Parmater v. Amcord, Inc.

• Citation: 699 So.2d 1238
• Parties: Mary C. PARMATER, as Administratrix of the Estate of Nancy Champion, Deceased, et al. v. AMCORD, INC. AMCORD, INC. v. Mary C. PARMATER, as Administratrix of the Estate of Nancy Champion, Deceased, et al. 1940862, 1940922.
• Decision Date: 02 May 1997
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 1238

699 So.2d 1238

Mary C. PARMATER, as Administratrix of the Estate of Nancy Champion, Deceased, et al. v. AMCORD, INC.

AMCORD, INC. v. Mary C. PARMATER, as Administratrix of the Estate of Nancy Champion, Deceased, et al.

1940862, 1940922.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 2, 1997.

Rehearing Applications Denied July 18, 1997.

James J. Thompson, Jr., and Bruce J. McKee of Hare, Wynn, Newell & Newton, Birmingham; and Patrick W. Parmater, Minnetonka, MN, for appellants/cross appellees.

Harold A. Bowron, Jr., of Balch & Bingham, Birmingham, for appellee/cross appellant.

KENNEDY, Justice.

In September 1985, a civil aviation crash in Alabama killed William Champion, who was piloting the aircraft; his wife Nancy; and their three minor children. The decedents lived in Iowa. An Iowa court appointed Norwest Bank of Des Moines, N.A., as executor of the estate of Nancy Champion and appointed Delmar Champion as the administrator of the estates of the minor children.

In March 1987, these personal representatives of the estates ("the Iowa plaintiffs") filed a wrongful death action against Amcord, Inc., ¹ and others, in Iowa. In July 1991, without stating grounds, the Iowa court granted Amcord's motion to dismiss; in its motion Amcord had argued lack of jurisdiction and delay in service. The order dismissing Amcord contained no language indicating finality. In September 1991, the Iowa court was asked to approve a settlement among the parties. Mary C. Parmeter, an Iowa resident and Nancy Champion's mother, was given notice of the "application for approval of settlement." In October 1991, the Iowa court entered a final judgment, dismissing all parties with prejudice and approving the settlement among the parties.

In January 1992, the Iowa plaintiffs filed a document which read in full: "COME NOW the Plaintiffs and hereby dismiss the within cause of action with prejudice against all named defendants; defendants to pay the costs." Later in January 1992, Amcord and the Iowa plaintiffs executed a general release, which stated that Amcord was released from all claims arising out of or in any way connected with the deaths in the airplane crash occurring in September 1985, including, but not limited to, claims stated in the Iowa action that was dismissed with prejudice.

While the wrongful death action was proceeding in Iowa, Parmater had applied for and received appointment as a "special administrator" of the estates of her daughter Nancy and the three minor children. Specifically, in September 1987, the Iowa court appointed Parmater as "Special Administrator ... for the limited purpose of pursuing claims under the laws of Alabama in Alabama at no expense to this Estate." The order further stated that such "orders constitute an election of remedies on behalf of Mary C. Parmater and effectively foreclose and/or extinguish any interest, rights or claims she may have had in the cases pending in Iowa."

Parmater then filed this lawsuit in Alabama for the alleged wrongful death of the same decedents as in the Iowa action. Amcord moved to dismiss, and Parmater voluntarily dismissed Amcord and others in 1988. However, in January 1991, the complaint was amended to bring all of them back in. Amcord filed another motion to dismiss and added a ground for dismissal, contending that the Alabama action was barred by the action pending in Iowa. All motions were denied by the Alabama trial court in August 1991. After executing the aforementioned Iowa release in January 1992 Amcord filed an answer raising the defense of res judicata, and in February 1992, Amcord filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of res judicata. The Alabama trial court denied the motion, but allowed Amcord to petition this Court for permission to appeal on the res judicata issue. This Court denied the petition, and Amcord renewed its res judicata motion, which the Alabama trial court then granted. Parmater appealed from the summary judgment in favor of Amcord, while Amcord cross-appealed from the trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction.

On appeal, Parmater contends that the Iowa settlement does not affect her ability to bring this wrongful death action against Amcord in Alabama.

At the outset we note that the authority of the Iowa court to appoint Parmater as a "special administrator," and the validity of the appointment, are not before this Court. Rather, assuming that the Iowa court did have authority to make such an appointment, the question before this Court is whether the settlement of the wrongful death action in Iowa precludes, under the doctrine of res judicata, another wrongful death action in Alabama based on a cause of action arising from the same nucleus of operative fact. ²

The Iowa wrongful death statute is identical to the Alabama statute insofar as it vests the claim solely in the personal representative for the benefit of the real parties in interest. Egan v. Naylor, 208 N.W.2d 915 (Iowa 1973). The Iowa personal representatives, after having been appointed by the Iowa court, had the authority to prosecute a wrongful death action in the State of Iowa under either the Iowa Wrongful Death Act or the Alabama Wrongful Death Act. Ala.Code 1975, §§ 6-5-410, 6-5-391. Furthermore, assuming jurisdiction, the representatives could have elected to bring the wrongful death action in Alabama. Hatas v. Partin, 278 Ala. 65, 175 So.2d 759 (1965). However, under both Alabama law and Iowa law, there ultimately can be only one recovery for the wrongful death; that fact raises the question whether the settlement of the Iowa wrongful death action by the Iowa plaintiffs is res judicata as to the wrongful death action filed in Alabama by Parmater.

The elements of res judicata are (1) a prior judgment on the merits, (2) rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) with substantial identity of the parties, and (4) with the same cause of action presented in both actions. Smith v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 653 So.2d 933 (Ala.1995); Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 566 So.2d 723 (Ala.1990). If these four elements are present, then...