Parrish v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 08 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 13-cv-1054-JPG-SCW |
| Parties | CECIL A. PARRISH, Plaintiff, v. THE BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
This matter comes before the Court on the motion for summary judgment filed by defendant The Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company ("BNSF") (Doc. 29). Plaintiff Cecil A. Parrish has responded to the motion (Doc. 32), and BNSF has replied to that response (Doc. 33). Parrish asks the Court to strike BNSF's response or, in the alternative, for an extension of time to file his response (Doc. 34). In this case, Parrish alleges that BNSF is liable under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., for an injury he incurred on April 12, 2013, while working for BNSF.
As a preliminary matter, Parrish's motion to strike contains a substantive response to BNSF's argument in its reply brief that Parrish's response was untimely. As such, it is a sur-reply brief, which is not allowed under any circumstances. See Local Rule 7.1(c). Accordingly, the Court will strike Parrish's motion to strike (Doc. 34).
Nevertheless, the Court rejects BNSF's timeliness argument. BNSF asks the Court to disregard Parrish's response because it was late. BNSF filed its summary judgment motion on September 23, 2014, and Parrish filed his response on October 27, 2014, thirty-four days later. However, the response was not, in fact, late. It is true the Local Rule 7.1(c) allows a party thirtydays to respond, but that thirty days runs from the date of service, not the date offiling. When the date of service triggers a response period, three extra days are added to the response period under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(d) when service is made electronically. So it appears the response period expired on October 26, 2014. However, since October 26, 2014, fell on a Sunday, the response period actually expired the following day, October 27, 2014, the day Parrish filed his response. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C). For these reasons, the Court finds Parrish's response was timely.
The Court now turns to the substance of BNSF's summary judgment motion.
Summary judgment must be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Spath v. Hayes Wheels Int'l-Ind., Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2000). A court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Chelios v. Heavener, 520 F.3d 678, 685 (7th Cir. 2008); Spath, 211 F.3d at 396.
The initial summary judgment burden of production is on the moving party to show the Court that there is no reason to have a trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 2013). Where the nonmoving party carries the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden of production in one of two ways. It may present evidence that affirmatively negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's case, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), or it may point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the nonmoving party's case without actually submitting any evidence, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-25; Modrowski, 712 F.3d at 1169. Where the moving party fails to meetits strict burden, a court cannot enter summary judgment for the moving party even if the opposing party fails to present relevant evidence in response to the motion. Cooper v. Lane, 969 F.2d 368, 371 (7th Cir. 1992).
In responding to a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party may not simply rest upon the allegations contained in the pleadings but must present specific facts to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-26; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57; Modrowski, 712 F.3d at 1168. A genuine issue of material fact is not demonstrated by the mere existence of "some alleged factual dispute between the parties," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, or by "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists only if "a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [nonmoving party] on the evidence presented." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
Viewed in Parrish's favor, the admissible evidence establishes the following relevant facts for the purpose of the pending summary judgment motion.
Parrish worked for BNSF as a conductor. On April 12, 2013, he was working as the yard foreman of a BNSF crew at a Gilster-Mary Lee ("GML") factory that was preparing to pull rail cars out of the GML yard. In order to pull the cars out, they had to be coupled with a locomotive. Coupling involves aligning a drawbar on the railcar coupler and a drawbar on the locomotive coupler so that when they impact each other, the knuckles of the couplers automatically attach to allow the locomotive to pull the railcar.1
At the GML yard, coupling was somewhat complicated by the fact that the railroad trackwas curved. On a straight track, the railcar coupler and the locomotive coupler couple when they contact each other if both drawbars are aligned at a ninety degree angle from the end of the car, that is, in a center position, so that they meet head-on on impact. On a curved track, however, the drawbars on the couplers have to be pivoted to the left or right so that when they contact each other, they meet head-on even though the railcar and locomotive are not perfectly parallel due to the curve in the track. The drawbars are designed to pivot to accommodate such curves, although they may get stuck due to weight, age, rust, dirt or foreign objects.
On April 12, 2013, Parrish and his crew were preparing to couple a railcar to a locomotive on the GML curved railroad track. The first attempt at coupling did not work, so Parrish tried to adjust the positions of the drawbars.2 He was able to pivot the drawbar on the locomotive coupler to the appropriate position by hand but the drawbar on the railcar would not move. Parrish decided to use a tool to pry the railcar drawbar into the proper position for coupling with the locomotive. The tool was a piece of tubular steel about three feet long and an inch and a half in diameter that was kept at the GML facility and used on a regular basis by BNSF employees to move stuck coupler drawbars. Although the tool was not specifically designed to pry stuck drawbars into position and was not formally approved or authorized by BNSF, Parrish had been taught by BNSF to use the tool for that purpose when he began working at the GML yard, had used it for that purpose at least twenty times, had taught others to use the tool for that purpose, and had been observed by his supervisors without comment on numerous occasions using it for thatpurpose. BNSF did not provide Parrish any other tool or instruction on any other method to move stuck drawbars. Parrish had never had a problem using the tool prior to April 12, 2013.
Parrish placed one end of the tool between the drawbar and the coupler casing and pulled on the other end to try to pry the drawbar into the proper position. Instead, the tool came loose, causing Parrish to tip backwards. When he stepped back to catch himself, his foot slipped on the gravel surface and his ankle snapped sideways at a ninety degree angle to his leg. Substantial medical treatment so far has not been able to fix Parrish's ankle such that he can return to work.
BNSF had not received any complaint about the railcar coupler prior to April 12, 2013, and post-incident inspection did not reveal any defect in the coupler.
On October 8, 2013, Parrish filed this lawsuit. In the First Amended Complaint, Parrish brings claims under FELA, 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq, charging that BNSF was negligent (Count I) and negligent per se for violation of the Safety Appliance Act ("SAA"), 49 U.S.C. § 20301 et seq. (Count II). Count I centers on BNSF's alleged failure to provide him with a safe workplace and proper tools and equipment on the job. Count II centers on BNSF's allowing a railcar to be used that was not equipped with coupler that coupled automatically on impact. BNSF now asks the Court for summary judgment on the grounds that Parrish has no evidence it was negligent in any way, that Parrish's injury was foreseeable or that the couplers malfunctioned.
45 U.S.C. § 51. FELA's enactment stemmed from the belief that "justice demands that one who gives his labor to the furtherance of the [railroad] enterprise should be assured that all combining their exertions with him in the common pursuit will conduct themselves in all respects with sufficient care that his safety while doing his part will not be endangered." Sinkler v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 356 U.S. 326, 330 (1958). Accordingly, ...
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