Parks v. Parks

• Decision Date: 09 October 1944
• Docket Number: 4-7395
• Citation: 182 S.W.2d 470,207 Ark. 720
• Parties: Parks v. Parks
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

182 S.W.2d 470

207 Ark. 720

Parks v. Parks

No. 4-7395

Supreme Court of Arkansas

October 9, 1944

Appeal from Union Chancery Court, Second Division; W. A. Speer Chancellor.

Reversed.

John M. Shackleford, for appellant.

Walter L. Brown, for appellee.

OPINION

McHaney Justice.

Appellant began this action to obtain a divorce from appellee and to quiet her title to lot 9, block 8, Ward's Addition to the town of Calion, in Union county. She alleged that she is the owner of said lot and that appellee is making some claim thereto. Appellee answered denying the alleged ground of divorce and asserted that he is the owner of said lot which has on it a large house, furnished throughout; that he bought and paid for said property and had the deed made to her with the express understanding and agreement that she would hold the same in trust for him; that thereafter he made certain repairs and improvements to the house at his own expense to the extent of about $ 1,000; that the house was insured at his cost and in his name; and that he has paid all taxes and at all times claimed it as his own. He prayed that title be vested in him.

The parties went to trial on the sole issue of the title to said property, which resulted in a finding by the court that, although appellee purchased the property and took the title in appellant's name, he did not intend in so doing to make a gift of same to her, and that he is now and at all times has been the owner thereof, and entered a decree vesting the title thereto in him. In his written opinion the court said: "To me the testimony is clear, satisfactory and cogent that she does not own a fee simple title, and that the only interest she has in it is that as his wife." The case is here on appeal.

The question to be decided is one of fact. There does not seem to be any dispute as to the law. It is well settled in this state that where a husband purchases land and causes the deed therefor to be made to his wife, there is a rebuttable presumption of fact that he intended the conveyance to be a gift to her, and that a trust does not result in his favor. As said in Poole v. Oliver, 89 Ark. 578, 117 S.W. 747, after making substantially the statement above, the court said: "This presumption may be rebutted by evidence of facts showing the husband's intention to have been that his wife should take the land as trustee and not for her own benefit; but such facts must have existed or taken place antecedently to or contemporaneously with the conveyance, or so soon thereafter as to form a part of the transaction. Miller v. Freeman, 40 Ark. 62; Robinson v. Robinson, 45 Ark. 481; Chambers v. Michael, 71 Ark. 373, 74 S.W. 516; Womack v. Womack, 73 Ark. 281, 83 S.W. 937; O'Hair, v. O'Hair, 76 Ark. 389, 88 S.W. 945.

"Tested by this rule, there is no satisfactory evidence of an intention to create a trust in favor of the husband. In fact, there is no evidence at all except that he occupied the land and cultivated it, and afterwards claimed it as his own; but his use and occupation is referable to his natural desire to manage and care for his wife's property. Chambers v. Michael, supra." And in one of our later cases, Hill v. Hopkins, 198 Ark. 1049, 133 S.W.2d 634, a headnote reads: "Since it is the duty of the husband to make provision for the support and maintenance of his wife, the purchase by the husband of land taking title in the name of his wife raises the legal presumption that it was a gift to her and that she took as donee, rather than as trustee." See, also, the more recent case of Aycock v. Bottoms, 201 Ark. 104, 144 S.W.2d 43. And the rule is also well settled that the proof to overcome this presumption of gift should be clear and convincing. Wood v. Wood, 116 Ark. 142, 172 S.W. 860, and cases there collected and cited.

The cases all seem to hold, as stated in Poole v. Oliver, supra, that "such facts must have existed or taken place antecedently to or contemporaneously with the conveyance, or so soon thereafter as to form a part of the transaction."

What are the facts that existed before the conveyance, or at that time, or so soon thereafter as to form a part of the conveyance that would justify a court of equity in finding that the presumption of gift had been overcome, under the rule stated? When Evans, the grantor in the deed, asked appellee how he wanted the deed made, he was told by appellee to make it to his wife, appellant, "for business reasons." Nowhere in this record do we find his "business reasons" amplified or explained. He testified that he had bought oil leases and mineral interests in his wife's name and that she had always conveyed same at his request to purchasers. The property in question was the home in which he and appellant lived after its purchase and was not business property. We think the testimony that he took title to...