Parras v. Standard Oil Co.

Decision Date16 December 1953
Docket NumberNo. 33465,33465
Parties, 52 O.O. 206 PARRAS v. STANDARD OIL CO.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The mere happening of an accident gives rise to no presumption of negligence, and where one is accidently injured while he is a business guest upon the premises of another, the burden is upon the person injured to show negligence upon the part of such other before he can recover damages from such other.

2. An inference of negligence can arise only upon the proof of some fact from which such inference can be reasonably drawn and it can never arise from mere guess, speculation, or wishful thinking.

On January 12, 1951, appellee, Sam Parras, hereinafter designated plaintiff, instituted in the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County an action in tort against appellant, The Standard Oil Company, hereinafter designated defendant.

Plaintiff alleges in his petition the corporate capacity of defendant, that it operates a filling station in Canton, and that on October 16, 1950, defendant, through its agent, contracted to grease plaintiff's automobile.

Defendant's agent was unable to properly grease the car because of the condition of the fittings at the points which needed greasing, and, after the hoist holding the car was lowered, defendant's agent told plaintiff to drive the car out of the lubritorium. As plaintiff stepped onto the hoist to get into the car, he stepped into a shippery foreign substance, which caused him to fall on the running board and into his car, which fall resulted in various injuries to him.

Plaintiff claims that defendant was negligent in that it placed, or permitted to remain, some foreign substance in such a manner and place as to cause injury to plaintiff, and that it failed and neglected to exercise ordinary care in apprizing plaintiff of the danger.

In its answer defendant admits its corporate capacity, its ownership and operation of the filling station, and that it contracted to grease plaintiff's automobile; denies the other allegations of plaintiff's petition; and charges plaintiff with contributory negligence and assumption of risk.

In his reply plaintiff denies any negligence or assumption of risk on his part.

Upon the trial, plaintiff was the only witness as to how the accident occurred. He testified that he went to defendant's gasoline station to have his automobile greased, and that he drove his car onto a hoist in the lubritorium, there being two hoists in such room. After the car was on the tracks of the hoist, it was elevated about five feet, and plaintiff went out of the room to smoke and to wait until the end of the greasing job. After about five minutes, defendant's agent called plaintiff inside and told him that the grease would not go into the fittings and that he, the agent, could not grease the car. Thereupon plaintiff told defendant's agent not to grease the car but to put some oil in the brakes, which was done after the hoist holding the car was lowered. Defendant's agent then told plaintiff to drive the car away and plaintiff proceeded to step onto the track of the hoist and in doing so slipped and fell over the running board and into the car. As to what caused his fall, plaintiff testified that he observed something on the hoist, and that he could not tell what it was, whether it was grease or oil, as his only knowledge was that it was wet. There is no evidence as to how this substance came to be on the hoist or how long it had been there, or that anyone knew that it was there.

At the close of plaintiff's evidence, the court sustained defendant's motion for a directed verdict.

Judgment was entered on the verdict, and plaintiff's motion for a new trial was overruled.

An appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas and remanded the cause for a new trial.

The cause is before this court upon the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

McAfee, Grossman, Taplin, Hanning, Newcomer & Hazlett, Cleveland, and Day, Cope, Ketterer, Raley & Wright, Canton, for appellant.

Fred Elias George and James V. Armogida, Canton, for appellee.

STEWART, Judge.

The sole question before us is whether the Court of Common Pleas was justified in directing a verdict for the defendant.

It is axiomatic that in the solution of such a question all the evidence submitted must be given an interpretation most favorable to the plaintiff, including not only direct or positive evidence but also any reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom. Under such a proper and strict formula, we are unable to see what there was to submit to the jury in the...

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