Parks v. State

• Decision Date: 17 March 2021
• Docket Number: No. 3D20-1418,3D20-1418
• Parties: Givanni Torrell Parks, Petitioner, v. The State of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Givanni Torrell Parks, Petitioner,
v.
The State of Florida, Respondent.

No. 3D20-1418

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

March 17, 2021

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

Lower Tribunal No. F96-38947

A Case of Original Jurisdiction - Habeas Corpus.

Givanni Torrell Parks, in proper person.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Ivy R. Ginsberg, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

Before LOGUE, LINDSEY, and MILLER, JJ.

MILLER, J.

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Petitioner, Givanni Torrell Parks, seeks habeas corpus relief from his conviction and sentence for second-degree murder, in violation of section 782.04(2), Florida Statutes, burglary with assault, in violation of section 810.02(2)(a), Florida Statutes, and attempted armed robbery, in violation of section 812.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes. In the instant petition, Parks contends after he was sentenced pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel while testifying in a deposition as a cooperating witness against his accomplice. Concluding Parks has failed to establish the manifest injustice necessary to warrant relief, we deny the petition.

BACKGROUND

In 1996, Parks was indicted for first-degree murder, burglary with assault, and attempted armed robbery. He subsequently entered into a written plea agreement with the State. Pursuant to the terms, Parks pled guilty to second-degree murder, burglary with assault, and attempted armed robbery, in exchange for a negotiated sentence of twenty-five years in state prison. Parks further agreed to testify as a cooperating witness in the prosecution of his cohort, Rionne Ellery Jackson, consistent with the contents of his post-Miranda¹ statement to law enforcement. Specifically, he

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"agree[d] to give at any and all hearings, depositions, and trials, complete and detailed truthful statements identifying . . . Rionne Ellery Jackson as being the person with the firearm who shot the victim . . . All such truthful statements [were required] to be factually consistent with his sworn statement." Any material breach of the plea agreement endowed the State with "the right to move the Court to vacate the Defendant's sentence of twenty-five (25) years and sentence the Defendant to life in prison."

After Parks began serving his sentence, Jackson was arrested and charged with the murder. The State listed Parks as a witness, and Jackson's criminal defense attorney noticed him for deposition. At the beginning of the deposition, Parks requested counsel. Jackson's lawyer and the prosecutor initially agreed to recess the proceedings in order to apprise the trial court of the issue, but, ultimately, moved forward with the deposition. Parks was reluctant and combative, and repeatedly claimed to have little memory of the events surrounding the homicide. Although he was furnished with a copy of the plea contract and his sworn statement, he refused to implicate his "co-defendant as the shooter." Parks v. State, 863 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).

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Following the deposition, the State sought to declare Parks in violation of the plea agreement. The trial court found him in breach, vacated his twenty-five-year sentence, and resentenced him to life in prison.

Parks appealed the resentencing order and this court reversed, finding Parks was denied the right to conflict-free counsel. Parks v. State, 782 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). Upon remand, new counsel was appointed. Parks was again found in violation of the agreement and sentenced to a term of life. A direct appeal and ensuing collateral attacks on the judgment and sentence proved unfruitful. See Parks v. State, 252 So. 3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018); Parks v. State, 194 So. 3d 1034 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016); Parks v. State, 178 So. 3d 413 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015); Parks v. State, 151 So. 3d 1227 (Fla. 2014); Parks v. State, 126 So. 3d 352 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013); Parks v. State, 84 So. 3d 325 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012); Parks v. State, 68 So. 3d 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); Parks v. State, 963 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Parks v. State, 932 So. 3d 193 (Fla. 2006); Parks v. State, 940 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Parks v. State, 863 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Parks v. State, 812 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). The instant petition ensued.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

"Article I, Section 13 of the Florida Constitution mandates the availability of the writ of habeas corpus." 2 Fla. Prac., Appellate Prac. § 9:6

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(2019); see Art. I, §13, Fla. Const. "The great writ has its origins in antiquity and its parameters have been shaped by suffering and deprivation." Henry v. Santana, 62 So. 3d 1122, 1127 (Fla. 2011) (citation omitted). By way of the writ, courts are afforded a speedy method of conducting a "judicial inquiry into the cause of any alleged unlawful custody of an individual or any alleged unlawful, actual deprivation of personal liberty." Porter v. Porter, 60 Fla. 407, 410, 53 So. 546, 547 (1910).

Although "judicial review in the form of habeas proceedings serves as a backup plan" to guard against such erroneous deprivations, J.R. v. Hansen, 736 F.3d 959, 969 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted), the writ "may not be used to . . . raise issues which would be untimely if considered as a motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.850." Barnard v. State, 949 So. 2d 250, 251 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (citing Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236, 1245-46 (Fla. 2004)). Nevertheless, as Parks correctly urges, and we have previously held, "to prevent a manifest injustice and a denial of due process, relief may be afforded even to a litigant raising" an untimely or procedurally barred claim. Stephens v. State, 974 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (citations omitted); see Johnson v. State, 226 So. 3d 908, 910 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (Appellate courts have "inherent authority to grant a writ of habeas corpus to avoid incongruous and manifestly unfair results.") (citation

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omitted); Harris v. State, 12 So. 3d 764, 765 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) ("An appellate court should correct manifest injustice in habeas corpus proceedings.") (citation omitted). Thus, we turn to the merits of the petition on review.

I. Manifest Injustice

The term "manifest injustice" eludes judicial consensus or precise definition. Nonetheless, this "exceptionally narrow concept" envisions "more than just a clear and certain prejudice to the moving party, but also a result that is fundamentally unfair in light of governing law." Slate v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 3d 30, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Accordingly, in defining the term, "several courts have applied the Black's Law Dictionary definition, which states that 'manifest injustice' is an 'error in the trial court that is direct, obvious, and observable, such as a defendant's guilty plea that is involuntary or that is based on a plea agreement that the prosecution rescinds.'" In re Roemmele, 466 B.R. 706, 712 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2012) (quoting Manifest Injustice, Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999)). Others have determined the error must be "apparent to the point of being indisputable.'" Id. at 712 (citation omitted). These principles guide our analysis today.

II. Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel

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The right to effective assistance of counsel, as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Florida Constitution, is among those "immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government." Powell v. Alabama...