Parks v. Huffington

Decision Date01 April 1981
Docket NumberNo. B2531,B2531
Citation616 S.W.2d 641
PartiesFred PARKS, et al., Appellants, v. Roy M. HUFFINGTON, et al., Appellees. (14th Dist.)
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Sloan B. Blair, Cantey, Hanger, Gooch, Munn & Collins, Fort Worth, for Fred Parks, individually and as trustee.

J. Currie Bechtol, Mark K. Glasser, Foreman & Dyess, Houston, for Arctic Investments, Ltd.

Richard B. Miller, Baker & Botts, Houston, for Roy M. Huffington and Roy M. Huffington, Inc.

Before BERT H. TUNKS, Retired Chief Justice, by designation and PAUL PRESSLER and MURPHY, JJ.

MURPHY, Justice.

In 1966 Roy M. Huffington, Appellee herein, Haden J. Upchurch, Appellant, Paul J. Scott and R. E. Warren entered into a partnership agreement to engage in the petroleum production business. The partnership was known as Huffington and Associates. Huffington was the managing partner and owned 57.145% interest in it. Upchurch and the others each owned 14.285%.

In 1968 Huffington negotiated for and obtained an oil and gas concession from the Republic of Indonesia. In 1969 Upchurch sued Huffington in the District Court of Harris County, contending that he, Upchurch, as a member of the partnership, was the owner of 14.285% of the benefits of the Indonesian petroleum concession contracts. Upchurch, by amended pleading, also contended Scott and Warren had abandoned their respective 14.285% interests in the partnership and he was entrusted to his pro rata share of the abandoned interests.

The trial court rendered judgment imposing a constructive trust in favor of Upchurch on a 14.285% share in the interest created by the Indonesian concession. The judgment allowed Upchurch no recovery for his part of the claimed abandoned interests of Scott and Warren. Huffington appealed to the 14th Court of Civil Appeals. Upchurch presented a cross point contending the trial court erred in not awarding a recovery of his share of the abandoned interests of Scott and Warren. The Court of Civil Appeals sustained Upchurch's cross point and modified the trial court's judgment so as to include a judgment awarding to Upchurch an interest in his share of the alleged abandoned interest. As so modified the judgment of the trial court was affirmed. Huffington v. Upchurch, 523 S.W.2d 44 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston (14th Dist.) 1975), rev'd. in part, 532 S.W.2d 576 (Tex.1976). On appeal to the Supreme Court, that court modified the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment so as to eliminate the amount awarded to Upchurch of a share of the interests of Scott and Warren alleged to have been abandoned. Otherwise the judgment was affirmed. Upchurch's claim as to the alleged abandoned interests of Scott and Warren was remanded to the trial court for a separate trial. Huffington v. Upchurch, 532 S.W.2d 576 (Tex.1976). The trial on remand resulted in a denial to Upchurch of any recovery based on his claim of abandonment by Scott and Warren.

The portion of the 1974 judgment of the trial court that was affirmed by the Supreme Court imposed in Upchurch's favor a constructive trust of the 14.285% interest in the benefits from the Indonesian concession and directed that an accounting be taken between Upchurch and Huffington for the period from January 1, 1968 to the date of the accounting. The accounting was received by Upchurch on July 15, 1974 and encompassed the period from January 1, 1968 to July 31, 1974. Upchurch's claim based on the alleged abandonment of Scott and Warren has been severed. The 1974 judgment is now final in the sense that it is no longer appealable. Upchurch subsequently assigned to Fred Parks, Trustee and Arctic Investments, Ltd., appellants herein, his interest in the judgment.

This is an appeal from the order by the trial court denying the appellants, Parks and Arctic, certain discovery which they sought in aid of their recovery of the 1974 judgment against Huffington. For a more factual background of this case see the two Huffington opinions hereinabove cited.

