Parsons v. Grand Lodge A. O. U. W. Of Iowa

• Decision Date: 06 April 1899
• Parties: PARSONS v. GRAND LODGE A. O. U. W. OF IOWA.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

108 Iowa 6

78 N.W. 676

PARSONS

v.GRAND LODGE A. O. U. W. OF IOWA.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 6, 1899.

Appeal from district court, Blackhawk county; A. S. Blair, Judge.

Action at law upon a certificate of membership in the defendant company. Defendant admitted the issuance of the certificate, and that plaintiff is the beneficiary named therein, but denied all allegations of the petition. It further pleaded that plaintiff was not the legal wife of the assured, and that the insured falsely and fraudulently represented that she was his wife, whereas in truth he had another wife living, from whom he had not been divorced. Plaintiff replied that she was married to the assured in April of the year 1893, and that she had no knowledge that he was then married. She further pleaded that some months after her marriage she learned that Frank H. Parsons, the assured, had another wife living, but that she had been divorced some two years prior to Parsons' death. She further pleaded that when she became beneficiary in the policy she was the bona fide wife of Parsons, and was a legal member of his family. Some other matters, in addition to a general denial, were also pleaded, which need not be more particularly noticed. The trial court directed a verdict for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.J. D. & C. Nichols, for appellant.

Mullen & Picket and D. E. & G. T. Lyon, for appellee.

DEEMER, J.

On the 15th day of October, 1892, the defendant, a mutual benefit association, issued a certificate of membership to Frank H. Parsons, in which Ada H. Parsons, who then bore the relationship to him of wife, was named as beneficiary. Thereafter, and on the 13th day of December, 1893, the assured directed and requested the defendant to change the beneficiary, and in this direction said: “And now authorize and direct such payment to be made to Mrs. Esther H. Parsons, bearing relation to myself of wife.” Thereupon, and on the 28th day of the last-mentioned month, the company issued a new certificate to Parsons, in which the beneficiary was named as “Esther H. Parsons, his wife.” At the time these certificates were issued, the law (Acts 21st Gen. Assem. c. 65, § 7) provided that no certificate should be issued to any person unless the beneficiary thereunder should be the husband, wife, relative, legal representative, heir, or legatee of the insured. The constitution of the association also provided that no certificate should be issued or made payable to any person not a member of the family or heir of the assured, and that, when a change of beneficiary was desired, the beneficiary under the new certificate must be a legal member of the family, or an heir at law of the member. Defendant contends that the evidence tended to show that the marriage between the assured and Esther H. Parsons was null and void because of prior marriage of the assured. As the allegations of the answer pleading prior marriage were denied by operation of law, the burden was on defendant to show that plaintiff was not the wife of the assured. The confession and avoidance contained in the reply did not obviate the necessity of such proof. Code, § 3577; Day v. Insurance Co., 75 Iowa, 694, 38 N. W. 113;Nichols v. Railroad Co. (Iowa) 62 N. W. 769;Schulte v. Coulthurst (Iowa) 62 N. W. 770. To prove the prior marriage, defendant introduced the direction first made by the assured to pay the amount to which he might be entitled to Ada H. Parsons, whom he described as his wife; a letter of the assured, in which he said there had been a mistake in his original certificate, and that it should read payable to Esther H., instead of Ada H.; letters in which he stated that Esther H. Parsons was his lawful wife, and that Mrs. Esther H. Parsons had only been his wife since December 2, 1893; and a statement made by him to an agent of the association, some time before the second certificate was issued, to the effect that he had procured a divorce from Ada Parsons in Chicago. The only other evidence bearing upon the question is that of plaintiff, in which she says she was not related to the assured in any other way than wife. We have already seen that the admissions in the reply cannot be considered. Whether or not they might have had probative force had they been introduced in evidence, we have no occasion to determine. Conceding, then, for the purposes of this case, that statements, oral and written, made by the assured prior to the time of the issuance of the certificate in question, are admissible in evidence, and that proof of a void marriage would defeat plaintiff's right of recovery, we find that the same kind of evidence adduced to sustain these propositions establishes the fact that the assured was divorced from his first wife prior to the time he received the second...