Parley v. Parley

• Decision Date: 08 October 2002
• Docket Number: (AC 21349)
• Citation: 72 Conn. App. 742,807 A.2d 982
• Parties: GAIL A. PARLEY v. JON A. PARLEY.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

72 Conn. App. 742

807 A.2d 982

GAIL A. PARLEY v. JON A. PARLEY.

(AC 21349)

Appellate Court of Connecticut

Argued June 6, 2002

Officially released October 8, 2002

Lavery, C.J., and Foti and Mihalakos, Js.

Jon A. Parley, pro se, the appellant (defendant).

Daniel H. Kennedy, Jr., for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

MIHALAKOS, J.

The defendant, Jon A. Parley, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dissolving the parties' marriage. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) ordered him to obtain life insurance to secure the court's alimony order and (2) distributed the marital home in that the court (a) excluded evidence of a written contract, (b) awarded to the plaintiff a credit in the amount of $60,000 and (c) failed to provide specific figures in its financial orders.¹ We reverse the judgment of the trial court as to its financial orders only and remand the matter to that court for a new trial as to the financial matters.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our consideration of the defendant's claims on appeal. The parties were married on August 10, 1979. Five children were born to the marriage, two of whom reached the age of majority prior to the dissolution action. On April 20, 1999, the plaintiff, Gail A. Parley, brought an action seeking dissolution of the marriage, claiming that it had irretrievably broken down.

The court entered orders regarding property distribution, alimony, child support and other miscellaneous matters. As part of the dissolution decree, the court ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff alimony in the amount of $50 per week. At the time of the dissolution, the defendant held a life insurance policy. To secure the alimony payment, the court ordered the defendant to obtain additional life insurance. In addition, the court found that "[t]he parties have agreed to a value of the marital home in the amount of $142,000 ...." After ordering that the plaintiff receive a credit in the amount of $60,000 from the equity in the marital home, the court distributed the remaining equity in the property, 60 percent to the plaintiff and 40 percent to the defendant. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. Before addressing the defendant's claims on appeal, we first set forth our well settled standard of review. "Our standard of review in domestic relations cases is clear. We will not reverse a trial court's rulings regarding financial orders unless the court incorrectly applied the law or could not reasonably have concluded as it did.... A fundamental principle in dissolution actions is that a trial court may exercise broad discretion in awarding alimony and dividing property as long as it considers all relevant statutory criteria." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Askinazi v. Askinazi, 34 Conn. App. 328, 330-31, 641 A.2d 413 (1994). "In reviewing the trial court's decision under [an abuse of discretion] standard, we are cognizant that [t]he issues involving financial orders are entirely interwoven. The rendering of judgment in a complicated dissolution case is a carefully crafted mosaic, each element of which may be dependent on the other." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cordone v. Cordone, 51 Conn. App. 530, 532-33, 752 A.2d 1082 (1999).

"A reviewing court must indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of the trial court's action to determine ultimately whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.... This standard of review reflects the sound policy that the trial court has the opportunity to view the parties first hand and is therefore in the best position to assess all of the circumstances surrounding a dissolution action, in which such personal factors such as the demeanor and the attitude of the parties are so significant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Askinazi v. Askinazi, supra, 34 Conn. App. 331.

We now turn to the defendant's claims.

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly ordered him to obtain additional life insurance to secure his alimony obligation. Specifically, he argues that the court failed to inquire regarding the cost and availability of such insurance, and, therefore, improperly ordered him to obtain the insurance. We agree and vacate the order of the court regarding the additional insurance to secure the alimony payments.

"The ordering of security for alimony by a trial court is discretionary under [General Statutes § 46b-82]." Cordone v. Cordone, supra, 51 Conn. App. 534; General Statutes § 46b-82. The court's discretion, however, is not without limits. This court has held that the trial court must delve into certain matters before ordering a party to obtain life insurance to secure the payment of alimony. See Michel v. Michel, 31 Conn. App. 338, 341, 624 A.2d 914 (1993). Specifically, the court must engage in a search and inquiry into the cost and availability of such insurance. Id.; see also Lake v. Lake, 49 Conn. App. 89, 92, 712 A.2d 989, cert. denied, 246 Conn. 902, 719 A.2d 1166 (1998).

