Parks v. Morris Homes Corp.

• Decision Date: 15 March 1965
• Docket Number: No. 18323,18323
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Carrie Lee PARKS, Respondent, v. MORRIS HOMES CORPORATION, Appellant.

Page 129

141 S.E.2d 129

245 S.C. 461

Carrie Lee PARKS, Respondent, v. MORRIS HOMES CORPORATION, Appellant.

No. 18323.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

March 15, 1965.

Frank Sawyer, Spartanburg, for appellant.

John C. Mooneyham, Spartanburg, for respondent.

LEWIS, Justice.

The plaintiff Carrie Parks brought this action against the defendant Morris Homes Corporation for the recovery of damages allegedly sustained by her on account of the fraud and deceit of the defendant's agents in procuring her signature to a building contract and a mortgage. This appeal is by the defendant from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $6,804.00 actual damages and $1,196.00 punitive damages. The exceptions charge error on the part of the trial judge (1) in refusing defendant's motions for a nonsuit and directed verdict, (2) in his rulings as to the admissibility of certain testimony, (3) in certain comments made during the trial, and (4) in refusing defendant's motion for a new trial upon the ground that the verdict was so grossly excessive as to show that it was the result of caprice, passion or prejudice.

The plaintiff owned three unencumbered, vacant lots located on Andrews Road in or near the limits of the City of Spartanburg, South Carolina. These lots were designated as Nos. 6, 7 and 8 on a subdivision plat, each with a frontage on Andrews Road of 100 feet. The defendant, which was engaged in the sale and construction of shell homes in the Spartanburg area at the time, secured on May 29, 1962, through its agents, the plaintiff's signature to a building contract for the purchase of a shell home and her signature to a note and mortgage over a portion of her lots to secure the time purchase price of $6,804.00. The mortgage was subsequently recorded on the public records of Spartanburg County and the building was constructed by the defendant. This controversy arises out of the claim by the plaintiff that she never intended to purchase the shell home in question and was induced to sign the foregoing instruments through the fraud and deceit of defendant's agents.

While the testimony relating to the material issues in the case is in sharp conflict, in determining whether the trial judge erred in refusing the motions for a nonsuit and directed verdict, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and our review thereof is so limited.

The plaintiff testified that, on the night of May 29, 1962, two agents of the defendant went to her home on Highland Street in Spartanburg for the purpose of selling her a shell home. She said that she told them that she was not ready to purchase a home and refused to buy. When she evidenced an interest in buying a shell home at some future time, the agents requested that they be allowed to run a credit report on her so that, when she did decide to build, there would be no delay in completing the transaction. Upon the insistence of the agents, she agreed for them to secure the credit report. When she agreed, she said that the agents produced a number of papers which they insisted she would have to sign for them to run the credit report. Due to her very limited education, she did not read the papers but, upon assurance by the agents that the papers, which she was asked to sign, related only to the credit report and did not affect her land, she signed them. She further testified that, since she lived some distance from her lots, (approximately two miles away in another section of the city), and had no occasion to visit her property during the time, she did not know that the defendant had constructed a dwelling on her lots until she was asked to sign a completion receipt. When she discovered that the defendant had constructed a building on her property, she went to her attorney who, after investigation, informed her for the first time that a mortgage over her property had been recorded on the public records by the defendant. The plaintiff denied that she purchased a building from the defendant or that she ever intended to sign a building contract or note and mortgage, and testified that her signature to the foregoing instruments was obtained through the fraudulent misrepresentations of the agents of the defendant that she was only signing papers to authorize them to run a credit report on her.

In order to make out a case of actionable fraud, the plaintiff was required to prove that the agents of the defendant made a material representation; that it was false; that when it was made the speaker knew it was false, or made it recklessly, without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; that it was made with the intention that it should be acted upon by the plaintiff; that plaintiff was ignorant of its falsity; that she relied on its truth; that she had a right to rely thereon; and that she thereby suffered injury. Gomillion v. Forsythe, 218 S.C. 211, 62 S.E.2d 297, 53 A.L.R.2d 169.

With reference to the exceptions charging error in the refusal of the trial judge to grant defendant's motion for a nonsuit or directed verdict, the sole contention of the defendant on appeal is that there was no showing of actionable fraud on the part of its agents in that the plaintiff failed to prove her right to rely on any representation made, because the evidence conclusively showed that plaintiff failed to read the instruments which she signed and failed to avail herself of every opportunity to understand the nature and contents thereof. In other words, the position of the defendant is that any right of the plaintiff to rely upon the representations of defendant's agents as to the nature and contents of the instruments was lost by her failure to exercise reasonable prudence for her own protection.

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the right to rely upon representations as to the contents of a written instrument must be determined in the light of the duty on the part of the representee to use reasonable prudence and diligence under the particular circumstances for his own protection. In the application of this test to the conduct of the defrauded party, no fixed rule can be formulated, but the question must be determined upon the facts of the particular case. Thomas v. American Workmen, 197 S.C. 178, 14 S.E.2d 886, 136 A.L.R. 1.

What constitutes reasonable prudence and diligence with respect to reliance upon a representation in a particular case and the degree of fault attributable to such reliance will depend upon the various circumstances involved, such as the form and materiality of the representation, the respective intelligence, experience, age, and mental and physical condition of the parties, the relation and respective knowledge and means of knowledge of the parties, etc. J. B. Colt Company v. Britt, 129 S.C. 226, 123 S.E. 845.

The duty on the part of the defrauded party to exercise reasonable care to protect himself requires that he read the contract which he signs and, if he cannot read, that he get some one to read it for him. While the failure of the defrauded party to read his contract before signing, or to have it read for him, will ordinarily bar him of recovery, this is not an absolute rule. It is subject to the just doctrine that a wrongdoer cannot shield himself from liability by asking the law to condemn the credulity of the ignorant and the unwary. Thomas v. American Workmen, supra, 197 S.C. 178, 14 S.E.2d 886.

The plaintiff was a widowed negro woman, the mother of six children, two of whom resided in the home with her at the time of the execution of the instruments in question. She was of very limited education and business experience....