Parrott v. Cary
Decision Date | 17 September 1964 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 8465. |
Citation | 234 F. Supp. 572 |
Parties | Forrest PARROTT, Plaintiff, v. William L. CARY et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
Landrum & Pierce, Richard Landrum, Zarlengo, Zarlengo & Seavy, and V. G. Seavy, Jr., Denver, Colo., for plaintiffs.
Donald J. Stocking, Regional Administrator, Joseph F. Krys, Asst. Regional Administrator, Edward V. Ahern, Securities and Exchange Commission, Denver, Colo., Philip A. Loomis, Jr., General Counsel, John A. Dudley, Special Counsel, and Michael Joseph, Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D. C., for defendant.
This matter is before the Court on defendant's motion to dismiss the Supplemental Second Amended Complaint for lack of jurisdiction, failure to exhaust administrative remedies and failure to show irreparable injury as is required for the granting of the injunctive relief sought in plaintiff's two claims. Defendant has submitted a memorandum brief supporting its position; plaintiff has filed none.
The legislative purpose of this recently adopted section was elaborately discussed in McEachern v. United States, 212 F.Supp. 706, 712 (D.C.S.C.1963), affirmed in part, vacated in part on other grounds and remanded 321 F.2d 31 (4 Cir., 1963). This purpose was stated as being to limit jurisdiction thereby conferred upon district courts to compel Government officials and agencies to make a decision in discretionary matters only when no decision has been made at all. The Act does not intend to influence the substance of the discretionary decision in any manner.
Plaintiff contends that because broker-dealer W. Allen Raleigh has ceased doing business, the defendant is under a "duty" to cancel Raleigh's registration and terminate investigative activities involving plaintiff. It is this "duty" which supposedly gives this Court power to proceed under Section 1361 in this action.
The last sentence of 15 U.S.C. § 78o (b) allegedly creates this "mandatory duty," as plaintiff terms it in his complaint. That sentence is:
"If the Commission finds that any registered broker or dealer * * * is no longer in existence or has ceased to do business as a broker or dealer, the Commission shall by order cancel the registration or application of such broker or dealer."
Defendant has presented persuasive authority to show that this section is permissive, not mandatory. The word "shall" does not connote any imperative obligation. The Commission in its discretion may terminate proceedings or it may continue them even after the broker-dealer has ceased doing business. Peoples Securities Co. v. Securities and Exchange Comm., 289 F.2d 268 (5 Cir., 1961) clearly states the interpretation given to this section.
Supra, at 275.
Therefore, it would seem that the defendant is under no duty to terminate the proceedings involving the...
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