Parsons v. Ford Motor Co.
| Decision Date | 21 June 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-01-00127-CV.,03-01-00127-CV. |
| Citation | 85 S.W.3d 323 |
| Parties | Harold PARSONS and Peggy Parsons, Appellants, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY and SRH, Inc. d/b/a Billy Young Isuzu; Billy Young Lincoln Mercury; and Billy Young Suzuki, Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Jerry Scarbrough, Killeen, for Appellant.
William L. Mennucci, Brown McCarroll, L.L.P., Austin, for Appellee.
Aric L. Stock, Touchstone, Bernays, Johnston, Beall & Smith, L.L.P., Dallas, for Appellee.
Before Chief Justice ABOUSSIE, Justices B.A. SMITH and PURYEAR.
This is an appeal from the granting of a no-evidence summary judgment in a product liability case. The case arises out of a fire that originated in Harold and Peggy Parsons's (the "Parsons") 1989 Lincoln Town Car when it was parked in their garage. The fire destroyed the Parsons's car and home. They sued the manufacturer and the dealer who five months before the fire allegedly replaced a defective part in the Town Car, subject to a safety recall. Eventually, the Parsons settled their claims against the dealer. The trial court entered a take-nothing summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer, Ford Motor Company.
We hold that, while there is evidence that the alleged defect was present at the time the car left the manufacturer's control, the Parsons's reliance on res ipsa loquitur cannot overcome the effect of the dealer's intervening repair and replacement of the allegedly defective part. Because the Parsons failed to otherwise present credible evidence that the defect was present at the time of the fire or that it caused the fire, we affirm the trial court's summary judgment.
On August 19, 1997, Peggy Parsons parked the Town Car in her garage and turned off the motor. Sometime later, the unattended car suddenly and spontaneously burst into flames. Mrs. Parsons tried in vain to extinguish the fire. It spread and eventually destroyed the Town Car, the garage, and the Parsons's home.
The couple purchased the 1989 Lincoln Town Car from Connell Chrysler Plymouth in Killeen, in March 1995. The car had 68,779 miles on the odometer at that time and was in "very good condition." The Parsons testified that "[w]e never had any after-market accessories and drove the car without incident until March 1997." Mr. Parsons took the car to Billy Young Lincoln Mercury in March 1997 to have the air conditioner repaired. In addition, he asked the dealer to replace the ignition switch as he had been advised to do by Ford in a recall letter the Parsons received several months earlier. No subsequent work was done to the car.
David Kingsley, the fire marshal, testified by affidavit that on August 18, 1997, he responded to a residential fire at the Parsons's home which engulfed the entire structure. The next day he conducted an investigation into the origin and cause of the fire. He "interviewed witnesses and examined the scene thoroughly." The fire damage was so extensive it prevented him from determining "the exact cause of the fire." However, he was able to rule out arson and concluded that "the fire had its origin in the 1989 Lincoln Town Car which was parked in the garage." He determined that the fire subsequently spread to the remainder of the garage and house. Only the fire marshal inspected the fire scene, including the car and the garage. The car was turned over to the Parsons's property insurer which disposed of it as salvage. Thus, the car was unavailable for examination and testing during this litigation.
The Parsons filed suit against Ford and SRH, Inc., a corporate entity doing business as Billy Young Lincoln Mercury. The suit alleged claims for negligence, deceptive trade practices, breach of warranties, and strict products liability. They alleged a general defect in the 1989 Lincoln Town Car because the design and manufacture of the car were peculiarly within the knowledge of Ford and in its exclusive control. They expressly pleaded the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and that on the day of the fire the ignition switch was "in the same condition it was in when it left the control of the Defendant, Ford Motor Company." They pleaded that the spontaneous fire was an occurrence which, in the ordinary course of events, would not have occurred without negligence on the part of the defendants and/or a defect in the car. The Parsons sought recovery for property damage, along with past and future mental anguish.
Both defendants urged no-evidence summary judgment motions which the district court granted and the Parsons appealed. Billy Young Lincoln Mercury did not file a brief in this Court, and the Parsons have now advised the Court that they settled their claims against the dealer, Billy Young Lincoln Mercury, leaving only their claims against Ford in issue. The Parsons filed the following documentary evidence in response to the motions.
Peggy Parsons testified by deposition that on the day of the fire, just before 8:00 p.m., she brought her grandson home from gymnastics class. She testified that the car had driven "slower, lumpy-bumpy." She parked it in the family's garage next to their other vehicle. When she got out of the car she smelled "a strange smell." She went into the house and told her husband that there was something wrong with the car, that "it smells." Then, the car exploded — she heard a "real scary, real huge blast." She went out and tried to extinguish the fire with a water hose to no avail. She then backed the other car out of the garage. She testified that flames were "coming up from the front of the car"; "I could see flames right next to the window, the front windshield, and the whole front of the car" was in flames.