After Parks and Arctic became assignees of Upchurch's interest in the judgment they instituted two proceedings to help them in reaping the benefits of their judgment. They filed what was designated "Motion to Enforce Judgment." In this motion the appellants recited that no "full, adequate or complete accounting," as directed by the original judgment, had been made even though the appellees had been notified of appellants' assigned interest. The appellants further contended the appellees refused to allow them their full benefits as such co-assignees because the appellees made arrangements with a New York bank to receive and disburse the income of the venture and such disbursement order by the appellees directed the bank to pay Upchurch the assigned interest, rather than the appellants as assignees. In the prayer to their motion the appellants asked for: (1) a complete accounting; (2) the appointment of an auditor, if deemed necessary; (3) an order directing the paying agent bank and the purchasers of oil to pay directly to appellants their share of the proceeds from the venture; (4) an order prohibiting the appellees from paying to Upchurch their share of the proceeds from the venture; (5) an order directing appellees to furnish appellants full information concerning income and expenses from the venture; and (6) an order directing appellees to provide appellants with the same tax information that it provides to other interest holders for the payment of Indonesian taxes.

With reference to appellants' "Motion to Enforce Judgment" the trial court rendered the following order:

"It is the Court's opinion that discovery or relief sought (1) for an additional accounting and audit of the parties' account after June 31, 1974 (2) for directions to paying agents, purchasers or Roy M. Huffington, Inc. to pay proceeds in a manner different from whatever is provided in the original judgment of the parties dated April 4, 1974 (3) to establish a procedure for movants to pay their respective income taxes due Indonesia and (4) to provide all information needed or requested by Global to file reports and disclosures required by the Securities and Exchange Commission, should be the subject of a new and independent suit and is not in the nature of a motion to enforce the provisions of the judgment in question dated April 4, 1974, ...."

The other procedure instituted by Parks and Arctic in order to gain the benefits of their assigned judgment was the filing of notices of intention to take the oral depositions of Roy M. Huffington, Inc., Roy M. Huffington and Harley Ballinger. (When Huffington procured the concession from Indonesia he placed it in the name of Roy M. Huffington, Inc., a corporation wholly owned by him. It was adjudged that it nevertheless was a partnership asset. Harley Ballinger is an officer of Roy M. Huffington, Inc.) It was recited in all of these notices that the depositions were to be taken pursuant to Rule 621a of the Tex.R.Civ.P. In connection with the depositions the appellants requested the production of fifty-five categories of documents as to which questions were to be asked.

With reference to appellants' notice of these depositions the trial court rendered the following order:

"On March 17, 1980, came on to be heard defendants' motion to quash the notice of intention to take oral deposition and direction to produce designated documents Roy M. Huffington, Inc., and the notices of intention to take oral depositions of Harley Ballinger and Roy M. Huffington in the above case, and the Court having heard the arguments of the parties, entertained briefs on the matter, and being fully advised in the premises, has concluded and ordered as follows:

IT IS ORDERED that defendants' motion to quash be sustained, but without prejudice for movants to subsequently file additional notices to take oral depositions and to produce documents which are relevant and material on whether the original accounting made by defendant Roy M. Huffington, Inc. dated July 15, 1974, and stating the account of the parties as of July 31, 1974, was an accurate and correct accounting as of that date and whether the judgment has been complied with in that respect as provided in paragraph 5 of the original judgment dated April 4, 1974."

It is readily apparent that the Appellant seek discovery under the simplified procedures of Rule 621a. 1 This rule provides:

At any time after rendition of judgment, and so long as said judgment has not been suspended by a supersedeas bond or by order of a proper court and has not become dormant as provided by Article 3773, V.A.T.S., the successful party may, for the purpose of obtaining information to aid in the enforcement of such judgment, initiate and maintain in the trial court in the same suit in which said judgment was rendered any discovery proceeding authorized by these rules for pretrial matters, and the rules governing and related to such pretrial discovery proceedings shall apply in like manner to discovery proceedings after judgment. The rights herein granted to the successful party shall inure to a successor or assignee, in whole or in part, of the successful party. Judicial supervision of such discovery proceedings after judgment shall be the same as that provided by law or these rules for pretrial discovery proceedings insofar as applicable.

The Appellants have brought this appeal seeking review of the trial court's order in denying appellant certain discovery requests made pursuant to Rule 621a to enforce the 1974 judgment awarding the 14.285% interest to Upchurch. We hold this court has no jurisdiction to review the trial judge's decision.

Orders relating to Rule 621a requests are of a peculiar nature as to what type of proceeding takes place, that is, interlocutory or ancillary. The proceeding if interlocutory would not be appealable unless specifically made so by statute....

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