In the present case, the defendant held a life insurance policy at the time of the dissolution. The court ordered him to obtain additional life insurance to secure his alimony payments without inquiring into the cost or availability of the additional insurance. As in Michel, the court in the present case "has entered ... financial orders that may be inappropriate, that is, too high or too low depending on the funds required to obtain such [additional] insurance." Michel v. Michel, supra, 31 Conn. App. 341. Although the charged party in Michel held no insurance at the time of the dissolution; id., 340; we conclude that the same analysis is necessary in cases in which a party is ordered to obtain additional insurance. Because the court did not inquire as to the cost and availability of the additional life insurance, the court's order lacks a reasonable basis in the facts, and, therefore, constitutes an abuse of the court's discretion. Although every improper financial order in a dissolution of marriage action does not necessarily merit a reconsideration of all of the court's financial orders; see, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 249 Conn. 265, 277, 752 A.2d 1023 (1999); in this case, the court's order that the defendant obtain additional life insurance is interdependent with its other financial orders and may not be severed from them. We must, therefore, remand the case to the trial court on all financial matters.²

II

The defendant next claims that the court improperly distributed the marital home.³ Specifically, he argues that the court improperly (1) excluded evidence of a written contract, (2) awarded to the plaintiff a credit in the amount of $60,000 and (3) failed to provide specific figures in its financial orders. In essence, the defendant takes issue with the court's determination that moneys used to construct an addition to the marital home were a gift to the plaintiff from her parents, and he also takes issue with the financial orders flowing from that determination. We disagree. The following additional facts are relevant to our disposition of the defendant's remaining claims on appeal. In 1992, the parties constructed an addition to the marital home. The plaintiff's father, Elzidor Miner, funded the construction by writing several checks payable to the plaintiff that totaled $60,000. After the addition was complete, Miner and his ailing wife moved into the marital home.

At trial, Miner testified that the $60,000 was intended to be a gift solely to his daughter. In addition, the plaintiff's testimony mirrored that of Miner. During trial, the defendant repeatedly proffered a copy of a document and argued that it evidenced a contract between the parties, but the court denied its admission as a full exhibit each time it was proffered.⁴ On October 6, 2000, the court issued its ruling from the bench and found, inter alia, that the $60,000 was indeed a gift from Miner to his daughter.

The defendant now argues that the court improperly found that the $60,000 was a gift intended solely for the plaintiff rather than the consideration required by the contract he claims existed between the parties. We disagree. To address the defendant's claims regarding the marital home, we must first decide whether the court properly found that the $60,000 was a gift to the plaintiff rather than made in connection with a contract to which the defendant was a party.

As a preliminary matter, we first address whether the court abused its discretion in excluding from evidence a copy of the purported contract. The defendant argues that the document was admissible because it was relevant to the determinations regarding the acquisition of assets. We decline to review his claim.

Pursuant to Practice Book § 61-10, "[i]t is the responsibility of the appellant to provide an adequate record for review...." The defendant has failed to provide this court with a complete copy of the relevant transcripts. The transcripts that the defendant did provide are devoid of the court's decision and explanation regarding the exclusion of the purported agreement.

"Our role is not to guess at possibilities, but to review claims based on a complete factual record developed by a trial court.... Without the necessary factual and legal conclusions furnished by the trial court... any decision made by us respecting [the defendant's claims] would be entirely speculative." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Duteau, 68 Conn. App. 248, 254, 791 A.2d 591, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 939, 835 A.2d 58 (2002). Because this court does not have before it the reasons for the exclusion of the agreement, we decline to review the defendant's claim that the exclusion was an abuse of discretion.

We now turn to whether the $60,000 was a gift intended solely for the plaintiff. "A gift is the transfer of property without consideration.... To make a valid gift inter...