Parr v. City of Seattle
| Decision Date | 21 November 1938 |
| Docket Number | 27189. |
| Citation | 84 P.2d 375,197 Wash. 53 |
| Parties | PARR et al. (ROUMM et al., Interveners v. CITY OF SEATTLE. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 2.
Action under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act to test the constitutionality of an ordinance of the City of Seattle relating to the licensing of certain so-called amusement devises, by Budd Parr and such other persons, firms, or corporations similarly situated, who might join as parties plaintiff, against the City of Seattle, a municipal corporation. Milton Roumm and another intervened. Judgment for the plaintiff and the interveners, and the defendants appeal.
Reversed.
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Chester B. Batchelor judge.
A. C Van Soelen, Corp. Counsel, and John A. Homer, Asst. Corp. Counsel, both of Seattle, for appellants.
Edward H. Chavelle and Cornelius C. Chavelle, both of Seattle, for respondents.
Lenihan & Ivers, of Seattle, amici curiae.
Plaintiff brought this action under the provisions of our uniform declaratory judgment act to test the constitutionality of an ordinance of the city of Seattle relating to the licensing of certain so-called amusement devices.
In his complaint plaintiff alleges, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, that they are the owners of certain amusement devices which are so constructed as to automatically make a direct payoff; that June 8, 1936, the city of Seattle enacted an ordinance relating to the use and operation of machine amusement devices, which ordinance contained a provision to the following effect
It was further alleged that the provision of the ordinance is invalid under the federal and state constitutions in that it violates the provisions of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the constitution of the United States, Article 1, § 10 of the constitution of the United States, U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 4, 14; art. 1, § 10; Article 1, § 3, Article 2, § 24, and Article 11, § 11 of the state constitution, and that the plaintiff's rights, status, and legal relationships are affected by the ordinance in that they are prohibited by the invalid ordinance from keepting, maintaining or operating their amusement devices.
The city answered admitting the passage of the ordinance, but denied that the same was invalid, and as an affirmative defense alleged that the amusement device or machine owned by the plaintiffs, as set forth in the complaint, is a gambling machine or device, or a machine or device which can be and is capable of being used for gambling.
J. S. Katz and Milton Roumm were by the court allowed to intervene in the action.
A trial was had to the court and judgment entered in favor of plaintiff and interveners to the effect that § 5 of the ordinance in question was invalid, arbitrary and void. Defendant has appealed.
At the outset we are faced with the question as to whether plaintiff properly instituted his proceeding in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the court under the provisions of our declaratory judgment statute.
The action was begun to test the constitutionality of an ordinance passed by the law making body of the city of Seattle. In order to secure a determination of the question presented it was necessary for the plaintiff to comply with the provisions of the act relative to the securing of jurisdiction of those parties named in the statute as having a right to defend the action.
Section 2, chapter 113, Laws of 1935, p. 305, Rem.Rev.Stat. (Sup.) § 784-2, which gives the right to test the validity of a municipal ordinance or franchise, is as follows: 'A person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.'
Section 11 of the act, p. 307, Rem.Rev.Stat. (Sup.) § 784-11 defining the parties necessary to be...
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