * * *' Laws Utah, c. 61, Sec. 1.
Defendants point out that the use of this 'double ratio,' allowing each district one senator for 19,000 inhabitants, or major fraction thereof, but requiring 55,000, or major fraction, for each additional senator, was devised for the express purpose of avoiding representation in true proportion to population; that thus giving each of the smaller senatorial districts at least one senator results in disproportionately large representation for the rural areas of the state and deprives the more populous, urban areas, referred to as the 'Wasatch Front' counties, that is, Weber, Salt Lake, Davis and Utah, of their fair share of senatorial representation. 3 This, they contend, is contrary to the principle of representation based on population, which they aver is inhereent in our form of representative government. They point to the abuses and inequities in representation which arose in England under the notorious 'Rotten Borough' system, which gave rise to the great parliamentary revolution and readjustment of representation based more nearly on population; and call attention to the constitutions of the various states of the United States, which have quite generally set up plans of representation in proportion to population as nearly as practicable.
The controversy here devolves upon the language of Article IX, Sec. 2, of the Constitution of Utah:
'The Legislature * * * at the session next following an enumeration made by the authority of the United States, shall revise and adjust the apportionment for senators and representatives on the basis of such enumeration according to ratios to be fixed by law.'
Defendants insist that the only reasonable import of the language requiring the legislature to revise the apportionment of senators and representatives on the basis of such enumeration is that representation should be in direct proportion to the population as found by such enumeration except only for the departure from that principle in allowing each county at least one representative in the House. Consequently, they urge that the Act is in arbitrary disregard of the constitution.
On the other hand, it is plaintiffs' position that the legislature has plenary power to apportion the legislature in any manner it deems proper within the confines of the Constitution, so long as it is not in direct conflict therewith; that there is no requirement, express or implied, that representation be either equal, or in any single mathematical ratio to population; that therefore it was free to set up the basis of representation contained in the Act because that comported with its judgment as to what would best serve the interests of the state.
The question as we see it is whether this Act represents a bona fide attempt to carry out the constitutional mandate by devising a reapportionment of the legislature within its framework, in which case it must be upheld; or is an attempt to reapportion the legislature of the state in arbitrary disregard of the requirements of the Constitution, in which event it would be invalid.
In view of the controversy here, in which each of the respective parties contends that the language of Section 2, Article IX, expresses the meaning they contend for, leading to diametrically opposite results, we look not only to the language itself, but to its historical antecedents, the discussions of the Constitutional Convention leading to its adoption, and to the subsequent practical interpretation placed upon it, for guidance in seeking a solution to the problem.
The difficulties in securing enactment of reapportioning legislation have been such that, notwithstanding the directive that it be done following each federal census, only three such acts have been passed since Statehood, and the 1955 Act is the first since 1931. It is the culmination of efforts made during each regular legular legislative session since 1941, a total of 20 bills having been introduced in attempting to comply with that requirement. This failure is not chargeable to partisanship of the major political parties, as each has controlled various of the legislative sessions during that period. Rather it seems to have been due to the refusal of representatives of the rural areas, which had a majority, 31 to 29 in the house and 12 to 11 in the senate, to agree to any reapportionment of the senate on a strictly population basis, 4 which would have vested control of both houses of the legislature in the 'Wasatch Front' urban counties.
After further abortive attempts in the 1951 session, the conflicting bills were referred to the Legislative Council. The Council suggested several possible compromises. A bill patterned upon its report, and another compromise bill were introduced in the 1953 session. Again neither of these proved palatable to the rural interests of the state. Upon the legislature's failure to agree in that session, a resolution proposing a constitutional amendment was passed, submitting the matter to the people in the 1954 election. It would have given each county one senator regardless of size, and although it carried in 23 of the 29 counties of the state, it was rejected by an overwhelming majority of the popular vote. Finally the opposing interests resolved their differences by adopting the 1955 Act, under review here.
In addressing attention to the arguments of the respective parties in regard to the constitutionality of this Act, there are two cardinal principles to be kept in mind. The first relates to the attitude and the prerogative of the court in appraising legislation under such an attack. It is of paramount importance to remember that the constitutional mandate is addressed, not to the courts, but to the legislature, whose responsibility it is to carry it out. The legislature having performed its function, if we are obliged to review it, we must do so with the highest possible degree of understanding of the multifarious problems the legislative process is fraught with, including the makeup of the legislature and its variety of interests. It must be realized that there is plenty of room within the framework of the Constitution for legislation with which we might not agree, were we legislators. 5 It is a rule of universal acceptance that the wisdom or desirability of legislation is in no wise for the courts to consider. Whether an act be ill advised or unfortunate, if such it should be, does not give rise to an appeal from the legislature to the courts. 6 But the remedy for correction of legislation remains with the people who elect successive legislatures. 7
Guided by those principles and in conformity with the pattern set historically by the courts of this country, it has always been and now is the responsibility of this court to be extremely reluctant to interfere with enactments of the legislature. This reluctance stems in part from the peculiar and awesome power which reposes in the courts. Under our system they are permitted to determine not only the scope of their own function, but when judicial review is invoked, are required to adjudicate the limitations upon the authority of other departments of government. We are conscious of how important it is for the three branches of government to operate independently in the full use of the powers vested in them, in proper relationship to each other and to the entire structure of government, and of the hazard of impairing that wholesome ingredient in our body politic the balance of power.
We believe that the fact that American courts have been constantly wary not to trench upon the prerogatives of other departments of government or to arrogate to themselves any undue powers, lest they disturb the balance of power, has contributed greatly to the success of our system of government and to the strength of the judiciary itself. In that spirit we approach...
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