Parsons v. Arizona
| Decision Date | 23 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 13-0718-PHX-RCB (JFM),CV 13-0718-PHX-RCB (JFM) |
| Parties | John James Parsons, Plaintiff, v. State of Arizona, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Plaintiff John James Parsons, who is confined in the Fourth Avenue Jail in Phoenix, Arizona, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint (Doc. 1) and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). Plaintiff has also filed a request ("Motion") for the Court to refer to him as "John: of the Parsons family" and to order the jail where he is incarcerated to provide legal materials. (Doc. 5.) The Court will deny Plaintiff's Motion and dismiss the Complaint with leave to amend.1
Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The Court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The statutory fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month'sincome each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula.
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
A pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, "it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.
"[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff's specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there are other "more likely explanations" for a defendant's conduct. Id. at 681.
But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts must "continue to construe pro se filings liberally." Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,342 (9th Cir. 2010). A "complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] 'must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)).
If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The Court should not, however, advise the litigant how to cure the defects. This type of advice "would undermine district judges' role as impartial decisionmakers." Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 n.13 (). Plaintiff's Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, but because the Complaint may possibly be saved by amendment, the Court will dismiss the Complaint with leave to amend.
Plaintiff alleges one count in his Complaint—that his "rights as a sovereign freeman" have been violated. (Doc. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff asserts this claim pursuant to the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff names as Defendants the State of Arizona and Governor Jan Brewer, the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office ("MCSO") and Sheriff Joe Arpaio, the Arizona Department of Public Safety and its "Peace Officers," and the City of Mesa Police Department and its "Peace Officers." (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff does not allege any facts connecting any particular Defendant(s) to an alleged violation of his rights. Plaintiff merely claims he was (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff seeks an "acquit[t]al of all charges," the return of his property, and $500,000 in damages. (Id. at 4.)
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on the court-approved form for prisoner civil rights complaints, and he asserted that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Because Plaintiff seeks relief against persons allegedly acting under color of state law, the Court construes the Complaint as brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979) (); see also Buckley v. City of Redding, 66 F.3d 188, 190 (9th Cir. 1995) ().
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that (1) the conduct about which he complains was committed by a person acting under the color of state law and (2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). A plaintiff must also allege that he suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976).
Plaintiff names the State of Arizona and the Arizona Department of Public Safety as Defendants. Ordinarily, under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, neither a state nor a state agency may be sued in federal court without its consent. Pennhurst Sate Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Further, neither the State of Arizona nor any State agency is a "person" within the meaning of § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (). For both reasons, the State of Arizona and the Arizona Department of Public Safety will be dismissed as Defendants in this case.
Plaintiff also sues Arizona Governor Brewer. Eleventh Amendment immunity bars suit for damages against Brewer in her official capacity for violations of federal law, but does not bar suit for declaratory or injunctive relief against her. See Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Brown, 674 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2012). However, an "individual state official sued 'must have some connection with the enforcement of the act.'" Id. (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908)). Further, "that connection 'must be fairly direct; a generalized duty to enforce state law or general supervisory power over persons responsible for enforcing the challenged provision will not subject an official to suit.'" Id. (quoting L.A. County Bar Ass'n v. Eu, 979 F.3d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1992)).
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts connecting Brewer with the enforcement of any act. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against her and she will be dismissed.
Plaintiff sues the City of Mesa Police Department. A municipal police department is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983. See, e.g., Petaway v. City of New Haven Police Dep't, 541 F. Supp.2d 504 (D. Conn. 2008); Pahle v. Colebrookdale Twp., 227 F. Supp.2d 361 (E.D. Pa. 2002). However, a municipality is a "person" for purposes of § 1983, i.e., a municipality such as a city or county, may be sued. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). To state a claim against a municipality under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that his constitutional rights were violated pursuant to a policy or custom of the municipality. Cortez v. County of Los Angeles, 294 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91); Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989)). Thus, a municipality may not be sued solely because an injury was inflicted by one of itsemployees or agents. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, a § 1983 claim against a municipal defendant "cannot succeed as a matter of law" unless a plaintiff: (1) contends that the municipal defendant maintains a policy or custom pertinent to the plaintiff's alleged injury; and (2) explains how such policy or custom caused the...
To continue reading
Request your trial