Parrott v. Gourdin
| Decision Date | 15 November 1944 |
| Docket Number | 15691. |
| Parties | PARROTT v. GOURDIN et al. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
F R. Hemingway, of Kingstree, and John I. Cosgrove, of Charleston, for appellants.
Henry E. Davis, of Florence, for respondent.
This action involves the validity of Act No. 512 of the 1944 Acts of the General Assembly. 43 St. at Large, page 1414.
The Act creates "for and in behalf of Williamsburg County" a commission to be known as "the Williamsburg County Aeronautics Commission." It consists of three members who are required to be residents of Williamsburg County and are appointed by the Governor on the recommendation of the members of the General Assembly from that County. One member of said Commission must also be recommended by the Mayor of the Town of Kingstree in said County. The Commission is empowered "to acquire by grant, purchase, lease condemnation, or otherwise, real property and rights of way for air port and aeronautical purposes, and to so acquire approaches and obstruction rights in the matter of air port and aeronautical purposes"; "to receive by gift or donation monies and other property to be used by it in carrying out the purposes of this Act"; "to lease to the United States of America or to any agency thereof any and all of the property and rights acquired by said Commission under the provisions of this Act, or under the provisions of any other Act, statute or law"; and "to enter into agreements with the United States of America or any agency thereof relative to the establishment, operation and maintenance of an Air Port and Aeronautical Field in said County." The Act further provides:
Under the terms of the Act, the Commission and the Treasurer of Williamsburg County are authorized to borrow a sum not exceeding $25,000, payable over a period of two years, the proceeds of which are to be used by the Commission in carrying out the terms of the Act. The Act declares that the notes evidencing such loan shall be binding obligations of said County, to the payment of which the full faith, credit and taxing power are pledged, and the Auditor is directed to annually levy a sufficient tax upon the taxable property of said County to pay the interest and the principal of said notes as they mature. The Act further declares that "it is the intent of this legislation that the said Commission shall act for and in behalf of said County."
This action was instituted by respondent, as a freeholder and taxpayer of the County of Williamsburg, in behalf of himself and others similarly situated, for the purpose of having said Act declared unconstitutional and enjoining the Commission from exercising the powers therein conferred. The validity of the Act is challenged in the complaint on two grounds. It is contended (1) that it was improperly enacted in that it did not receive three readings on three several days in each branch of the General Assembly, as required by Article 3, Section 18, of the Constitution; and (2) that under Section 6, Article 10, of the Constitution, the General Assembly did not have the power to authorize the incurring of County obligations and the levying of a tax for the purposes stated in the Act. Appellants deny that the Act is invalid in any particular and in their answer allege that an agreement had been made by the County with the Federal Government whereby the Government would construct a modern airport in the County, costing approximately $600,000, upon the condition that the land for such airport was provided by the County; that the Town of Kingstree had agreed to contribute to the cost of the acquisition of the land in return for an interest in the airport; that the Act was passed to provide an appropriate agency with authority and power to deal with the Federal Government; and that the title to said airport would be vested in the Commission and possession delivered to it at the expiration of its use for military purposes, whereupon it would be used as a public airport. The answer further sets out in great detail the various benefits which it is claimed would accrue to the County on account of the construction and operation of said airport.
The case was heard on its merits in the Court below upon the pleadings and certain documents offered in evidence. The trial Judge held that the Act was properly enacted, but that it was unconstitutional in that it contravened Article 10, Section 6 of the Constitution, and issued a permanent injunction in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. From this order both parties have appealed, appellants from that portion of the order declaring the Act unconstitutional as violating Article 10, Section 6 of the Constitution and respondent from the holding of the trial Judge that the Act was lawfully passed.
We shall first discuss the exception of respondent. There was offered in evidence portions of the journals of the House and Senate to the effect that a bill was amended by striking out all after the enacting words and inserting in lieu thereof the Act in question. Apparently respondent offered this evidence for the purpose of showing that the Act in question was not read three times in each branch of the General Assembly. Appellants introduced in evidence a certified copy of the Act and a certificate of the Secretary of State showing that the Act received three readings on as many days in each branch of the General Assembly, as evidenced by the signatures of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House; was duly ratified, approved by the Governor, and the Great Seal of the State affixed thereon. Under these circumstances, the "enrolled bill" rule applies and the trial Judge properly held that the journals could not be used to impeach the Act. State ex rel. Hoover v. Town Council of Chester, 39 S.C. 307, 17 S.E. 752; State ex rel. Richards v. Moorer, 152 S.C. 455, 150 S.E. 269; State ex rel. Coleman v. Lewis, 181 S.C. 10, 186 S.E. 625; Brailsford v. Walker, Mayor, et al., S.C., 31 S.E.2d 385. Respondent contends that the application of the "enrolled bill" rule constitutes a denial of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. No case is cited to support such contention and we think it is clearly untenable.
The first question raised by appellants is whether the purposes for which the proceeds of the notes mentioned in the Act are to be expended are among those enumerated in Article 10, Section 6 of the Constitution, the pertinent portion of which is as follows: "The General Assembly shall not have power to authorize any county or township to levy a tax or issue bonds for any purpose except for educational purposes, to build and repair public roads, buildings and bridges, to maintain and support prisoners, pay jurors, County officers, and for litigation, quarantine and court expenses and for ordinary County purposes, to support paupers, and pay past indebtedness."
Appellants contend that within the contemplation of this section of the Constitution (a) an airport is an integral part of a public road or highway system and the levying of taxes to acquire land for same is an appropriate exercise of the power to authorize a county to levy taxes "to build and repair public roads," (b) an airport is a "public building," and (c) the expenditure of funds for an airport is for an "ordinary county purpose." We shall consider these contentions together.
Constitutional provisions of many of the states prohibit the Legislature from imposing taxes upon counties, cities, or other municipal corporations for corporate purposes, but vest in the Legislature the power to authorize such municipalities to levy taxes for such purposes. 51 American Jurisprudence 417. The problem of determining with precision what constitutes a corporate purpose within the purview of such constitutional limitations has frequently been a difficult one and a source of much controversy. See extensive annotation in 46 A.L.R. beginning on page 609 and the supplemental annotation in 106 A.L.R. p. 906. Our Constitution of 1868, Article 9, Section 8, provided that the corporate authorities of counties and municipalities may be vested with power to assess taxes "for corporate purposes." During the era of railroad construction in the last century when many counties undertook in one way or another to aid in the building of railroads to promote the general economic welfare of their inhabitants, there was much controversy as to whether such aid constituted a corporate purpose. The cases from various jurisdictions are reviewed in the annotation in 46 A.L.R., beginning on page 728. Many Courts held that railroads were but improved highways and on this theory upheld such financial aid to railroads. Our own cases on this question, under the above section of our Constitution of 1868, are reviewed by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Folsom v. Township of Ninety-Six, 159 U.S. 611, 16 S.Ct. 174, 40 L.Ed. 278. With the development of aviation, the Courts of many jurisdictions in recent years have been called upon to determine whether the establishment and maintenance of a public airport is a corporate purpose and they appear to hold rather uniformly that such expenditure does constitute a corporate purpose. 6 American Jurisprudence 12. The cases from various...
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