Parsons v. BD. CTY. COM'RS MARSHALL CTY., KAN.

• Decision Date: 16 December 1994
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 94-2178-GTV.
• Citation: 873 F. Supp. 542
• Parties: Donald PARSONS, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF MARSHALL COUNTY, KANSAS, Kenneth Coggins, Marshall County Sheriff, and Scott Tormandson, Deputy Sheriff, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

873 F. Supp. 542

Donald PARSONS, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF MARSHALL COUNTY, KANSAS, Kenneth Coggins, Marshall County Sheriff, and Scott Tormandson, Deputy Sheriff, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 94-2178-GTV.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

December 16, 1994.

William Scott Hesse, Myers, Pottroff & Ball, Manhattan, KS, for Donald Parsons.

Michael K. Seck, Kurt A. Level, Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, Overland Park, KS, for The Board of County Com'rs of Marshall County, Kan., Kenneth Coggins and Scott Tormandson.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

VAN BEBBER, District Judge.

This is an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging various constitutional violations. Defendants have filed a motion, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), to dismiss plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or in the alternative to dismiss the claims against the individual defendants on the basis of qualified immunity (Doc. 8). For the reasons that follow, defendants' motion to dismiss is granted.

I. Background

Plaintiff's complaint alleges that while being held at the Marshall County Jail plaintiff was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that "Marshall County Deputy Sheriff Scott Tormandson repeatedly and intentionally" told plaintiff that plaintiff's fiancée was "having sexual intercourse" with three different men. Complaint ¶ 7. Plaintiff alleges that these statements were not true. Id. He further alleges that the deputy sheriff's allegations caused plaintiff to become "very distressed," and that as a result, plaintiff "attempted to commit suicide on May 13, 1994, by slashing his wrists multiple times." Complaint ¶ 8. Plaintiff further alleges that he was taken to a nearby hospital where his wounds were treated. Complaint ¶ 9. He also alleges that he was denied proper medical treatment. Complaint ¶ 23.

Plaintiff's claims are presented in four counts, all of which appear to be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and are based upon alleged violations of his constitutional rights. In his first count plaintiff alleges that Deputy Sheriff Tormandson violated plaintiff's constitutional rights by subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment. Count II alleges the same constitutional violation by all defendants because they were "deliberately indifferent to the needs" of plaintiff when he was "driven to suicide by the jailers." Complaint ¶ 19. Plaintiff alleges in Count III that defendants Marshall County (presumably the Board of County Commissioners of Marshall County) and Sheriff Kenneth Coggins failed to follow their own policy, practice, and procedures in obtaining medical treatment for plaintiff and as a result plaintiff was denied proper medical treatment. Finally, plaintiff claims that he was damaged because the "policies, practices and procedures of Marshall County and Sheriff Coggins are inadequate to meet the physical and psychological needs of Marshall County Jail prisoners." Complaint ¶ 25.

II. Legal Standards

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts in plaintiff's complaint and view them in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 118, 110 S.Ct. 975, 979, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990); Swanson v. Bixler, 750 F.2d 810, 813 (10th Cir.1984). All reasonable inferences must be indulged in favor of plaintiff, Swanson, 750 F.2d at 813, and the pleadings must be liberally construed. Gas-a-Car, Inc. v. American Petrofina, Inc., 484 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir.1973); Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). The issue in reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint is not whether plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claims. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The court may not dismiss a case for failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The statement need not be factually detailed but it "must give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, 78 S.Ct. at 103. Similarly, "allegations of conclusions or opinions are not sufficient when no facts are alleged by way of the statement of the claim." Bryan v. Stillwater Board of Realtors, 578 F.2d 1319, 1321 (10th Cir.1977). While a plaintiff is not required to precisely state each element of the claim, Rule 8(a) nevertheless requires minimal factual allegations on those material elements that must be proved to recover. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.1991). Finally, the court notes that it may not apply a "heightened pleading standard" — a standard more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) — in § 1983 cases alleging municipal liability. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993).

III. Analysis

To state a valid claim under § 1983 a plaintiff must allege that the defendants acted under color of state law to deprive him of a constitutional right. Ruark v. Solano, 928 F.2d 947, 949 (10th Cir.1991). The first step, then, is to determine which constitutional right is alleged to have been violated and then judge the validity of the complaint "by reference to the specific standard which governs that right." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989).

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to "cruel and unusual punishment," and his response to the motion to dismiss specifically invokes the Eighth Amendment. "The Eighth Amendment, applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits infliction of cruel and unusual punishments on those convicted of crimes." Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1569 (10th Cir.1991). The rights of pretrial detainees, "those persons who have been charged with a crime but who have not yet been tried on the charge," are not controlled by the Eighth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1871-72, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). Rather, for punishment imposed before a determination of guilt, "the pertinent constitutional guarantee is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 n. 40, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1413 n. 40, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977); see also Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1493 (10th Cir.1990) (holding that critical juncture for distinguishing between pretrial detainees, who are governed by the due process standard, and prisoners, who are governed by the Eight Amendment, is the time of conviction rather than sentencing).

It is not clear whether plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or a convict serving his sentence at the time of the incidents giving rise to his complaint. Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that he "was a resident of the Marshall County Jail awaiting trial on a criminal charge." Complaint ¶ 6. In his brief in response to defendants' motion to dismiss, however, plaintiff states that he was convicted of a crime and sentenced to the Marshall County Jail.

Plaintiff has not alleged any violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, and the court will treat plaintiff's complaint as raising solely Eighth Amendment claims. Under the circumstances of this case, plaintiff would be afforded no greater rights under the Due Process Clause. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1088, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986) (due process clause affords no greater protection that does Eighth Amendment for inmate alleging excessive use of force); Estate of Hocker v. Walsh, 22 F.3d 995, 998 (10th Cir.1994) (same constitutional standard applies to pretrial detainees as to convicted prisoners who allege denial of medical care).

Liberally construing plaintiff's complaint, the court can discern three separate bases for the alleged constitutional violations: (1) statements made by the deputy sheriff which led to plaintiff's psychological distress, (2) failure to protect plaintiff from his attempted suicide, and (3) failure to provide adequate medical care.

A. Statements by Deputy Sheriff

Although plaintiff's complaint alleges no physical force used against him, the statements¹ that Deputy Sheriff Tormandson made to plaintiff could conceivably constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The Seventh Circuit recently noted that "mental torture is not an oxymoron, and has been held or assumed in a number of prisoner cases ... to be actionable as cruel and unusual punishment." Thomas v. Farley, 31 F.3d 557 (7th Cir.1994) (citing cases).

The Tenth Circuit has recognized that psychological injury resulting from non-physical force could form the basis of a § 1983 claim based on a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1524 (10th Cir.1992). In Northington, the plaintiff, who had been serving a community corrections placement sentence, alleged that corrections officers stopped him on his way from the county jail to his community placement worksite, held a handgun to his head, threatened to kill him, and transported him back to the jail. Id. at 1522. Finding that plaintiff's alleged psychological injury resulting from the alleged death threat could constitute an Eighth Amendment violation, the Tenth Circuit panel reversed the district court's dismissal of the claim. Id. at 1524. In doing so, the court identified the basis of the potential Eighth Amendment violation as a use of excessive force. Id. at 1523.

Similarly, plaintiff in this case alleges a type of mental abuse by Deputy Sheriff Tormandson which led to psychological injury,...