In his deposition, Harold Parsons said that he was watching television when his wife came in and asked him to examine the car. He told her that he would "see about it after it cooled down" from being driven. Then he heard an explosion and his wife told him that "the car's afire" and to "call 911." He said he opened the door and saw the fire blazing. By affidavit he said, He also said that their home and all their possessions were destroyed by the fire.
In an effort to prove that the car remained in the same condition it was in when it left Ford's control, the Parsons submitted the affidavit of William D. Melton, the original owner of the car. He testified that he purchased the 1989 Lincoln Town Car new from Pavilion Lincoln Mercury in Austin in November 1989. He drove it until February 1995, when he traded it in for another Lincoln at A Plus Auto Sales in Killeen. At that time, the car had 68,762 miles on it. He testified that while he owned the car, he experienced only one problem, a "very minor air conditioning problem." He also said that "[n]o after market electrical components were installed in it" and that Ford never warned him of any dangers.
Gayle Skaggs, the owner of A Plus Auto Sales in Killeen, testified by affidavit that he purchased the Town Car in question from William Melton on February 27, 1995, and sold it to Connell Plymouth on March 1, 1995. While he owned it, the car was driven very little, if at all, and "no other changes were made to it." When he sold the car to Connell Chrysler Plymouth, it had only 68,762 miles on the odometer.
The Parsons submitted the title history of their vehicle showing the various owners and mileages at the time of each sale and the warranty repair history of the vehicle. The repair documents show repairs in 1989, 1990, and 1993, none of which appear to have been related to the ignition switch or the electrical system. Finally, the Parsons submitted a copy of Safety Recall 95S28, dated April 24, 1996, regarding all 1988 through 1993 Lincoln Town Cars. The recall is identified as "Safety Related," and states:
On some of the affected vehicles, a short circuit could develop in the ignition switch that could lead to overheating, smoke, and possibly fire in the steering column area of the vehicle. The condition may occur while the vehicle is in use or unattended. To correct this potential condition, the ignition switch will be replaced with a revised design switch. The wiring in the upper steering column area will also be inspected for the installation of any aftermarket electrical accessories. If an improper installation is noted you are to advise the customer of the need to have the condition corrected. These correction costs are not part of this recall.
The recall notice also states that "This switch is used on approximately 70% of affected vehicles."
The record contains several volumes of documents submitted by Ford to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") pursuant to that agency's investigations of vehicle fires originating in the steering columns or ignition assemblies of Ford vehicles. These documents include several hundred customer complaint reports compiled by Ford documenting spontaneous vehicle fires in 1989 Lincoln Town Cars. The Parsons also relied on these documents to defeat the summary judgment motions.
This is an appeal of a no-evidence motion for summary judgment granted under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i). A no-evidence summary judgment motion must specify the elements of the non-movant's claim or defense on which there is no evidence. Macias v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 316, 316-17 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). The burden then shifts to the non-movant to bring forth evidence raising a fact issue on the challenged elements. Id. The non-movant has the burden to present enough evidence to be entitled to trial. Lampasas v. Spring Ctr., Inc., 988 S.W.2d 428, 432 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
Review...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Alza Corporation v. Thompson, No. 13-07-00090-CV (Tex. App. 4/1/2010)
...Use Alza contends that appellees' claims are dependent on "proof of proper use of the patch," citing Parsons v. Ford Motor Co., 85 S.W.3d 323, 329-30 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, pet. denied) (citing Plas-Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 444-45 (Tex. 1989)). Alza contends that appe......
-
Schronk v. City of Burleson
...(3) made the product unreasonably dangerous; and (4) was a producing cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Parsons v. Ford Motor Co., 85 S.W.3d 323, 329 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied). 23. A claim that a drug or medical device is “misbranded” is in essence a marketing defect claim. See, e......
-
Gonzalez v. Bayer Healthcare Pharm., Inc.
...the product was unreasonably dangerous; and (4) that it was a producing cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Parsons v. Ford Motor Co., 85 S.W.3d 323, 329 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002) (citation omitted). A prescription drug product that is “properly prepared[ ] and accompanied by proper directionsa......
-
Schronk v. City of Burleson and Laerdal Medical Corp., No. 10-07-00399-CV (Tex. App. 7/22/2009)
...(3) made the product unreasonably dangerous; and (4) was a producing cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Parsons v. Ford Motor Co., 85 S.W.3d 323, 329 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied). 23. A claim that a drug or medical device is "misbranded" is in essence a marketing defect claim. See, ......