Parks v. West

• Decision Date: 17 June 1908
• Citation: 111 S.W. 726
• Parties: PARKS et al. v. WEST et al.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

111 S.W. 726

PARKS et al. v. WEST et al.

Supreme Court of Texas.

June 17, 1908.

Error from Court of Civil Appeals of Fifth Supreme Judicial District.

Action by J. W. Parks and others against R. C. West and others, trustees of the Independent School District of Mertens. There was a judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals (108 S. W. 466) affirming in part, and reversing and rendering in part a judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs bring error. Reversed and rendered.

R. S. Neblett, R. R. Owen, and Simkins & Simkins, for plaintiffs in error. McClelland & Prince, Morrow & Smithdeal, and Chas. L. Black, for defendants in error.

WILLIAMS, J.

The plaintiffs in error, who are resident citizens of Hill, Ellis, and Navarro counties in the territory called in the record the "Mertens Independent School District," owning lands and other property therein subject to taxation, brought this action to enjoin the defendants, the school trustees for the district, from issuing bonds thereof in the sum of $5,500 for the purpose of raising money for school purposes and from levying a tax upon the property in the district to pay the same. Several reasons were set up why the issuance of the bond and the levying of the tax should be restrained. Only one of them need be considered here, and it rests upon the following facts: The village of Mertens is situated wholly in Hill county, and the district is formed by including with it rural territory of which some is in Hill county, some in Ellis county, and some in Navarro county. We shall assume that the Court of Civil Appeals correctly held that the formation of such districts, composed of parts of several counties, has the sanction of the Legislature, in the acts of 1897 (Laws 1897, p. 45, c. 45), and of 1901 (Laws 1901, pp. 28, 29, c. 24), amending article 616a, Rev. St. 1895, and that the Mertens district has met all the requirements of these statutes. We are, nevertheless, of the opinion that counsel for plaintiffs in error are correct in their contention that the Legislature has no authority under the Constitution thus to authorize the disregard of county lines in the formation of school districts. The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals very correctly states the rule by which the power of the Legislature is to be tested when it says: "The legislative department of a state government may make any law not prohibited by the Constitution of the state or that of the United States. Therefore, the rule is that in order for the courts to hold an act of the Legislature unconstitutional, they must be able to point out the specific provision which inhibits the legislation. If the limitation be not express, then it should be clearly implied." State of Texas v. Brownson, 94 Tex. 436, 61 S. W. 114. But we think the court fell into error when it assumed that the Constitution has imposed no limitations upon legislative action in the matter of creating school districts.

If the Constitution left the Legislature entirely free in providing for a system of public schools, or if it contained no provisions limiting the power to create school districts, or if it expressly granted the unrestricted power to create them, the conclusion of the Court of Civil Appeals would be the correct one. But the Constitution does not stop with the provision that the Legislature shall "make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public schools." It contains many limitations as well as express provisions, which, while conferring power to do some specified things, operate as denials of authority to do other things. Among the latter is the provision in the amendment of 1883: "And the Legislature may also provide for the formation of school districts within all or any of the counties of this state, by general or special law, without the local notice required in other cases of special legislation and may authorize an additional annual ad valorem tax to be levied and collected within such school districts for the further maintenance of public school buildings therein; provided, that two-thirds of the qualified property taxpaying voters of the district voting at an election to be held for that purpose shall vote such tax, not to exceed in any one year twenty cents on the one hundred dollars valuation of the property subject to taxation in such district, but the limitation upon the amount of district tax herein authorized shall not apply to incorporated cities or towns constituting separate and independent school districts." Article 7, § 3. Of this amendment it was said in the case of State v. Brownson, 94 Tex. 439, 61 S. W. 115: "Four Legislatures had assembled under the Constitution when this amendment was submitted to the popular vote and it seems obvious that, when submitted, it was considered that under the then existing limitations upon the Legislature with reference to the public schools, the varied needs of special localities could not be met, and that the purpose of the provision quoted was to give the Legislature a free hand in establishing independent school districts." It was further said in that opinion: "The present Constitution as originally adopted, with but few exceptions, gave the Legislature unlimited power over the distribution and management of the school fund" (page 439 of 94 Tex., and page 115 of 61 S. W.)—which is true; but it is not true that the Constitution gave or has ever given the Legislature unlimited power to levy or to authorize the levy of taxes to provide the school fund. On the contrary, the Constitution has, itself, said what the fund should consist of and how it may be raised, and the amendment of 1883, part of which is quoted above, made provision in addition to that which had previously existed for the purpose of increasing the fund, and granted the power to authorize local taxation in the school districts to be formed as provided for. While it may be true that before that amendment was adopted the Legislature had power to provide for the application of the school fund in localities as it should deem best, it does not follow that it had power to impose other school taxes, either generally or locally, than those specified in the Constitution.

In the Brownson Case the court was considering the question whether or not the territory in an incorporated city or town could be included with other territory in an independent district formed for school purposes only, and this question was answered affirmatively. There was no question as to including territory of more than one county, and, in saying that the Legislature was given a free hand the court had no reference to the question. The language first quoted from that opinion shows that the court regarded the provision for the creation of school districts and investing them with the power of local taxation as intended to meet the varied needs of localities, which could not be met under the "then existing limitations." The amendment was adopted for the purpose of supplying a power which, it was assumed, the Legislature did not possess without it. This assumption doubtless arose from the fact that the Constitution undertook to provide and define specifically the sources from which was to be derived the revenue for the support of the schools, in such manner, it was thought, as to exclude the power the Legislature otherwise would have had to provide others by local taxation. Hence the power was given to make further provision than the Constitution, itself, made, by forming districts and investing them with the power of taxation to the extent prescribed. The language of the amendment is pregnant with the thought that it grants a power that did not, under the Constitution, exist without it. It is to authorize "an additional tax * * * for the further maintenance of public free schools." Being of this character, it is a provision which authorizes the doing of the prescribed things in the way defined and not otherwise. It is a rule for the construction of constitutions,...