Parkridge Hosp., Inc. v. Woods

Decision Date13 February 1978
Citation23 UCCRep.Serv. 872,561 S.W.2d 754
PartiesPARKRIDGE HOSPITAL, INC., Appellant, v. Jayne Ann WOODS, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee, Appellee. 561 S.W.2d 754, 23 UCC Rep.Serv. 872
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

Roger W. Dickson, Carl E. Hartley, Stophel, Caldwell & Heggie, Chattanooga, for appellant.

Brooks McLemore, Jr., Atty. Gen., Jim G. Creecy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for appellee.

OPINION

HENRY, Chief Justice.

In this civil action for recovery of sales and use taxes paid under protest, the sole issue is whether human blood is "tangible personal property" subject to sale or use tax. The Chancellor responded in the affirmative. We agree.

We adopt the opinion of the Chancellor as the opinion of the Court. It reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

The plaintiff is a domestic corporation, with its principal place of business in Chattanooga, Tennessee. The defendant audited the plaintiff for sales and use tax purposes for the period of January 1, 1973 through December 31, 1975 and claimed sales and use tax deficiencies for that period. One of the issues involved in that audit was the applicability of Tennessee sales and use taxes to human blood, and upon the assessment of the sales and use taxes, the same was paid under protest, pursuant to T.C.A. 67-2303, which was followed by the filing of this Complaint within the statutory period. The blood at issue was obtained by the plaintiff from essentially two sources: Blood Alliance, a commercial blood bank, and Blood Assurance, a non-profit organization, making blood available to patients in need of transfusions.

It is the Commissioner's contention that the commodity, human blood, is within the taxing provisions of the sales and use tax law, and it is the plaintiff's contention that human blood is not a commodity subject to the Tennessee sales or use tax and that the providing of such blood to plaintiff by sources such as Blood Alliance and Blood Assurance is either outside the present scope of or exempt from the Tennessee sales and use tax statutes.

The issue thus presented to the Court is primarily one of statutory construction of the existing statutes related to the subject matter.

T.C.A. 67-3003 states as follows:

"Levy of tax Rate. It is declared to be the legislative intent that every person is exercising a taxable privilege who engages in the business of selling tangible personal property at retail in this state, or who uses or consumes in this state any item or article of tangible personal property as defined in this chapter, * * *."

"Tangible personal property" is defined in T.C.A. 67-3002(l) to mean and include "personal property, which may be seen, weighed, measured, felt, or touched, or is in any other manner perceptible to the senses." "Sale" is defined in T.C.A. 67-3002(b) to mean, "any transfer of title or possession, * * * in any manner or by any means whatsoever of tangible personal property for a consideration, * * *." Under the wording of the legislative enactments, when given their natural and ordinary meaning of the language used, it is obvious that human blood falls within the ambit of this statute, being an item of tangible personal property. Declaring that human blood is taxable under this taxing statute would not be open to debate, but for the passage by the Tennessee General Assembly of the following Act found in the Uniform Commercial Code at T.C.A. 47-2-316(5) (1967):

"The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness shall not be applicable to a contract for the sale, procurement, processing, distribution or use of human tissues (such as corneas, bones, or organs), whole blood, plasma, blood products, or blood derivatives. Such human tissues, whole blood, plasma, blood products, or blood derivatives shall not be considered commodities subject to sale or barter, and the transplanting, injection, transfusion or other transfer of such substances into the human body shall be considered a medical service."

It is the fundamental rule of statutory construction to ascertain and give effect to the intention or purpose of the Legislature as expressed in the statute. The purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code as enumerated in T.C.A. 47-1-102 are "to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions." The purpose of the sales and use tax is to derive revenue for the State. Both laws are inclusive and are sufficient to regulate the subject matter their enactment is purported to cover and...

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24 cases
  • Owen of Georgia, Inc. v. Shelby County
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • June 17, 1981
    ...462 F.Supp. 45 (D.C.Tenn.), aff'd 595 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1979); State v. Doe, 588 S.W.2d 549 (Tenn.1979); Parkridge Hospital, Inc. v. Woods, 561 S.W.2d 754 (Tenn.1978); Dorrier v. Dark, 537 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn.1976). It is beyond cavil that the primary objective is to promote the public inter......
  • Ellwest Stereo Theater, Inc. v. Boner
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee
    • July 14, 1989
    ...between statutes in favor of each other, wherever possible, so as to provide harmonious operation of laws. Parkridge Hospital Inc. v. Woods, 561 S.W.2d 754 (Tenn.1978). In this case, the Court does not believe that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the state statute and the Metro ......
  • Steppach v. Thomas
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • February 28, 2011
    ...not conflict. State v. Turner, 193 S.W.3d 522 (Tenn.2006); In re Akins, 87 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tenn.2002) (citing Parkridge Hosp., Inc. v. Woods, 561 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Tenn.1978)). Furthermore, the rules of statutory construction direct courts not to “apply a particular interpretation to a stat......
  • American City Bank of Tullahoma v. Western Auto Supply Co., 80-311-II
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • September 18, 1981
    ...the statutes in favor of each other, whenever possible, so as to provide harmonious operation of the laws. Parkridge Hospital, Inc. v. Woods, 561 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Tenn.1978). Here, we believe the U.C.C. and T.C.A. § 67-4102 Item S(b), are completely harmonious. The privilege tax statute set......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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